Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 76172
Sepulveda, J.
L.L. (Father) appeals from an order of the juvenile court adjudging his daughter, D.L., a dependent child as described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (d). Father also appeals from orders of the juvenile court adjudging his children, L.L. Jr. and M.L., dependent children as described in section 300, subdivision (j). He contends that an allegation in one of the dependency petitions fails to state a cause of action and that the jurisdictional findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
Except as otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and R. L. (Mother) have three children together, D.L., a girl, age 16, L.L. Jr., a boy, age 11, and M.L., a girl, age 6. On September 26, 2006, the San Mateo Human Services Agency (Agency) filed separate petitions seeking to have each child declared a dependent of the court. The children were not detained but remained in their home with Mother. Father was jailed awaiting prosecution on criminal charges stemming from the allegations made in the petitions. At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on December 6, 2006, the juvenile court sustained the petitions, as amended, declared the children dependents, and continued to allow them to stay in their home with Mother.
The Agency’s involvement began on September 11, 2006, when it received an anonymous referral regarding possible physical abuse by Father. On September 21, 2006, social worker Aaron Lechuga interviewed D.L. at school regarding the referral. D.L. told Lechuga that on September 9, 2006, while on a family camping trip, she and Father got into a physical altercation over her telephone usage. Father struck her in the face, and then kicked her when she fell to the ground. D.L. said she had suffered a bruise under her eye as a result. L.L. Jr. witnessed the incident, ran to get Mother, and she stopped Father from inflicting any further injury. During the September 21, 2006 interview, D.L. also alluded to past sexual abuse by Father, but was concerned about disclosing the information (apparently, because of the likely impact on her family).
Following D.L.’s revelation about sexual abuse, Lechuga contacted the local police. Two detectives were dispatched to D.L.’s school to assist Lechuga with the interview. Once the police arrived, D.L. divulged that Father had sexually molested her when she was approximately 11 to 12 years old. According to D.L., she was able to remember the first incident of sexual abuse “ ‘like it was yesterday.’ ” She told Lechuga and the detectives that the incident occurred on a “Sunday in December” when she was 11 years old. D.L. had been watching a movie in her room. She could not go to sleep and went to the room where her brother and Father were sleeping. In an attempt to fall asleep, D.L. lay down next to Father. D.L. reported that while she lay next to him, Father began touching her breasts under her clothing, and her vagina over her clothing. She immediately got up and went back to her room. The next morning, D.L. told Mother about the incident. D.L. told Lechuga and the detectives that over the next six months to a year, Father would enter her room while she was sleeping, pretending to check on her or tuck her into bed. Under that pretense, Father would rub her breasts and vagina, over and under her clothing. D.L. also accused Father of digitally penetrating her on two occasions. D.L. informed Mother of the abuse as many as three more times between the ages of 11 and 12.
In a separate interview with Lechuga and the detectives, Mother confirmed that D.L. told her about Father’ sexual misconduct on multiple occasions between the ages of 11 and 12. After each allegation, Mother would confront Father, who always denied touching D.L. inappropriately. Eventually, Mother forbade Father from being alone with either D.L. or M.L. Mother also put a lock on D.L.’s bedroom door so she could lock herself in at night. Father agreed not to be alone with his daughters and not to enter D.L.’s room in the future. D.L. told Lechuga and the detectives that the molestation stopped after Mother forbade Father from being alone with her or M.L. and put a lock on her door. Mother also told the police that she was inclined to believe D.L. because Father’s sexual behavior changed contemporaneously with the allegations. He became more aggressive and experimental, bringing home explicit movies and adult sex toys.
During the course of the September 21, 2006 interview, D.L. also accused Father of trying to film her, with hidden video cameras, on two occasions. Specifically, D.L. alleged that Father attempted to film her while she was dressing. Both times that she discovered a video camera, she had recently returned from bathing. On the first occasion, D.L. discovered a large video camera next to her computer, underneath some clothing. She was, however, certain that no videotape was inside the camera on that occasion. On the second occasion, D.L. found a much smaller video camera hidden in her room, next to her computer and underneath discarded clothes. This time she did not check to see if it was recording, she just started crying and gave the video camera to her grandmother. Father acknowledges trying to film D.L. He claims, however, that it happened only once, and that he did it in order to catch D.L. disobeying the family rules.
