In re Deziyah D.

Full title: IN RE DEZIYAH D.[1]

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Nov 15, 2018

H12CP17016963A (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2018)

Opinion

H12CP17016963A

11-15-2018

IN RE DEZIYAH D.[1]

R. Gilligan, JTR By termination of parental rights petition filed with the court on May 11, 2018, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights of Taina R. (Mother) and Frankie D. (Father) as those rights pertain to the minor child, Deziyah D., born January 8, 2014. Proper service of process on both respondents was confirmed and notice of the trial was properly given in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes and the Practice Book. Counsel was appointed for Mother, Father and the minor child. There is no known action pending in any other court concerning custody of the minor child nor any claim of Native American affiliation. The court finds that it has jurisdiction of this matter. Legal Standard A hearing on termination of parental rights consists of two phases: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909 (2010); In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure of the respondent to rehabilitate in the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable time. In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234 (2011); In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000). If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756 (2007). In the dispositional phase ... the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 479 (2011); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 902 (2008). Procedural History On May 1, 2017, DCF filed an ex parte motion for order of temporary custody and neglect petition in the interest of Deziyah D. The motion was granted on May 1, 2017, the court having found that the minor child was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings and that continuation in the home was contrary to her welfare and vested temporary custody of the child in DCF. (Gilligan J.) On May 5, 2017, the order of temporary custody was sustained. (Dannehy, J.) At a hearing on March 29, 2017, Mother was defaulted, Father stood silent to the allegations in the neglect petition and Deziyah was adjudicated neglected. (Dannehy, J.) After a contested hearing on disposition held on February 1, 2018, Deziyah was committed to DCF. A hearing was conducted on March 1, 2018 at which the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. (Dannehy, J.) The subject termination of parental rights petition was filed by DCF on May 11, 2018. On May 11, 2018 the court granted DCF’s motion for nondisclosure and sealing of Father’s new address out of concerns for his safety. (Taylor, J.) At the preliminary hearing on June 7, 2018 the court found proper service, both respondents appeared, were appointed counsel and entered pro forma denials to the petition. Mother On September 13, 2018, Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights in writing and was canvassed by the court. The court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of Deziyah and terminated Mother’s parental rights to Deziyah. (Dannehy, J.) Father A trial on the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to Deziyah was conducted on November 5, 2018. Father was not present. Counsel for Father reported that he has had no contact with Father since July 2018 and had no explanation for Father’s absence. The court requested the judicial marshal to confirm that Father was not in the court house which resulted in a negative response. Father’s counsel remained and participated in the trial on Father’s behalf. The Testimonial and Documentary Evidence Presented Counsel for DCF offered three exhibits: a Social Study in Support of Permanency Plan dated January 24, 2018 (Exhibit A), Final Specific Steps for Father dated February 1, 2018 (Exhibit B) and a Social Study in Support of Termination of Parental Rights dated June 7, 2018 (Exhibit C). No exhibits were offered by the attorney for Father or the attorney for the minor child. DCF presented testimony from one witness, DCF social worker, Beatrice Velasquez. Velasquez testified that the case was transferred to her approximately one week prior to the day of trial since the social worker previously assigned to the case was on medical leave and not available. The court has reviewed and considered the testimony and the documentary evidence admitted as full exhibits. The court makes the factual findings set forth herein upon an independent assessment of all the evidence. Adjudicatory Grounds (Father) As the adjudicatory ground in the termination of parental rights petition, DCF alleges that Deziyah has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and Father has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, Father could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). Prior Neglect Finding As noted, on March 29, 2017, Deziyah was adjudicated neglected. (Dannehy, J.) The requisite finding required under General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) that the child has been adjudicated neglected in a prior proceeding has been established. Reasonable Efforts General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(1) requires that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parent(s) and made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parent(s). Therefore, the court must first determine in the adjudicatory phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding whether DCF has met its burden to prove that it has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parents. See In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148-49 (2009). With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1), the court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence. Reasonable Efforts to Locate Father DCF’s efforts to locate Father have not been questioned. Father was served with the petition by a state marshal. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Father and accomplished the same. Reasonable Efforts to Reunify the Child with Father General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(1) requires that in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parent(s). The word reasonable is the linchpin which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 48 (2005). Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ... defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ... [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255 (2000). [R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934 (2003). [T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element. In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552 (2009). Our Appellate Court has held that the court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In re Shaiesha O., supra, 47. Reasonable Efforts to Reunify Father and Deziyah DCF referred Father to Wheeler Clinic for a mental health and substance abuse assessment. DCF referred Father to the Therapeutic Family Time program at the Village for Families and Children and offered Father supervised visitation with Deziyah. (Exhibit C, p. 11-12.) The court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Father and Deziyah. Ground B-1 Father’s Failure to Rehabilitate Social Worker Velasquez testified that although she was assigned the case recently, she reviewed the exhibits in anticipation of her providing testimony at the hearing. Velasquez testified that at the time of Deziyah’s removal, Father’s presenting issues were a past history of substance abuse and parenting issues. Father has one son, age 18 (born 8/31/00) who lives with his mother. Father also had another son born in 1995 who was killed in 2012 when he was struck by an automobile driven by a drunk driver. Father reports that the tragedy led him to turn his life around and he has not used illegal drugs since his son was killed. (Exhibit C., p. 7.) Father has two jobs. He is employed as a full-time chef and also works in the construction industry. (Exhibit A., p. 6.) He has never married and has lived with a partner, Daisy F. for five years. There is no prior DCF history concerning Father’s two older children. (Exhibit C., p. 7.) DCF cites Father’s substance abuse as a concern. DCF referred Father and his current partner to Wheeler Clinic in June 2017 for substance abuse and mental health evaluations. Despite multiple referrals, Father did not complete the assessment until December 2017. When Velasquez was asked if Father gave any reason for the delay, Velasquez replied that she could not recall. A subsequent review of the documentary evidence by the court reveals that Father cited difficulty with the time required and his work schedule. (Exhibit A., p. 4.) The Social Study in Support of the Permanency Plan, dated 1/24/18 (Exhibit A, p. 4) reports that the December 2017 test results were negative and that there were no recommendations for further treatment. (Exhibit A., p. 4.) However, on page 23 of the Social Study in Support of the Termination of Parental Rights Petition (Exhibit C), reports that DCF referred Father to Wheeler Clinic on 1/30/18 and 4/26/18 to participate in a hair test. The Social Study dated May 30, 2018 further reports that Father has not completed it to date. When the court inquired of counsel for the petitioner whether DCF had an addendum to the social study or any documentary evidence for the five-month period since the May Social Study, counsel replied that the three exhibits being offered were the most recent reports available. Pages three through eight of the Social Study dated January 24, 2018 (Exhibit A) list the specific steps for Father’s rehabilitation. Of the twenty specific steps listed on Exhibit A, Father is reported to be in full or partial compliance except as follows. Father’s Visitation with Deziyah The Specific Steps required Father to visit Deziyah as often as DCF permits. Father successfully completed the 12-week Therapeutic Family Time (TFT) Program at the Village for Families and Children in October 2017. After the TFT Program, DCF assumed supervision of weekly visits. As of the date of Exhibit A, January 24, 2018, Father was offered 14 supervised visits on Wednesdays from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. The Social Study reports that Father participated in 11 to date ... There has (sic) been a few times when father had to cancel visits due to his work schedule. (Exhibit A, p. 8.) The Study reports that at supervised visits, Deziyah is very attached to the worker and the worker has to encourage Deziyah to spend time with her father. Father does try to engage Deziyah and keep her interested throughout the visit. p. 8. In the Present Situation section of the Social Study in Support of the Termination of Parental Rights Petition (Exhibit C, p. 12), the Study reports that neither parent has visited Deziyah consistently through the Department. The Study reports that the relative foster mother has permitted visits with Deziyah on week-ends and according to the foster mother, Father has requested visits but not consistently. Father’s partner prepares and bring dinner to the visits. The foster mother also reports that Father has called her to speak with Deziyah on Face Time. (Exhibit C, p. 12.) The attorney for the minor child reported that she met with Deziyah as recently as the day prior to the hearing. She also spoke with the foster mother who reported that Father calls her to schedule visits with Deziyah from time to time. Father usually brings his girl friend. The foster mother told her that sometimes Deziyah is all over her father at visits and sometimes she is stand offish but she knows who he is. She also discussed a permanent transfer of guardianship with the foster mother. In her summation, the attorney for the minor child stated that her position was that the child, as all children, needed permanency but she was not sure that DCF had met its burden of proof on the evidence presented and could not support the petition. Conclusion A termination of parental rights petition is a most serious and sensitive judicial action. Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 (1975). The standard of proof to be applied in the finding of a statutory ground to terminate parental rights is clear and convincing evidence. Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(j). Practice Book Sec. 32a-3(b). The standard of clear and convincing evidence should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Tyqwane, 85 Conn.App. 528, 539 (2004). Our Supreme Court has denounced laxity in procedural safeguards at termination proceedings ... (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 437 (1982). Moreover, [I]nsistence upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria before termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption proceedings can occur is not [however] inconsistent with concern for the best interests of the child ... A child, no less than a parent, has a powerful interest in the preservation of the parent-child relationship ... In re Carla C., 167 Conn.App. 248, 264-65 (2016). Our statutes and [case law] make it crystal clear that the determination of the child’s best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence ... [A] parent cannot be displaced because someone else could do a better job of raising the child. (Emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738 (2009). It is, then, improper for a termination of parental rights to be grounded on a finding that a child’s prospective foster or adoptive home will be ‘better’ than life with one or more biological parent. In re Paul M., 154 Conn.App. 505-06 (2014). The adjudicatory ground alleged is General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). As Judge Mack observed in In Re Jaheim, It is interesting to note that the language of the statute is, ‘could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.’ It does not say, ‘assume custodial care’ of the child. The need for permanency might be well served by other than the most drastic of remedies. In Re Jaheim, Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, No. K09-CP010433-A (Oct 3, 2007). Just as DCF has created standards for parents to achieve parental competency and reunification, the law has mandated certain standards including the evidentiary standard of proof which must be clearly established before a parent’s parental rights may be terminated. DCF’s burden required it to prove the adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. The court finds that DCF has failed to sustain its burden of proof. The termination of parental rights petition is dismissed. --------- Notes: [1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

