Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup. Ct. No. JD222692
MORRISON, J.
Z.W., the minor’s maternal grandmother and defacto parent, appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her counsel and appointing a guardian for the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to this code].) Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in denying her counsel and in delegating all aspects of visitation to the guardians. We affirm.
FACTS
The four-year-old minor was removed from parental custody in July 2005 due to domestic violence in the home and the mother’s drug use and depression. Appellant requested defacto parent status shortly thereafter. The jurisdiction report recommended placement with the maternal great-grandmother rather than appellant, in part due to appellant’s criminal and drug abuse history.
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in September 2005, the court granted appellant defacto parent status and ordered supervised visits for her. The minor was placed with the maternal great-grandparents. The mother failed to reunify with the minor after 12 months of services and the court set a selection and implementation hearing.
Appellant filed a petition for modification in October 2006, seeking appointment of counsel and placement of the minor. The court denied the petition without a hearing, finding no change of circumstances.
The assessment for the selection and implementation hearing stated that the minor’s caretakers preferred guardianship to adoption because they were guardians of another child and did not want to cause conflict by adopting the minor. The assessment noted the minor acted out at a recent visit with the mother and appellant but the specifics of that visit were not discussed. The minor was doing well in his placement, had bonded to his caretakers, and had no behavioral or emotional problems.
At the selection and implementation hearing, appellant asked the court to appoint counsel and stated she wanted weekend visits and no further supervision. The court noted that appellant was not entitled to a court-appointed attorney and that the specific terms of visitation would be up to the guardians. The court selected a permanent plan of guardianship and terminated the dependency. The court specifically ordered visitation for the maternal grandmother, “As arranged with the guardians subject to any reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the guardian, including supervision.” However, the court was clear that appellant should be allowed contact with the minor and discussed the issue with the guardian.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel for her as a defacto parent to assist her in addressing visitation issues.
A de facto parent is “a person who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).) “The de facto parent may: [¶](1) Be present at the hearing; [¶](2) Be represented by retained counsel or, at the discretion of the court, by appointed counsel; and [¶](3) Present evidence.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(e).)
The purpose of a de facto parent is to provide information about the minor to the court from a perspective of a former caretaker who can be expected to be able to provide useful insight to the court on the minor’s best interests. (In re Rachael C. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1452.) A de facto parent has no right to visitation. (In re P.L. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1361.) Nonetheless, the court ordered visitation for appellant, providing her more than she, as a defacto parent, was entitled to.
Appellant’s visitation argument is based more on her status as a relative, than as a defacto parent. However, as a noncustodial grandparent, appellant is not entitled to either counsel or a visitation order. (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1508.) Thus, while exit orders for a guardianship must, by statute, contain visitation orders for parents, such orders are discretionary as to other relatives. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C).)
The juvenile court discussed the visitation issue extensively with the mother, appellant and counsel and was aware both of the family tensions and of appellant’s criminal and substance abuse history. Appellant had supervised visitation with the minor for 18 months but never moved to unsupervised or overnight visits. After reunification efforts cease, the best interests of the minor are in permanence and stability. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) To protect the minor’s long-term stability in light of appellant’s history, the court properly left the question of conditions of appellant’s visits to the guardians who would be able to assess appellant’s circumstances and the minor’s needs over time. Given the discretionary nature of the orders and appellant’s history, appointment of counsel would not have resulted in more favorable visitation orders. The court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint counsel for appellant.
II
Appellant further argues that the court’s visitation order improperly delegated control over whether any visits would occur to the guardians.
Because appellant did not object to the terms of the visitation in the juvenile court, she has forfeited the issue on appeal. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.) Even assuming appellant’s discussions with the court about visitation constituted an objection to the orders, she cannot prevail.
As noted above, when a guardianship is established, the court must define the rights of the parents to visitation and make orders for visitation unless it would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well being of the child. (§ 366.26 (c)(4)(C).) In making visitation orders, the court can properly delegate “the ministerial tasks of overseeing the right as defined by the court. . . . Such matters as time, place, and manner of visitation do not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child and thus do not infringe upon the judicial function.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) “Only when a visitation order delegates . . . the absolute discretion to determine whether any visitation occurs does the order violate the statutory scheme and separation of powers doctrine.” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374.)
However, as also noted above, there is no statutorily defined right of visitation when a guardianship is established for a grandparent/de facto parent. Appellant’s right to visitation is defined completely by the exercise of the court’s discretion in making a visitation order. When the court exercises its discretion to allow visitation, it is only necessary that the terms be reasonable. Here, the court’s order defines appellant’s right to visit but leaves the specifics of visitation to the guardian.
In arguing its invalidity, appellant misconstrues the court’s order. The order grants the right of visitation to appellant. The time, place and manner of visits are left to the guardian. As previously discussed, the court did not abuse its discretion in setting the terms of appellant’s visitation and there was no improper delegation to the guardian of the decision whether visitation would occur.
Moreover, while the guardianship has been established and the dependency terminated, the court retains jurisdiction over the minor. (§§ 366.3, subd. (a), 366.4.) Thus, the court retains the ability to oversee the issue of visitation should it be unreasonably denied or should the guardian become convinced any further visitation is detrimental to the minor.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.