The nine-month period identified in section 1(D)(m)(ii) also applies to the "reasonable efforts" ground in section 1(D)(m)(i) of the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2000) (holding that the then 12-month limitations period in section 1(D)(m) applied to both the "reasonable efforts" and "reasonable progress" grounds); In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 118-20 (1st Dist. 2002), appeal allowed, 203 Ill. 2d 547 (2003) (concluding that the 2000 amendment to section 1(D)(m) did not render uncertain the supreme court's interpretation of the statute in D.L.; amendment did not substantively change language interpreted by the supreme court but merely added lower case roman numerals and an additional ground of unfitness); see also In re Brianna B., 334 Ill. App. 3d 651, 658 (4th Dist. 2002) (adopting First District's reasoning in D.F.). Identifying the appropriate time frame is critical because, as our supreme court observed in D.L., section 1(D)(m) limits the evidence that may be considered in measuring "reasonable efforts" and "reasonable progress" to those matters concerning the parent's conduct during the relevant time span outlined in the statute. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10.
The appellate court determined that the proper time frame is the nine-month period following the trial court's adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency, and upheld the trial court's finding of unfitness. 332 Ill. App. 3d 112. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
An administrative agency's interpretation of a statute, including a statute it is charged with administering, is not binding on this court ( Richard's Tire Co. v. Zehnder, 295 Ill. App. 3d 48, 692 N.E.2d 360 (1998) (determining whether previous or amended version of statute was controlling and declining to interpret statute in light of administrative rules and regulations)), and we address the proper construction of the statute de novo. In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 119, 772 N.E.2d 939, 945 (2002) (addressing significance of statutory amendment). The objective of this court in construing a statute is to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
See In re D.F., 332 Ill.App.3d 112, 125 (2002). In the instant cause, as respondent points out and the record makes clear, the trial court, with respect to reasonable efforts, concluded as follows: "I cannot say that [respondent] failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal" of O.
We will not disturb the trial court's finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 124 (2002). The trial court's finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.
¶ 27 The State must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 124 (2002). A trial court's finding of unfitness is entitled to deference and will be disturbed only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Under this analysis, the court must determine whether he has made earnest and conscientious strides toward making the cited corrections. See In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 125 (2002). Separately, "reasonable progress" relates to the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time of removal and, thus, is adjudged on an objective basis.
Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/KD) (West 2002)) lists various grounds under which a parent may be found unfit, any of which standing alone may support such a finding. See In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 117, 125 (2002). A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility assessments that the trial court is in the best position to make.
Accordingly, respondent's argument is waived. See In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 241-42 (2001) ("[w]here a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived"); accord In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 121 (2002) (parent waived contention with respect to section 1(D)(m) by failing to object to the time period used by trial court). Even were we to review respondent's constitutional challenge, as she urges, we find that it has no merit. Foremost, we begin by citing established law, which holds that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional.
The First District recently considered the effects of the amendment to section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act in a case also titled In re D.F., and determined that the nine-months-from-the-adjudication-of-neglect limit still applies to the reasonable efforts basis. In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 120, 772 N.E.2d 939, 945-46 (2002). The court reasoned that because the legislature was presumed to know that courts had decided that the nine-month limit applied to the reasonable efforts basis, and because the legislature did not change the substance of the reasonable efforts basis other than to add a "(i)" in front of it, the prior judicial interpretations applying the nine-month limit retain their validity.