R. Gilligan, JTR

By termination of parental rights petition filed with the court on May 11, 2018, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights of Taina R. ("Mother") and Frankie D. ("Father") as those rights pertain to the minor child, Deziyah D., born January 8, 2014. Proper service of process on both respondents was confirmed and notice of the trial was properly given in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes and the Practice Book. Counsel was appointed for Mother, Father and the minor child. There is no known action pending in any other court concerning custody of the minor child nor any claim of Native American affiliation. The court finds that it has jurisdiction of this matter.

Legal Standard

A hearing on termination of parental rights consists of two phases: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909 (2010); In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure of the respondent to rehabilitate "in the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable time." In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234 (2011); In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000). If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756 (2007). "In the dispositional phase ... the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 479 (2011); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 902 (2008).

Procedural History

On May 1, 2017, DCF filed an ex parte motion for order of temporary custody and neglect petition in the interest of Deziyah D. The motion was granted on May 1, 2017, the court having found that the minor child was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings and that continuation in the home was contrary to her welfare and vested temporary custody of the child in DCF. (Gilligan J.) On May 5, 2017, the order of temporary custody was sustained. (Dannehy, J.) At a hearing on March 29, 2017, Mother was defaulted, Father stood silent to the allegations in the neglect petition and Deziyah was adjudicated neglected. (Dannehy, J.) After a contested hearing on disposition held on February 1, 2018, Deziyah was committed to DCF.

A hearing was conducted on March 1, 2018 at which the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. (Dannehy, J.) The subject termination of parental rights petition was filed by DCF on May 11, 2018. On May 11, 2018 the court granted DCF’s motion for nondisclosure and sealing of Father’s new address out of concerns for his safety. (Taylor, J.) At the preliminary hearing on June 7, 2018 the court found proper service, both respondents appeared, were appointed counsel and entered pro forma denials to the petition.

Mother

On September 13, 2018, Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights in writing and was canvassed by the court. The court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of Deziyah and terminated Mother’s parental rights to Deziyah. (Dannehy, J.)

