A "rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable, because the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality." In re Doe, 90 Hawai'i 246, 251, 978 P.2d 684, 689 (1999) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted). The Circuit Court reasoned that

A "rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable, because the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality." In re Doe, 90 Hawai‘i 246, 251, 978 P.2d 684, 689 (1999) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted). The Circuit Court reasoned that it would be an "absurdity" to exclude the "serious offenses" of attempted second degree murder for Lafoga and accomplice to attempted second degree murder for Ines from extended term sentencing –– reasoning that the omission of attempted second degree murder from HRS § 706-661(1) could not have been purposeful "when the premise of extended terms are for the protection of the public."

When interpreting statutes, this court has previously held that "[t]he fundamental starting point is the language of the statute itself." In re Doe, 90 Hawai`i 246, 252, 978 P.2d 684, 690 (1999). Moreover, "where there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd or unjust result clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning."

In re Doe, 90 Hawai'i 246, 250, 978 P.2d 684, 688 (1999) (citation omitted). HRS § 587A-33(i) is not a jurisdictional statute. The Family Court's jurisdiction is set forth in HRS § 571-11(9) (Supp. 2021) and HRS § 587A-5.

A "rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable, because the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality." In re Doe, 90 Hawai‘i 246, 251, 978 P.2d 684, 689 (1999) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted). Construing the word "crime" with an ordinary meaning to include "violations" is consistent with legislative intent, and is a rational and reasonable interpretation of the statute.

The ICA concluded that interpreting the term "crime" in HRS § 831-3.2(a) to include violations is rational, reasonable, and consistent with legislative intent. 151 Hawai‘i at 320, 511 P.3d at 819 ("A ‘rational, sensible[,] and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable ....’ " (quoting In re Doe, 90 Hawai‘i 246, 251, 978 P.2d 684, 689 (1999) )). Hence, the ICA held that because Barker's harassment arrest resulted in a conviction for a violation, Barker does not meet the statutory expungement criteria.

151 Hawai'i at 320, 511 P.3d at 819 ("A 'rational, sensible[,] and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable . . . .'" (quoting In re Doe, 90 Hawai'i 246, 251, 978 P.2d 684, 689 (1999))). Hence, the ICA held that because Barker's harassment arrest resulted in a conviction for a violation, Barker does not meet the statutory expungement criteria.

The appellate courts of this jurisdiction have, in other settings, applied procedural due process protection only where an individual's rights are substantially affected. See In re Doe, 91 Haw. 147, 150, 981 P.2d 704, 707 (App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 90 Haw. 246, 978 P.2d 684 (1999) ("To require dismissal of a charge [on speedy trial grounds], it is necessary that[, inter alia,] the delay cause substantial prejudice to the accused's rights to a fair hearing[.]" (Internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted.));In re Doe, 62 Haw. 70, 74, 610 P.2d 509, 512 (1980) ("Due process requires that a youthful offender whose substantial rights would be affected by a family court order revoking probation and terminating the stay of a mittimus be furnished with due notice of the contemplated action, as well as a hearing."

"It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute." Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 339, 843 P.2d 668, 673 (1993) (quoting State v. Wallace, 71 Haw. 591, 594, 801 P.2d 27, 29 (1990) (quoting Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 215-16, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984))); see also Beneficial Hawaii, Inc., 96 Hawai`i at 309, 30 P.3d at 915; State v. Young, 93 Haw. 224, 236 n. 6, 999 P.2d 230, 243 n. 6 (2000); In re John Doe, Born on November 23, 1978, 90 Haw. 246, 250, 978 P.2d 684, 688 (1999). Thus, we must attempt to make sense of the City Council's inclusion of "trusts" within the definition of "lessees" and whether it evinces an intent to allow for the conversion of the leased fee interests of condominium units held in trust.

We are mindful of our duty to give effect to all parts of a statute whenever possible. See, e.g.,In re Doe, 90 Haw. 246, 250, 978 P.2d 684, 688 (1999) ("[c]ourts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute" (quoting State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Haw. 280, 289-90, 933 P.2d 617, 626-27, (1997) (some citations omitted))). Our interpretation of HRS § 706-670 does not run afoul of this principle.