{¶ 6} "The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy * * *." In re Disqualification of Hunter , 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 608, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). "[T]he significance of that remedy is heightened when, as here, an active litigant or practitioner seeks a blanket order disqualifying a judge from all of that person's cases."

{¶ 4} "The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy * * *." In re Disqualification of Hunter , 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 608, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). The significance of that remedy is heightened when, as here, an active litigant or practitioner seeks a blanket order disqualifying a judge from all of that person's cases.

{¶ 11} "The disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy." In re Disqualification of O'Neill, 100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 15, citing In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). Mr. Thompson has not demonstrated that there are extraordinary circumstances that warrant Judge Saffold's disqualification.

{¶ 13} “The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy * * *.” In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). The significance of that remedy is heightened here because Conley, an admittedly “active practitioner and litigator in Stark County,” seeks a blanket order of disqualification.

That principle, however, must be balanced against the rule that “[t]he statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy.” In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 608, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). The significance of that remedy is heightened here because Cillo acts as counsel of record in all capital cases in Lorain County and “handles the cases where the most serious crimes have been perpetrated.”

Because he failed to submit a transcript, there is no way to determine whether the comments were made, the specific word choice and context in which they were allegedly made, or whether the comments reflect judicial bias or prejudice against Ertle or Brawley. “The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy * * *.” In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 608, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). Because Ertle has not submitted any evidentiary support, he has not established that he is entitled to such a remedy.

To hold otherwise would invite parties to file lawsuits solely to obtain a judge's disqualification, which would severely hamper the orderly administration of judicial proceedings. See In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 608, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988); In re Disqualification of Kilpatrick, 47 Ohio St.3d 605, 606, 546 N.E.2d 929 (1989). {¶ 5} Second, Sizemore has failed to substantiate her claim that Judge Pokorny is engaging in a conspiracy with Judge Forsthoefel and Melick.

The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy. In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). Therefore, the chief justice cannot rule on an affidavit of disqualification when, as here, nothing is pending before the trial court.

[Ohio St.3d 1214]{¶ 8} The disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy. In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). Further, a “judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.”

{¶ 26} The disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy. In re Disqualification of O'Neill, 100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 15, citing In re Disqualification of Hunter, 36 Ohio St.3d 607, 522 N.E.2d 461 (1988). “A *1087judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.”