Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD223375, JD223376
HULL, J.
Mother, S.L., appeals the juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights. She contends her children are not adoptable because they have a mother who fought for them and she had relatives out of state who could have taken custody of the children but were not contacted. She also contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel did not advise her of her appellate rights and did not seek a guardian ad litem for her based on her mental disability. We affirm the orders.
The Department of Health and Human Services urges us to strike appellant’s brief because, among other violations of the California Rules of Court, it does not contain a summary of significant facts, a table of contents or authorities, or citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(A), 8.204(a)(1)(B), 8.204(a)(2)(C), 8.204(e)(2).)
Mother’s brief does violate California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), which requires not only separate statements of facts and argument, but also appropriate headings for the arguments made. Mother also fails to cite to the record for the factual assertions she makes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Mother’s self-representation does not excuse noncompliance with the rules on appeal, as a party in propria persona is held to the standard of an attorney. (Cf. Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) However, despite mother’s noncompliance, we exercise our discretion to review mother’s contentions on appeal, as best we can discern them. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)
Facts and Proceedings
We set forth here only those facts relevant to the matters raised by mother in her appeal.
On November 23, 2005, D.L., then three months old, was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. Examination revealed she had sustained a subdural hematoma, multiple retinal hemorrhages, a cranial fracture and bruising to her forehead. D.L.’s half brother, then 18 months old, had sustained a cranial fracture when he was nine months old. Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) petitions were filed, alleging the children were at substantial risk of physical harm.
The doctors treating D.L. noted she had “[a]cute symptomatic seizures, traumatic brain injury, probably non-accidental.” Further examination also revealed a mild liver contusion. All the injuries were from blunt trauma to the head (although violent shaking was also possible) and abdomen, which were high force injuries, and constituted nonaccidental physical abuse. D.L.’s seizures were a result of the head injury. The children were placed in a foster home and reunification services were not ordered.
By May 2006, mother had independently participated in a number of services. Based on her efforts, reunification services were reopened. After sporadic compliance with services, reunification services were again terminated in June 2008. Specifically, the court found mother had not consistently attended or completed counseling, was noncompliant with taking psychotropic medication, failed to attend her medication assessment and continued to demonstrate poor relationship choices, having been the victim of domestic violence by the same man twice in the previous six months.
The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on November 10, 2008. Mother failed to appear. After considering the social worker’s reports, the court terminated mother’s parental rights.
Discussion
I
Factual Issues
Much of mother’s brief relates to factual claims about this case. In essence, mother is asking us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the trial court’s. We cannot do this. An appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence (People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548), reappraise the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts. Those functions are reserved for the trial court. (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 367.) Accordingly, we will address the legal issues raised in mother’s brief.
II
Adoptability
Mother contends the children are not adoptable as “[t]hey have a mother... who fought for them for three years doing everything I could think of and was ordered to do.” She also contends the children are not adoptable because she had relatives who should have been considered for placement.
As to the latter point, the record reflects that a number of relatives were approached about or considered for placement. The paternal grandmother seemed only genuinely interested in caring for her grandson, D.C., and not his half sibling, D.L. Further, the social worker had concerns relative to the grandmother’s age, health and lack of a stable residence. At mother’s request, a social worker also contacted a maternal aunt. She did not respond to a detailed message regarding placement of the children. The maternal grandmother was also assessed. Placement with her was denied by the state of Louisiana ICPC due to her criminal record. Mother does not identify any other relatives.
When, as here, the court determines that there is clear and convincing evidence the child cannot be returned to his or her parents and is likely to be adopted, it must terminate parental rights unless it finds that termination would be detrimental under one of five specified statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(B); In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) It is the parent’s burden to establish the relevant exception. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; see also Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249; In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 307.)
Here, there was evidence that the children were adoptable, they were in good health and developmentally on target, they were friendly and talkative. Their current caretaker, with whom they had been living for a year and a half, wanted to adopt them. No evidence was offered at the hearing, and no issues are raised here, concerning any of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights. The court has no discretion at this stage of the proceedings to consider reunification services and return of the children to the parent. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
III
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mother next contends her counsel was ineffective for failing to notify her of her appellate rights and failing to seek a guardian ad litem for her.
In an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the burden is on appellant to establish both that counsel’s representation fell below prevailing professional norms and that, in the absence of counsel’s failings, a more favorable result was reasonably probable. [Citations.] Unless the record affirmatively establishes ineffective assistance of counsel, we must affirm the judgment.” (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292-293.) Mother has not established any such failure of counsel.
“In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. [Citations.] The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case. [Citations.]” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910.)
Here, mother presumably rests her claim of mental disability on her diagnosed posttraumatic stress syndrome. While the therapist indicated mother had a compromised level of functioning for which she needed treatment, there is no indication in the record that this rose to the level of an inability to understand the nature or consequences of the proceedings and assist counsel. To the contrary, mother made some significant efforts on her own to procure services aimed at reunifying with her children. Further, she testified at length in June 2008. There is nothing in her testimony to suggest any incapacity.
As for the claim that mother was not advised of her right to appeal, mother does not indicate from which hearing she should have been advised of appellate rights and was not. Nor does the record support her claim. After the April 10, 2006, jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, at which mother was also denied reunification services, mother left the courtroom against the court’s orders. The court mailed her notification of her appeal rights on April 12, 2006. In fact, mother filed a notice of appeal on April 20, 2006. Mother was present at the June 4, 2008 hearing, at which the matter was set for a section 366.26 hearing. Mother was served written notice of writ procedure at that time.
Disposition
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
We concur:, SCOTLAND, P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.