Father

A trial on the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to Deziyah was conducted on November 5, 2018. Father was not present. Counsel for Father reported that he has had no contact with Father since July 2018 and had no explanation for Father’s absence. The court requested the judicial marshal to confirm that Father was not in the court house which resulted in a negative response. Father’s counsel remained and participated in the trial on Father’s behalf.

The Testimonial and Documentary Evidence Presented

Counsel for DCF offered three exhibits: a Social Study in Support of Permanency Plan dated January 24, 2018 (Exhibit A), Final Specific Steps for Father dated February 1, 2018 (Exhibit B) and a Social Study in Support of Termination of Parental Rights dated June 7, 2018 (Exhibit C). No exhibits were offered by the attorney for Father or the attorney for the minor child.

DCF presented testimony from one witness, DCF social worker, Beatrice Velasquez. Velasquez testified that the case was transferred to her approximately one week prior to the day of trial since the social worker previously assigned to the case was on medical leave and not available.

The court has reviewed and considered the testimony and the documentary evidence admitted as full exhibits. The court makes the factual findings set forth herein upon an independent assessment of all the evidence.

Adjudicatory Grounds (Father)

As the adjudicatory ground in the termination of parental rights petition, DCF alleges that Deziyah has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and Father has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, Father could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

Prior Neglect Finding

As noted, on March 29, 2017, Deziyah was adjudicated neglected. (Dannehy, J.) The requisite finding required under General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) that the child has been adjudicated neglected in a prior proceeding has been established.

Reasonable Efforts

General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(1) requires that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parent(s) and made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parent(s). Therefore, the court must first determine in the adjudicatory phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding whether DCF has met its burden to prove that it has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parents. See In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148-49 (2009).

With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1), the court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.

Reasonable Efforts to Locate Father

DCF’s efforts to locate Father have not been questioned. Father was served with the petition by a state marshal. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Father and accomplished the same.

Reasonable Efforts to Reunify the Child with Father

General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(1) requires that in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parent(s). "The word reasonable is the linchpin which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof." In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 48 (2005). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ... defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ... [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255 (2000). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934 (2003). "[T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552 (2009). Our Appellate Court has held that the court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In re Shaiesha O., supra, 47.

Reasonable Efforts to Reunify Father and Deziyah

DCF referred Father to Wheeler Clinic for a mental health and substance abuse assessment. DCF referred Father to the Therapeutic Family Time program at the Village for Families and Children and offered Father supervised visitation with Deziyah. (Exhibit C, p. 11-12.) The court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Father and Deziyah.

Ground B-1 Father’s Failure to Rehabilitate

Social Worker Velasquez testified that although she was assigned the case recently, she reviewed the exhibits in anticipation of her providing testimony at the hearing. Velasquez testified that at the time of Deziyah’s removal, Father’s presenting issues were a past history of substance abuse and parenting issues.

Father has one son, age 18 (born 8/31/00) who lives with his mother. Father also had another son born in 1995 who was killed in 2012 when he was struck by an automobile driven by a drunk driver. Father reports that the tragedy led him to turn his life around and he has not used illegal drugs since his son was killed. (Exhibit C., p. 7.) Father has two jobs. He is employed as a full-time chef and also works in the construction industry. (Exhibit A., p. 6.) He has never married and has lived with a partner, Daisy F. for five years. There is no prior DCF history concerning Father’s two older children. (Exhibit C., p. 7.)

DCF cites Father’s substance abuse as a concern. DCF referred Father and his current partner to Wheeler Clinic in June 2017 for substance abuse and mental health evaluations. Despite multiple referrals, Father did not complete the assessment until December 2017. When Velasquez was asked if Father gave any reason for the delay, Velasquez replied that she could not recall. A subsequent review of the documentary evidence by the court reveals that Father cited difficulty with the time required and his work schedule. (Exhibit A., p. 4.) The Social Study in Support of the Permanency Plan, dated 1/24/18 (Exhibit A, p. 4) reports that the December 2017 test results were negative and that there were "no recommendations for further treatment." (Exhibit A., p. 4.) However, on page 23 of the Social Study in Support of the Termination of Parental Rights Petition (Exhibit C), reports that DCF referred Father to Wheeler Clinic on 1/30/18 and 4/26/18 to "participate" in a hair test. The Social Study dated May 30, 2018 further reports that Father "has not completed it to date." When the court inquired of counsel for the petitioner whether DCF had an addendum to the social study or any documentary evidence for the five-month period since the May Social Study, counsel replied that the three exhibits being offered were the most recent reports available.

