Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NJ25935. John C. Lawson, II, Judge.
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Minor Diego C. appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court declaring him to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, entered after the court denied minor’s motion to suppress evidence brought pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1. Both minor and respondent contend that the juvenile court erred in denying minor’s motion. We agree and reverse the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The petition to bring minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court alleged that minor possessed a knife on school grounds, in violation of Penal Code section 626.10, subdivision (a)(1). After the juvenile court denied minor’s motion to suppress evidence, minor admitted the truth of the allegation. On April 5, 2011, the court declared minor a ward of the juvenile court and declared the offense to be a felony with a maximum confinement time of three years, but found appellant suitable for deferred entry of judgment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790. The court imposed conditions of probation and scheduled a dismissal hearing for the following year. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the denial of the suppression motion.
At the hearing on the suppression motion, Tony Booker (Booker), testified that he was an employee of Phineas Banning High School, where minor was a student. He testified that on December 3, 2010, minor was brought into the assistant principal’s office by a campus aide who had found minor outside class during class time, with no hall pass. It was school policy to allow students to leave class to go to the nurse or the restroom with a hall pass, but some teachers allowed students to leave without one. Booker did not know why minor was out of class, but thought it unlikely that he was out of class with permission. Booker searched minor and found a knife in his jacket pocket.
Booker testified that the school’s administrative search policy was contained in the parent-student handbook. Booker did not bring the handbook to court, but described the policy as permitting searches upon reasonable suspicion. He testified that he had had a reasonable suspicion based upon the fact that minor was in the company of three other students. However, Booker did not explain his suspicion.
The juvenile court found that minor’s detention was justified because he had violated a school rule by being out of class without an excuse or hall pass. The court held that because the detention was reasonable and based upon a rule violation, the search was reasonable.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Respondent agrees and joins in minor’s request that the judgment be reversed. In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563.)
Public school officials are subject to the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 336-337; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 558-559 (William G.).) “Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive....” (New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, at pp. 341-342, fns. omitted.) “There must be articulable facts supporting that reasonable suspicion.” (William G., supra, at p. 564.)
Individualized suspicion is not required for searches conducted pursuant to an established policy based upon the “special needs” of the school, when the policy applies to all students, the students and their parents have notice of the policy, and the search is carried out in a minimally intrusive manner. (In re Sean A. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 182, 188-190, citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 664-665.) To apply the special needs exception, there must be sufficient evidence of the policy to permit an informed analysis of it and its purposes. (Cf. In re Sean A., supra, at p. 189.) The evidence was insufficient here to allow such an analysis. Booker testified that there was an established search policy applying to all students, suggested that both parents and students had notice of the policy, but other than requiring a “reasonable suspicion, ” the policy was not described. Thus, no special needs exception applied here.
Minor and respondent both rely on In re Lisa G. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 801, and we agree that the facts are comparable. There, the minor’s teacher searched her purse after the minor had engaged in disruptive behavior and left class without permission on the first day of school. (Id. at pp. 805-806.) Looking for identification and the minor’s class schedule, the teacher found a knife. (Id. at p. 805.) The appellate court observed that the teacher had not asked for identification prior to the search, and held that the minor’s disruptive behavior alone did not justify the search. (Id. at pp. 806, 808.) Reversal was required because the teacher failed to articulate a reasonable suspicion of misconduct that would justify looking into the student’s purse. (Id. at pp. 805, 808.)
Similarly, Booker failed to articulate a reasonable suspicion that a search would reveal evidence of minor’s rule violation or other wrongful activity. Booker did not say what his suspicion was, other than an unauthorized absence from class, and Booker already knew that minor did not have a hall pass. A suspicion that a student was tardy or truant from class, without more, provides “no reasonable basis for conducting a search of any kind.” (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
We thus agree with minor and respondent that the evidence seized in this case was inadmissible and the suppression motion should have been granted. Under such circumstances, the judgment must be reversed. (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 567-568.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the juvenile court declaring minor a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is reversed.
We concur: DOI TODD, Acting P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.