Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a wardship order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. PJ40703, Fred J. Fujioka, Judge.
Teresa R. Barrera, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Eric E. Reynolds, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TURNER, P.J.
The minor, D.L., appeals from the October 18, 2007 order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placing him home on probation. On October 1, 2007, the minor admitted the misdemeanor battery allegation in a delinquency petition filed June 5, 2007. (Pen. Code, § 242, 243, subd. (a).) The minor had been previously placed home on probation for that offense. On October 1, 2007, the juvenile court sustained the allegation of a delinquency petition filed August 6, 2007, charging the minor with assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) On October 18, 2007, the juvenile court declared the assault with a deadly weapon to be a felony pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The minor argues that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings and he is entitled to predisposition custody credits. We affirm the wardship order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909; see also In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089 [standard of proof is the same in juvenile proceedings as that required in adult criminal trials]; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275 [same].) On June 1, 2007, Devin M. and an unidentified cousin were attacked by the minor and two other youngsters. Prior to the attack, the minor mentioned the name of a gang. The minor and another male hit Devin M. The minor hit Devin M. in the ribcage with a closed fist approximately five times. Devin M. felt something like a knife was cutting him during the melee. Devin M. did not see anything hit him. However, Devin M. did feel something stinging and bleeding. Thereafter, the minor walked away. Devin M. later discovered a cut and a bruise on his body. Devin M. went to the hospital for treatment where the wound was cleaned and bandaged.
Devin M. still had a triangular scar on his body at the disposition hearing. The scar was described by the juvenile court: “[T]he evidence that is dispositive in this case, as far as I’m concerned, is the scar that the victim has and the unique shape of the scar. I need to describe it better for the record. It’s upside-down triangle. It starts out thick at the bottom on the left side. It goes up in a straight line, and I think I mentioned 2 inches up. It stretches the apex, and then it comes down in a crescent-shape scar that moves towards the right as you look at it. It does not appear like the type of injury that you would receive rolling around on the ground or I would expect to see a scrape. The scar is thicker on the left-hand side as it goes up, and it’s thicker at the bottom, and it is a straight line as it moves in - - I’m sorry. It is a cut as it moves down the right in a crescent shape. [¶] It’s not the kind of injury you would expect to see if someone is rolling around on the ground. You would expect to see a thicker scar. It does not appear to be the type of injury you would receive from a punch. It appears to me - - I’m sorry. It’s clear to me that this scar was caused by an instrument that’s capable of cutting an individual, and I believe that that’s how it occurred. [¶] . . . [¶] My view is that this injury was caused by an instrument capable of cutting the victim, and, therefore, this instrument was capable of causing great bodily injury or death. It just didn’t occur in this particular assault.”
Detective Elizabeth Eaton investigated the assault in this case. Detective Eaton interviewed the minor at the juvenile hall on June 27, 2007. The minor was advised of his constitutional rights. The minor agreed to speak to Detective Eaton in English. The minor initially denied having been involved in a fight. However, Detective Eaton showed the minor a photograph of the victim. The minor then claimed the victim had disrespected the local gang by use of a hand gesture. The minor admitted becoming angry and hitting Devin M. Devin M. fought back. Then the minor put Devin M. in a headlock. Also, the minor punched Devin M. in the chest. When Detective Eaton indicated Devin M. had been cut, the minor denied using a weapon. The minor said he had worn a ring at the time of the fight. The ring was broken after the fight.
First, the minor argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s assault with a deadly weapon finding. In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: “[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. omitted; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; Taylor v. Stainer, supra, 31 F.3d at pp. 908-909.) The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) The California Supreme Court has held, “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 370.) “The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872; see also People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d. at pp. 932-933.)
Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) provides, “Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .” The California Supreme Court has held: “As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a ‘deadly weapon’ is ‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028-1029, quoting In re Jose R., supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at pp. 275-276; see also People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1086.) Moreover, the Aguilar court held: “In determining whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue. [Citations.]” (People v. Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029; In re Jose R., supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 276; see also People v. Russell (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 776, 782; People v. Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 539; People v. Nealis (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4, fn. 2.) In People v. Beasley, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at page 1086, our colleagues in Division Eight of this appellate district held: “Although neither physical contact nor injury is required for a conviction, if injuries result, the extent of such injuries and their location are relevant facts for consideration. [Citation.]” (See People v. Herd (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 847, 850; People v. Russell (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 660, 665.) Even in a case where no weapon was seen in the defendant’s hand, the nature of the wounds, together with the witnesses’ testimony is sufficient to prove the assault was committed with a deadly weapon. (People v. Gutierrez (1934) 140 Cal.App. 720, 721; see also People v. Stephens (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 557, 558; People v. Urrutia (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 468, 471; People v. Henry (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 49, 50.)
Here, the juvenile court had the opportunity to hear the testimony of Devin M. and view his scar. The juvenile court described the nature of the scar in detail, noting its unique nature. The scar was prominent despite the fact that the assault took place four months prior to the disposition hearing. Although Devin M. did not see a weapon, he did feel a stinging sensation like a knife was cutting him during the attack. A reasonable trier of fact could have deduced from the evidence that the assault was with a deadly weapon. (See Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319; People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)
Second, the minor argues that the juvenile court failed to award the correct number of predisposition custody credits. The California Supreme Court has held that a minor is entitled to credit for the time he was detained in juvenile hall pending resolution of the charges against him. (In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 184; In re Deborah C. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 125, 140; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 536; see also § 726, subd. (c); In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067-1068.) However, in this instance, the minor was placed home on probation rather than in custody. As a result, the predisposition credits are of no consequence. If at a future date, the minor violates the terms of his probation, a further noticed hearing will be conducted before he is subjected to a modified dispositional order. (See § 777; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.580(a).) If that occurs, the juvenile court will then set a maximum term of physical confinement including predisposition credits. (See In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 572-574; In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1744.) Because the minor is not prejudiced by the failure to award the predisposition credits at this time, we need not remand or reverse.
The wardship order is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., KRIEGLER, J.