There is some confusion about the dates of these two occasions. The petition filed December 28, 2006, that was “amended to conform to in-court findings of 12-06-2006,” stated the dates were December 2003 and July 2005. D.L. testified at the December 6, 2006 hearing that the two occasions were in December 2004 and July 2005. The police report stated the two occasions were July 2005 and December 2005. When this confusion was addressed at the December 6, 2006 hearing, the juvenile court dismissed it as insignificant.
Finally, during the same interview, D.L. accused Father of giving her a vibrator and lubricant when Mother, L.L. Jr., and M.L. were visiting family in El Salvador. While Mother and D.L.’s siblings were out of the country, D.L. stayed in the home with Father, an aunt, an uncle, and a cousin. According to D.L., Father gave her the vibrator and told her that he and Mother preferred she use it, rather than have sex. After presenting the vibrator to her, D.L. alleges, Father “put it on” and showed her how to use it. D.L. understood the purpose of a vibrator and, as a result, could not understand why Father would offer her one. D.L. told Lechuga and the detectives she felt uncomfortable about what Father had done. Mother confirmed that Father gave D.L. a vibrator while she was out of the country, and she said that D.L. showed it to her when she returned. Mother said that she had been angry with Father and told him it was not his place to give D.L. the vibrator. Mother said that if Father was concerned that D.L. would have sex or get pregnant he should give her condoms rather than a sex toy. Father also acknowledges that the incident occurred and that he did a “stupid thing.”
There is some confusion about the date of this incident as well. D.L. testified that it occurred in January “of last year” at the December 6, 2006 hearing. The jurisdiction/disposition report states that it occurred in January 2005, but the same report also stated that Mother left for El Salvador in November 2005. The police report, attached to the jurisdiction/disposition report, states that the incident occurred in January 2006.
After that initial interview on September 21, 2006, social worker Jennifer Torres interviewed D.L. on October 16, 2006, in advance of completing her jurisdiction/ disposition report. During that interview, D.L. told Torres that she lied to Lechuga and the detectives about Father molesting her. According to D.L., she was recanting because she did not realize her allegations would cause so many problems for her family. She had not thought that Father would be in jail so long, or that it would be difficult for him to get out. D.L. further said that her accusations about Father, made to Mother between the ages of 11 and 12, were false. She told Torres that she lied to Mother because she was “jealous and angry” that she was no longer an only child. D.L. said that she began to lie after M.L. was born in order to get attention from Mother and Father. According to D.L., she was the “ ‘princess’ ” before L.L. Jr. and M.L. were born and she had wanted to return to that lifestyle. Further, D.L. told Torres the detectives had interviewed her “for hours” on September 21, 2006, implying that her allegations of sexual abuse were influenced or coerced. D.L. did not recant any other portion of her story.
As a result of the interviews on September 21, 2006, the Agency filed a dependency petition on behalf of D.L., alleging that she came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (d). The section 300, subdivision (a) allegation that Father had caused D.L. serious physical harm or that D.L. was at a substantial risk to suffer serious physical harm was predicated on the events of September 9, 2006. The original section 300, subdivision (d) allegations that Father had sexually molested D.L. and been sexually inappropriate with her, that she was at a substantial risk of being sexually abused and that Mother failed to protect her were based on D.L.’s allegations of sexual abuse, Father filming her with hidden video cameras, the presentation of an adult sex toy to her, and Mother’s knowledge of the circumstances and failure to prevent any further interaction.
“Count a-1: [¶] On or about September 9, 2006, the father struck the child in the face several times with an open hand, and after the child fell to the ground, the father kicked her repeatedly, and the child sustained a black eye as the result of the abuse.”
“Count d-1: [¶] When the child was approximately eleven-years-old, the child was sexually abuse[d] by her father, and the abuse consisted of the father digitally penetrating the child and fondling, and the last incident occurred when the child was approximately twelve-years-old; further, the mother[,] who knew about the abuse[,] failed to protect the child from further abuse in that she continued to allow the father to have access to the child, and on two separate occasions, the father attempted to videotape the child by hiding a camera in the child’s bedroom, and one of those attempts w[as] successful. In addition, the father was sexually inappropriate with the child in that he provided the child with an adult sex toy, and subsequently, the father was arrested for continuous sexual abuse of a child.”
At the December 6, 2006 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, County Counsel amended the section 300, subdivision (d) allegation of D.L.’s petition to reflect her recantation. County Counsel told the court that he was amending the petition “based on discussion with counsel and developments in the case as reflected in the reports.” Then he read the amended language of Count d-1 into the record, although it does not appear from the record that he had additional copies of the amended petition for all parties and the court. The juvenile court ultimately sustained the petition, as amended.
