Opinion
A102712
10-27-2003
In re D.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.J., Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant minor admitted the allegation of an amended pleading that he committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) At the conclusion of a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained two other allegations of the petition that appellant had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5) and another instance of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered appellant committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for a period not to exceed 10 years. The commitment was subsequently reduced to a period not to exceed seven years when the court realized that it had erroneously added three years to the commitment in the mistaken belief that an enhancement allegation for inflicting great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7) had been sustained. This appeal from the order of commitment is timely.
In his opening brief appellant contended that three years for the enhancement had been erroneously included in calculating the ten-year commitment. The Attorney General, appearing as respondent, pointed out that the error has been corrected. Appellant does not address the issue further in his reply brief. We therefore conclude that the problem has been corrected and appellant has abandoned this claim of error.
Appellants second and final contention is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the CYA because the record does not demonstrate that the commitment will benefit appellant, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 734. Appellant further argues the record does not establish that less restrictive placements would be ineffective.
"We review a commitment decision only for abuse of discretion, and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court. [Citations.] Furthermore, it is clear that a commitment to the Youth Authority may be made in the first instance, without previous resort to less restrictive placements." (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.)
The probation officer initially recommended that appellant "be committed to the nine month mandatory program at Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility." At the jurisdictional hearing the prosecutor told the court that "the recommendation is well-founded," representing "essentially the minimum appropriate recommendation." The court then asked the deputy probation officer in the court—who had not prepared the report on appellant—"Why is this not a California Youth Authority recommendation?" The officer replied: "Well, I think it certainly could be. Theres clearly—three offenses were very serious, I believe two separate incidents, and arguably maybe one of the two incidents would have been enough for Youth Authority recommendation. [¶] Being that this minor has not been a ward of the Court, up until this time still a dependent child, I think she [the deputy probation officer who did prepare the written recommendation] was willing to give him an opportunity to prove himself and to prove [to] probation and to the Court that he can change his behavior at the Boys Ranch. Clearly, if hes not able to do that, if he has any other offenses while hes still a juvenile, California Youth Authority would be the only alternative the Court would have."
After appellants counsel urged the court to follow the probation officers written recommendation, the court then stated "I have a number of concerns about this young man." Among the courts concerns were that appellant "flat-out lied in court . . . about his involvement" and to the probation officer expressed no remorse or responsibility for the attacks. The court went on: "Pittsburg High School reveals hes a virtual non-attender, and at John Swett [High School], he once almost created a riot in the cafeteria, indicating that he has significant disciplinary problems. [¶] On page 17, while hes been at the Hall, indicates at line 4, `The minors pattern of adjustment problems in detention, which culminated [in] a recent fight, hes now on security risk. [¶] So all in all, this young man seems to be a danger to the public and to society. . . . [¶] Now, sending him to the Boys Ranch doesnt make much sense. Thats not a locked facility." The court concluded by making the following findings: "[A]s it relates to local less-restrictive programs and forms of custody, the Court is not fully satisfied that there are any local less-restrictive programs that are appropriate dispositions, and that the Court feels based on the seriousness of the charges and the fact that this minor absolutely refuses to take responsibility for his actions, that the Court feels that the minor can better benefit from various programs provided by the . . . Youth Authority. [¶] The Court finds the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward is such as to render it probable, the minor be benefitted [sic] by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [Y]outh [A]uthority."
Appellant rarely attends school, and, as noted by the juvenile court, he is disruptive when he is present. Since 2000, he has committed increasingly brutal crimes of physical violence. The juvenile court could conclude from this record that appellant required a placement where he would be closely supervised and his movements restricted. The placement initially recommended was, as noted by the court, unable to provide such restriction. Restricting appellants movements might also be seen as a means to concentrate his attention on the education and programs offered by the CYA. All of this constitutes substantial evidence in support of the courts finding that appellant would benefit from the commitment. (E.g., In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151-154; In re Gerardo B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1258-1259; In re Robert D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 767, 773.)
Appellant faults the court for not explicating in detail on the record why placements less restrictive than the CYA would not be appropriate. It is clear from the courts comments quoted above that the court did consider less restrictive placements, but concluded that nothing short of CYA would be "appropriate" to appellants situation. Moreover, the court did note that appellants disruptive behavior had continued while he was at juvenile hall, so in a sense a less restrictive placement had already been found wanting. What the court stated was sufficient. (See In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183-184.)
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in making the commitment. (E.g., In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 378-380; In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.)
The order of commitment is affirmed.
We concur: Reardon, J., Rivera, J.