Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YJ29172, Stephanie M. Davis, Referee. Affirmed.
Patricia Winters, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and G. Tracey Letteau, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Dominique B. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, after a finding he committed second degree attempted robbery. The juvenile court placed appellant on probation with several conditions, including one requiring appellant to maintain satisfactory grades in school. On appeal, appellant contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the finding he committed attempted robbery; and (2) the condition of satisfactory grades is unconstitutional as to appellant. We hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. We further find the probation condition to be proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Prosecution Evidence
On July 5, 2006, at approximately 7:25 p.m., Heng Lam stood outside his doughnut store. As Mr. Lam was standing on the sidewalk, three boys approached him on bicycles. Minor L. stopped directly in front of him, appellant stopped to his left, and Minor R. stopped to Mr. Lam’s right. Minor L. asked Mr. Lam, “Do you have a dollar? Give me a dollar.” Appellant approached Mr. Lam and touched the pocket of Mr. Lam’s pants with his hands. Mr. Lam testified that appellant spoke to him at this time, but could not recall what the appellant said. Mr. Lam backed away from the boys and ran into the doughnut store. Minor L. dismounted his bicycle and ran after him. Appellant stood outside of the store during this time. Once he was inside the store, Mr. Lam asked his older sister for a telephone to call the police. He turned around and saw Minor L. clench his right fist, bend his right elbow, and make a punching motion across the front of Lam’s face. As Mr. Lam turned back away from him to call the police, Minor L. ran outside. Appellant and Minor L. mounted their bicycles and rode away with Minor R.
Defense Evidence
Appellant testified in his own behalf. Appellant, Minor L. and Minor R. were at a park prior to their arrest on July 5, 2006. They wanted to go to Taco Bell; however, they did not have money, so the three boys decided to “panhandle.” Appellant, Minor L., and Minor R. rode up to Mr. Lam on their bicycles. Minor L. stopped directly in front of Mr. Lam. Appellant was to the left of Mr. Lam, and Minor R. was on Mr. Lam’s right. All three boys were in a line directly in front of Mr. Lam.
Minor R. asked Mr. Lam for a dollar. Appellant testified that his intention was to ask Mr. Lam for a dollar and to leave. Appellant denied that he touched Mr. Lam in any way. Instead, he testified that when Mr. Lam said he did not have any money, appellant asked, “Can you at least check?” and pointed to Mr. Lam’s pocket. Mr. Lam then backed up and ran into the doughnut store. Minor R. ran into the store after Mr. Lam, while appellant remained on his bicycle outside. Appellant saw Mr. Lam with the phone in his hand, but did not hear Mr. Lam say anything about calling the police. Minor R. swung at Mr. Lam, but did not hit him. Minor L. called out, “Raul, come on” to Minor R. Minor R. left the store, and the three boys rode away. Neither appellant, Minor R., nor Minor L. used threatening language or raised their voices while speaking to Mr. Lam.
City of Hawthorne Police Officer Keith Chaffin testified on behalf of Minor L. Officer Chaffin spoke with Mr. Lam at approximately 7:30 p.m. on July 5, 2006 regarding the attempted robbery. Officer Chaffin took an initial statement from Mr. Lam about what had occurred. He then brought Mr. Lam and his sister to a location about a quarter mile away from the doughnut store where the three minors were detained for a field show-up. Officer Chaffin testified that during the field show-up, Mr. Lam stated that Minor R. rode his bike and stopped directly in front of Mr. Lam. Appellant and Minor L. were stopped somewhat behind Mr. Lam on either side, forming a triangle around him. According to Officer Chaffin, Mr. Lam stated during the field show-up that Minor R. first asked Mr. Lam for money. Officer Chaffin further testified that Mr. Lam claimed that appellant “started searching or like reaching out to search” Mr. Lam’s pockets. In addition, Mr. Lam initially stated that Minor L. was the boy who followed him into the store and tried to punch him.
The juvenile court found there was sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed attempted robbery. The court declared appellant a ward of the court and ordered appellant to complete one hundred hours of community service. Appellant was also ordered, among other probation conditions, “to try to get grades of C’s or above” in all of his classes.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Appellant Committed Attempted Second Degree Robbery
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to establish that he had an intent to rob Mr. Lam. Appellant argues the record shows an intent to do nothing more than “panhandling for money to go to Taco Bell, ” which is consistent with his own testimony. Appellant further contends that because Mr. Lam testified to believing it was normal for the minors to solicit him for money, he was not subjected to force or fear. Because an element of force or fear against the intended victim is required by Penal Code section 211, appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of attempted second degree robbery. We disagree.
All other statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted.
In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, “[We] must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) Juvenile appeals are subject to this same standard of review. (In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 726.)
Appellant is correct in stating that under section 211, some element of force or fear must be proved in order to establish the crime of robbery. To establish robbery under section 211, the People must prove the taking of personal property from the person or immediate presence of another by means of force or fear with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1058.) Attempted robbery, however, requires only that a defendant possess the specific intent to commit robbery and that he perform a direct overt act done toward the commission of the robbery. (People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 860.)
There was substantial evidence that the three minors were engaged in a joint effort to commit robbery. There was evidence that appellant approached Mr. Lam with Minor R. and Minor L., forming a triangle around him, and that one of the minors asked Mr. Lam for money. Though Mr. Lam told the three minors that he had no money, appellant advanced towards him and touched Mr. Lam’s left pants pocket with his hand. At this point, Mr. Lam became frightened and felt it necessary to back away from the boys and run into his store. Once inside his store, Mr. Lam used a telephone to immediately call the police. Given the totality of the circumstances, we find there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that appellant intended to permanently deprive Mr. Lam of his property. Further, by touching Mr. Lam and causing him to be afraid, appellant engaged in a direct, unequivocal action toward the robbery’s commission. Consequently, this evidence is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that appellant attempted to rob Mr. Lam.
Although appellant contradicted the prosecution’s evidence that the minors surrounded Mr. Lam and that he touched Mr. Lam’s pocket, it is the exclusive right of the trial court to determine the credibility of the evidence upon which a determination depends. (In re E.L.B. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 780, 788.) Therefore, in reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude there is substantial evidence supporting the finding that appellant committed second degree attempted robbery.
2. Requiring Appellant to “try” to Maintain a “C” Average was not Unconstitutional
Appellant contends that during the dispositional hearing, he was ordered to maintain grades of “C” or above in all of his classes as a condition of probation. Appellant argues this condition is fundamentally unfair, as there is no evidence to show that compliance with such a standard is within appellant’s capacity. Appellant is mistaken in his understanding of the academic standard set for him as a condition of his probation.
Appellant was ordered by the juvenile court to “[m]aintain satisfactory grades and attendance, and citizenship.” This condition arose from a standardized juvenile court form by which the court selects appropriate probation conditions from among a list of 46 restrictions. The term “satisfactory grades” has been defined to mean passing grades of a “D” or above in each graded subject. (In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1102.)
The court further instructed appellant to “try to get grades of C’s or above in all of [his] classes.” We do not find this statement to be a formal condition of probation arising from the juvenile court. Our reading of the record finds this instruction to be merely an effort by the court to urge appellant to push himself academically. Therefore, we leave intact the condition that appellant maintain “satisfactory” grades of “D” or above, in accordance with what we find to be the court’s intent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, J. SUZUKAWA, J.