“On two separate occasions in approximately December of 2003 and July 2005, the father attempted to videotape [D.L.] by hiding the camera in [D.L.]’s bedroom. In addition, the father was sexually inappropriate with [D.L.] while the mother was away from home during January of 2005 in that the father provided [D.L.] with an adult sex toy and demonstrated how to use it. [¶] Further, [D.L.] . . . has alleged and later recanted the following: that she was sexually abused by her father in that he fondled her . . . breast and vaginal area over and underneath her clothing. And the last incident occurred when [D.L.] was approximately 12 years old. [¶] Further, [D.L.] informed her mother of the molest[ation] and the mother failed to protect [D.L.] from further incidents in that she continued to allow the father to have access to [D.L.]. Further, the father has been arrested for continuous sexual abuse of [D.L.].”
In addition, the Agency filed petitions on behalf of L.L. Jr. and M.L., alleging that they came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (j). The petitions contained allegations that the children were at a substantial risk of being physically abused because of the September 9, 2006 incident between D.L. and Father. The petitions also contained allegations that L.L. Jr. and M.L. were at a substantial risk of being sexually abused because of D.L.’s allegations of sexual molestation, Father’s sexually inappropriate behavior, and Mother’s failure to protect D.L. from any further incidents. The juvenile court sustained the petitions filed on behalf of L.L. Jr. and M.L. At their request, the court granted supervised visits for all three children with Father while he was in jail.
“Count j-1: [¶] On or about September 9, 2006, the child’s father struck the child’s sibling, [D.L.], in the face several times with an open hand, and after the child’s sibling, [D.L.], fell to the ground, the child’s father kicked the child’s sibling, [D.L.], repeatedly, the child’s sibling, [D.L.], sustained a black eye as a result of the abuse.” The “j-1” allegation in L.L. Jr.’s petition alleged that he witnessed Father striking [D.L.], otherwise both allegations in L.L. Jr.’s and M.L.’s petitions were identical.
“Count j-2: [¶] When the child’s sister, [D.L.], was approximately eleven-years-old, she was sexually [abused] by their father, and the mother[,] who knew about the abuse[,] failed to protect the child’s sibling, [D.L.], resulting in other incidents of abuse. Subsequently, the child’s father was arrested for continuous sexual abuse of the child’s sibling, [D.L.].”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of Dependency Petition
Father contends the jurisdictional findings related to section 300, subdivision (d), including the section 300, subdivision (j) findings, must be reversed because D.L.’s petition failed to state a cause of action. The Agency argues that Father forfeited his claim because he did not challenge the sufficiency of the petition in the juvenile court. We agree.
A challenge to the sufficiency of a petition is treated as a demurrer. (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133-1134; In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.) There is a split of authority on whether a parent waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of an allegation in a dependency petition on appeal after failing to raise the issue by demurrer or other procedural mechanism in the juvenile court. (See In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322; In re Alysha S., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 397)
The court in Alysha S. held the issue could be raised for the first time on appeal. (In re Alysha S., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 397.) Alysha S. construed a challenge to the sufficiency of a petition in a dependency proceeding as being similar to a demurrer in a civil action. (Ibid.) Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 430.80, subdivision (a), Alysha S. concluded that in a dependency case, a party can only challenge the sufficiency of the petition on appeal if the petition did not state a cause of action. (In re Alysha S., 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 397.)
However, a growing number of cases disagree with Alysha S.’s analogy to civil cases, and follow Shelley J. in holding that a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations of the petition is waived if not raised below. (In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 328-329; see In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 481; In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 459-460; see also In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 458-459; In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 626-627.) Shelley J. criticized Alysha S. as being wrongly decided, due to the court’s failure to “acknowledge that rules applicable to civil cases are not applicable to dependency actions unless expressly made so. ‘Dependency proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings governed by their own rules and statutes. [Citations.] Unless otherwise specified, the requirements of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Shelley J., supra, at p. 328.)
Father does not acknowledge the split in authority, arguing only that he is not required to challenge the petition in juvenile court. However, if Father did not believe that the allegation, as drafted, supported a finding that D.L. was within the description of section 300, subdivision (d), the onus was on him to challenge the petition. (In re S.O., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 459-460.) Father claims that he could not challenge the sufficiency of the amended petition with a written motion “akin to a demurrer” because the petition was amended at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. (In re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 176.) However, nothing requires a parent’s challenge to the petition to be in written form. (See generally In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1036; In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 386; In re Nicholas B., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1133-1134; In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 328-329; In re Fred J., supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at p. 176.)
