Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. JJ15582, Donna Groman, Judge.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
The juvenile court found that D.H. committed second degree robbery and threatened a public officer. The court declared him a ward of the court, ordered him placed on home probation and set five years, four months as the maximum term of confinement. We strike the maximum term of confinement and affirm the orders in all other respects.
Because D.H. raises no argument on appeal regarding the court’s finding that he threatened a public officer we do not address it.
FACTS
Henry A. was playing basketball with his brothers. His cell phone was on the ground next to the basket. Two girls walked by and then returned. The “short girl” told Henry “I’m going to take your phone because you looked at my home girl like that.” She then grabbed Henry’s phone, put it in her pocket and ran off with the “tall girl.” Henry ran after them. The girls stopped running when they got to the place where D.H. was standing. The short girl handed the phone to D.H. who held it for approximately 30 seconds then handed it back. Henry approached the two girls and D.H. and asked D.H.: “Can you tell them to give me my phone back?” D.H. responded, “I can’t help you.” The two girls then started to run again. D.H. chased Henry as Henry ran after the girls and, catching up with him, started hitting him. D.H. hit Henry approximately six times, after which the “tall girl” hit Henry with a broom, and D.H. and the girls fled together in the same direction. A bystander in a car assisted Henry and the brothers in following the fleeing group. Upon seeing the car, the two girls and D.H. ran in different directions. Later that same day the police arrested D.H.
DISCUSSION
On an appeal from a juvenile court judgment, we apply the same standard of review applicable to an adult criminal conviction. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—i.e., credible evidence of solid value—from which the court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the offense alleged in the petition. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848–849.)
Penal Code section 211 defines robbery as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” It is undisputed that D.H. did not take the cell phone from Henry nor do the People contend that the girl who took the phone did so by means of force or fear. Thus, her original taking the phone from Henry constituted theft only. (People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1707.) The People contend, however, that D.H. is guilty of robbery as an aider and abettor. Under its theory, the crime of theft continued as the girl tried to escape (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28) so that when D.H. used force during the escape to prevent Henry from regaining his phone he committed a robbery.
A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when “he or she, (i) with the knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
D.H. concedes that to be guilty of aiding and abetting one need not have advanced knowledge that the principal is about to commit a crime; the knowledge element may be satisfied if he gains such knowledge during the commission of the crime. He contends, however, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he gained the requisite knowledge during the commission of the crime. He argues the evidence was insufficient to show that when he used force to prevent Henry from chasing the girl with the phone, he knew the girls had stolen the phone from Henry.~(AOB at 9)~ We disagree.
The evidence showed that D.H. and the girl with the phone were standing together on the sidewalk when Henry approached and asked D.H.: “Can you tell them to give me my phone back?” From this evidence the court could reasonably conclude that D.H. knew the girls had stolen Henry’s phone, especially since there was no evidence either girl contested Henry’s claim that the girls have “my phone.”
D.H. also suggests that a person not involved in the original theft but who only uses force to prevent the victim from regaining his property during the thief’s attempted escape cannot be guilty of robbery. Assuming arguendo, that D.H. did not aid in the original theft, we nonetheless disagree. As we discussed above, the evidence was sufficient to show that D.H. was aware of the theft. Further, the perpetrators had not yet reached a place of safety when D.H. used force to prevent Henry from regaining the stolen phone and thereafter fled with the girls. All the elements of robbery are satisfied and we see no conceptual difference between the situation in which the thief herself or a later joining accomplice uses force in preventing the victim from recovering his property. Indeed, D.H. cites no authority or rationale for his position.
Finally, D.H. contends that the declaration of a maximum term of confinement for five years, four months should be stricken. The People agree, as do we. Because the minor was not removed from the physical custody of the parent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, but sent home on probation, the requirement of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), to set a maximum term of confinement, was inapplicable. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573.)
DISPOSITION
The disposition order is modified to strike the maximum term of confinement. In all other respects the court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., FERNS, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.