Pages three through eight of the Social Study dated January 24, 2018 (Exhibit A) list the specific steps for Father’s rehabilitation. Of the twenty specific steps listed on Exhibit A, Father is reported to be in full or partial compliance except as follows.

Father’s Visitation with Deziyah

The Specific Steps required Father to visit Deziyah as often as DCF permits. Father successfully completed the 12-week Therapeutic Family Time (TFT) Program at the Village for Families and Children in October 2017. After the TFT Program, DCF assumed supervision of weekly visits. As of the date of Exhibit A, January 24, 2018, Father was offered 14 supervised visits on Wednesdays from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. The Social Study reports that Father "participated in 11 to date ... There has (sic) been a few times when father had to cancel visits due to his work schedule." (Exhibit A, p. 8.) The Study reports that at supervised visits, "Deziyah is very attached to the worker and the worker has to encourage Deziyah to spend time with her father. Father does try to engage Deziyah and keep her interested throughout the visit." p. 8. In the "Present Situation" section of the Social Study in Support of the Termination of Parental Rights Petition (Exhibit C, p. 12), the Study reports that neither parent has visited Deziyah consistently "through the Department." The Study reports that the relative foster mother has permitted visits with Deziyah on week-ends and according to the foster mother, Father has requested visits but not "consistently." Father’s partner prepares and bring dinner to the visits. The foster mother also reports that Father has called her to speak with Deziyah on Face Time. (Exhibit C, p. 12.)

The attorney for the minor child reported that she met with Deziyah as recently as the day prior to the hearing. She also spoke with the foster mother who reported that Father calls her to schedule visits with Deziyah from "time to time." Father usually brings his "girl friend." The foster mother told her that sometimes Deziyah is "all over her father" at visits and sometimes she is "stand offish but she knows who he is." She also discussed a permanent transfer of guardianship with the foster mother. In her summation, the attorney for the minor child stated that her position was that the child, as all children, needed permanency but she was not sure that DCF had met its burden of proof on the evidence presented and could not support the petition.

Conclusion

A termination of parental rights petition is "a most serious and sensitive judicial action." Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 (1975). The standard of proof to be applied in the finding of a statutory ground to terminate parental rights is clear and convincing evidence. Connecticut General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(j). Practice Book Sec. 32a-3(b). The standard of clear and convincing evidence "should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Tyqwane, 85 Conn.App. 528, 539 (2004). "Our Supreme Court has denounced laxity in procedural safeguards at termination proceedings ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 437 (1982). Moreover, "[I]nsistence upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria before termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption proceedings can occur is not [however] inconsistent with concern for the best interests of the child ... A child, no less than a parent, has a powerful interest in the preservation of the parent-child relationship ..." In re Carla C., 167 Conn.App. 248, 264-65 (2016).

"Our statutes and [case law] make it crystal clear that the determination of the child’s best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence ... [A] parent cannot be displaced because someone else could do a better job of raising the child." (Emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738 (2009). "It is, then, improper for a termination of parental rights to be grounded on a finding that a child’s prospective foster or adoptive home will be ‘better’ than life with one or more biological parent." In re Paul M., 154 Conn.App. 505-06 (2014).

The adjudicatory ground alleged is General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). As Judge Mack observed in In Re Jaheim, "It is interesting to note that the language of the statute is, ‘could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.’ It does not say, ‘assume custodial care’ of the child. The need for permanency might be well served by other than the most drastic of remedies." In Re Jaheim, Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, No. K09-CP010433-A (Oct 3, 2007).

Just as DCF has created standards for parents to achieve parental competency and reunification, the law has mandated certain standards including the evidentiary standard of proof which must be clearly established before a parent’s parental rights may be terminated. DCF’s burden required it to prove the adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. The court finds that DCF has failed to sustain its burden of proof.

The termination of parental rights petition is dismissed.