Father contends, in the alternative, that he did challenge the petition by informing the court there was no cause of action in D.L.’s amended petition. The comments of Father’s counsel in the juvenile court were, however, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel’s challenge came during his argument at the close of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing and, read in context, it is clear that counsel was arguing the evidence presented did not support the allegations that had been made. Following the Shelley J. line of cases, we conclude Father’s facial attack on the sufficiency of the petition was waived by his failure to object in the juvenile court.
Counsel argued, “Well, Your Honor, there is the old adage[:] are you lying now or did you lie before? We know at some point you lied. We concede that the home situation had a bizarre quality to it. The Father from the outset did admit behavior which . . . was inappropriate to use the social worker’s lingo. But from the beginning he admitted certain misconduct and denied the most serious allegation that being what shocks everybody[,] sexual abuse of one’s own child. [¶] . . . What [D.L.]’s father did and what we have conceded he did is certainly adequate to make an order of dependency. But let’s go through the details. . . . [¶] . . . Sexual abuse is a basis for dependency. A child making a report and then recanting is not. You can report anything you want, your honor.”
Finally, we agree with the Agency that even if the issue had not been waived, the usefulness of an attack on the facial validity of a dependency petition seldom extends beyond the juvenile court because of the appellate principles of harmless error: “If the evidence at the jurisdictional hearing was insufficient [to support jurisdiction], [the parent] can seek reversal on that ground. But if the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings, any failure of the petition to state a cause of action became harmless error. Either way, the only issue before us is the sufficiency of the evidence at the jurisdictional hearing.” (In re Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 628.)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Father contends the jurisdictional findings as to L.L. Jr. and M.L. under section 300, subdivision (j) and as to D.L. under section 300, subdivision (d) are not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he argues there is insufficient evidence that any physical or sexual abuse of D.L. placed her siblings L.L. Jr. and M.L. at risk of abuse; D.L.’s petition did not adequately state a cause of action that D.L. was sexually abused; and there is insufficient evidence that D.L. was sexually abused or at substantial risk of sexual abuse.
In a juvenile dependency proceeding the Agency “ ‘has the burden of showing specifically how [the children have] been or will be harmed.’ [Citation.] This must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] On appeal, the jurisdictional findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. [Citation.] We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order. [Citation.]” (In re S.O., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 461.) “ ‘We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence, but must decide only whether sufficient evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. . . . Issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone’. . . .” (In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 329.) “[T]he question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the [children] to the defined risk of harm.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824, italics omitted.) “[P]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue. (Ibid.)
Section 300, subdivision (j) permits dependency where “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” When determining whether there is a substantial risk to the children “[t]he court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative.” (§ 300, subd. (j).) The purpose of section 300, subdivision (j) is primarily to protect children whose siblings have been abused or neglected. (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214-1215.) Sibling petitions aim to prevent siblings from being abused “ ‘in succession before they may individually obtain protection of the state.’ [Citation.]” (In re Dorothy I. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158.) In fact, sibling petitions were accepted by courts long before the legislature created section 300, subdivision (j). (In re Dorothy I, supra., 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 1157; see In re Edward C. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 193; In re Miller (Wash. 1952) 242 P.2d 1016.)
Father concedes there is sufficient evidence to establish that D.L. was physically abused as defined in section 300, subdivision (a), but argues that there is no evidence to establish that L.L. Jr. or M.L. are at a substantial risk to be physically abused. We disagree.
Father claims that D.L. was hit, at least in part, because she was repeatedly disrespectful to both parents, had been sexually active, and generated a large telephone bill. He emphasizes that there is no evidence of similar misbehavior by L.L. Jr. or M.L. Regardless of the provocation for Father’s altercation with D.L., striking her in the face and kicking her once she was on the ground qualifies as physical abuse. (§ 300, subd. (a).) A parent is never allowed to abuse a child, no matter the child’s behavior. (§ 300, subd. (a).) Moreover, Father’s contention that D.L.’s defiance led to the physical abuse does not lessen the risk of physical abuse for L.L. Jr. and M.L. In fact, it has the inverse effect: Father’s past incident of physical abuse, especially in front of another child, indicates a likelihood of physical abuse in the future. (See § 300, subd. (a); see also In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) L.L. Jr. and M.L. may exhibit behavior similar to D.L.’s, and we cannot trust that Father would not react violently in those circumstances. Concern for M.L. is further amplified because she is a female and Father may have concerns about her getting pregnant in the future, just as he did with D.L. Father’s prior pattern of behavior supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that he could abuse L.L. Jr. or M.L. as they get older. (See § 300, subd. (a); In re Rocco M., supra, at p. 824.) Once physical abuse has occurred it is appropriate for the juvenile court to infer that it will continue. (See § 300, subd. (a); In re Rocco M., supra, at p. 824.)
