Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(a) and (b) "distinguish between lawyers and government lawyers," and subsection (b) applies when the allegations involve a judge’s prior employment as a prosecutor. In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 6. {¶ 39} Under Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(b), "a judge cannot preside over a case in which the judge previously served as the prosecutor."

.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(a) and (b) "distinguish between lawyers and government lawyers," and subsection (b) applies when the allegations involve a judge's prior employment as a prosecutor. In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 6.

However, the chief justice has previously" 'declined to establish a rule "requiring disqualification of a judge based solely on suppositions that the judge may be called as a witness or allegations that the judge possesses evidence material to the case." '" In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 9, quoting In re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, 863 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 6, quoting In re Disqualification of Gorman, 74 Ohio St.3d 1251, 657 N.E.2d 1354 (1993). Here, Mr. Petersen has failed to establish that Judge Paschke's disqualification is required because she will be a material witness at the contempt hearing. If Mr. Petersen believes that the judge's April 2 order was ambiguous, he may raise those arguments before the court and, if applicable, on appeal.

However, the chief justice has previously " ‘declined to establish a rule "requiring disqualification of a judge based solely on suppositions that the judge may be called as a witness or allegations that the judge possesses evidence material to the case." ’ " In re Disqualification of Hedric , 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 9, quoting In re Disqualification of Stuard , 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, 863 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 6, quoting In re Disqualification of Gorman , 74 Ohio St.3d 1251, 657 N.E.2d 1354 (1993). Here, Mr. Petersen has failed to establish that Judge Paschke's disqualification is required because she will be a material witness at the contempt hearing. If Mr. Petersen believes that the judge's April 2 order was ambiguous, he may raise those arguments before the court and, if applicable, on appeal.

Nevertheless, the chief justice has previously " ‘declined to establish a rule "requiring disqualification of a judge based solely on suppositions that the judge may be called as a witness or allegations that the judge possesses evidence material to the case." ’ " In re Disqualification of Hedric , 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 9, quoting In re Disqualification of Stuard , 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, 863 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 6, quoting In re Disqualification of Gorman , 74 Ohio St.3d 1251, 657 N.E.2d 1354 (1993). "The mere suggestion that [a judge] may be a witness in [the] case and an allegation that her testimony may be material to disposition of the case are insufficient to establish the existence of bias, prejudice, or other disqualifying interest."

{¶ 6} Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(b) requires a judge who formerly served as a government lawyer to disqualify himself or herself from any "particular matter" in which he or she personally and substantially participated as a government attorney. In In re Disqualification of Hedric , 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, former Chief Justice Moyer interpreted the scope of "matter" for purposes of the rule. A defendant's attorney had sought to disqualify a judge from a case involving a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence ("OVI") because the judge had previously prosecuted the same defendant for OVI and the pending OVI charge included a specification enhancing the punishment due to the defendant's prior OVI convictions, including the OVI charge prosecuted by the judge.

And for judges who formerly served as government lawyers, they must disqualify themselves from matters in which they " ‘participated personally and substantially as a lawyer * * * concerning the [* * *] particular matter’ " before the court. (Ellipses in Hedric ; brackets added.) In re Disqualification of Hedric , 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 5, quoting Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(b). Here, Ms. Miller has failed to establish that Judge Goslee's prior professional interactions with her family members are related to the underlying wrongful-death lawsuit.

However, the rule does not automatically require a judge's disqualification from a case involving a defendant whom the judge prosecuted in a previous unrelated case. SeeIn re Disqualification of Batchelor , 136 Ohio St.3d 1211, 2013-Ohio-2626, 991 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 5 ; In re Disqualification of Hedric , 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 6. Here, Judge Selvaggio states that he never appeared as a government lawyer in the underlying matter and that the 2012 case was a different matter that has since been terminated.

However, the rule does not automatically require a judge's disqualification from a case involving a defendant whom the judge prosecuted in a previous unrelated case. See In re Disqualification of Batchelor, 136 Ohio St.3d 1211, 2013-Ohio-2626, 991 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 5; In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 6. Here, Judge Selvaggio states that he never appeared as a government lawyer in the underlying matter and that the 2012 case was a different matter that has since been terminated.

However, those facts do not necessarily support an inference that the judge will harbor personal bias against the defendant such that the reasonable person would question whether the judge could be fair in the current proceeding. See, e.g., Basinger; In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016. "Just as ‘[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased,’ In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5, a judge is presumed to be capable of separating what may properly be considered from what may not be considered." Basinger at ¶ 5.