See also United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1553 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding improper the district court's dismissal of a counterclaim for failure to serve the opposing parties individually rather than through their attorney); In re Brenner, Nos. 89-8322, 89-8680, 1991 WL 214051, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1991) ("It is presumed that service on an attorney gives adequate notice to the party she represents.") ( citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1145-46 at 418-20, 425 (1987 Supp. 1990); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962); In Re William A. DiDio, 1 B.R. 196, 199 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)). The Court did not consider the Grays' Sur-Reply in this instance as the Grays did not seek leave to file it.

See e.g., In re DiDio, 1 B.R. 196, 199 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1979) (interpreting former Rule 802). Clerical oversight, another unanticipated event, does not create excusable neglect.

While the failure to learn of the entry of a judgment might ordinarily be considered a sufficient basis for excusable neglect, Rule 9022 specifically provides that such lack of notice will not affect the appeal period, except if it falls within the parameters of Rule 8002. In re DiDio, 1 B.R. 196, 198 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1979). Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) further places a limitation on this Court's authority to enlarge the time for filing an appeal. That rule clarifies beyond doubt that extensions can be allowed only in accordance with the provisions set forth in Rule 8002.

(emphasis added).See also Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626, 633-634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390-1391, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); In re DiDio, 1 B.R. 196, 199 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1979). This finding does not, however, completely resolve the dischargeability issue since the creditor also claims that a portion of the debt is for child support and thus nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

In fact, the bankruptcy rules are more severe with respect to appeals, for Bankruptcy Rule 906(b)(2), which is a general grant of power to the bankruptcy court for authorizing extensions of time, expressly forbids such extensions in certain postjudgment acts, among them appeals under Bankruptcy Rule 802, except to the extent the specific rule itself permits. Id. at 971, See also In the Matter of T. C. Morrow, supra; In re DiDio, 1 B.R. 196, 198 (E.D.Pa. 1979). Although Alco dealt primarily with the ten (10) day notice of appeal rule, we find the above policy considerations to be persuasive in the case at bar.

Notice to a party's counsel is imputed to the party. In re Robertson, 13 B.R. 726, 733 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va. 1981); In re Didio, 1 B.R. 196, 199 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Penn. 1979). It is the clerk of the bankruptcy court who mails notices of all significant events to creditors listed on the bankrupt's schedule.