Father also claims that the fact that the juvenile court allowed him visits with the children while in jail is proof that the court did not believe that Father was a threat to their safety. The court’s order, in fact, undermines Father’s argument. That the juvenile court permitted supervised visitation in the security of a jail setting reflects its belief that Father was a threat to the safety of the children.
Father contends that the section 300, subdivision (d) allegation, based on D.L.’s accusations of sexual abuse, is not supported by sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that D.L. was actually sexually abused, let alone that L.L. Jr. or M.L. are at a substantial risk to suffer abuse, as necessary under section 300, subdivision (j). We disagree.
Father argues that there was no evidence that D.L. was actually abused, as necessary under section 300, subdivision (d), because the language in the petition only recited the facts, including her recantation. Father examines the different incidents of sexual misconduct separately and out of chronological order. The incidents of sexual misconduct, however, become less innocuous when they are viewed as a progression of behavior between Father and D.L.
The earliest incidents of sexual misconduct between Father and D.L. were D.L.’s claims of sexual molestation between the ages of 11 and 12. Although D.L. later recanted the charges, it is not uncommon for children to recant allegations of abuse after the family experiences a hardship because of the accused’s absence and the child feeling responsible for the family. (See In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1235 [a child abuse specialist testified that it is “extremely common” for children to recant reports of child abuse in an effort to protect themselves physically and psychologically and to protect their families].) As Torres stated in her jurisdiction/disposition report that “it would not be unusual[] for D.L. to now claim the molest[ation] never took place because she is feeling responsible for the separation of the family and the hardship the father’s absence has caused.” The juvenile court could infer that was the case here. (See In re Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.)
Later, Father continued his sexually inappropriate behavior by attempting to record D.L. with hidden video cameras. Viewed in conjunction with the evidence of sexual molestation, this conduct shows a pattern of inappropriate behavior and poor decision making that put D.L., L.L. Jr., and M.L. at risk of being victims of sexual abuse in the future. (See In re Rocco M.,, supra, at p. 824.) Father continued his sexual misconduct by presenting D.L. with a vibrator and lubricant. The pattern of Father’s behavior shows that his decision making and mental state have not changed or progressed since D.L. was 11 years old. (§ 300, subd. (j).)
The juvenile court could justifiably reject Father’s explanation that he attempted to videotape D.L. to catch her breaking family rules, in light of D.L.’s allegations of other sexual misconduct.
Father also argues that his allegedly inappropriate behavior is too old and stale to indicate a present or future risk of abuse. The latest incident of inappropriate behavior, however, was only about a year before the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, and Father’s inappropriate behavior has been consistent since D.L. was 11 years old. Moreover, old evidence is not an automatic bar to a finding of dependency. (See In re Dorothy I., supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1156-1157 [evidence of molestation 15 years earlier of the child’s half-sibling was sufficient to support a finding of dependency].)
Having established that D.L. was abused as described in section 300, subdivision (d), the juvenile court also properly found that L.L. Jr. and M.L. are at a substantial risk for the same kind of abuse. (§ 300, subd. (j).) The court in In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 197 said that “[s]exual abuse of one’s sibling can support a [juvenile] court’s determination that there is substantial risk to the remaining siblings.” (See also In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1215; In re Carmen O. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 908 [affirmed a jurisdictional order under section 300, subdivision (j) for a brother whose sister was sexually abused without directly addressing the issue].) In Dorothy I. the appellate court upheld a sibling petition solely on the basis of sexual misconduct 15 years earlier. (In re Dorothy I., supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 1157.) In that case, the dependent child was not even alive at the time of the previous molestation, but the father’s behavior over a prolonged period of time created the present risk. (Id. at pp. 1156-1158.) Here, Father’s behavior has been consistently inappropriate over the last four to five years and there is no indication that it will change. In this case, Father is an identifiable and specific hazard to the safety of L.L. Jr. and M.L. because he does not respect the privacy of his children, makes sexually inappropriate decisions, and molested his older daughter. (See In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) Therefore, the juvenile court had plenty of “ ‘reason to believe the acts may continue in the future.’ ” (Ibid.)
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J., Reardon, J.