Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0200832
Sepulveda, J.
The minor, Devon F., appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying his motion, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 779, to modify the court’s prior disposition committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). We affirm.
All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
DISCUSSION
On March 22, 2005, the minor was committed to the DJJ after violating his probation by running away as he was being transported to a new placement. He appealed that disposition, and we affirmed. On June 21, 2006, the minor filed a motion to modify the prior disposition order, pursuant to section 779, which the juvenile court denied. Section 779 provides, “The court committing a ward to the [DJJ] may thereafter change, modify, or set aside the order of commitment . . . . This section does not limit the authority of the court to change, modify, or set aside an order of commitment after a noticed hearing and upon a showing of good cause that the [DJJ] is unable to, or failing to, provide treatment consistent with Section 734.” (§ 779.) Section 734 provides, “No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the [DJJ] unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJJ].” (§ 734.) We review the juvenile court’s commitment decisions for an abuse of discretion, “indulging all reasonable inferences to support its decision.” (In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320.)
See People v. Devon F. (Mar. 20, 2006, A110373) [nonpub. opn.] (Devon I).
The minor’s then-appointed appellate attorney filed a declaration in support of the section 779 motion, which indicated that the minor told her that he had attended a 30-minute group meeting at DJJ, led by a custodial guard, who periodically discussed sex offenses with the group, which was comprised of other sex offenders. The minor told appellate counsel that he believed he was receiving more sex offender treatment at his prior placement at Trinity Whitewater, as he occasionally received individual counseling there, the group meetings were conducted by a therapist, and he “was engaged in more discussion about sex offenses.” At the section 779 hearing, the minor’s probation officer verified that while at Trinity Whitewater, the minor participated in weekly sex offender groups conducted by a licensed therapist, and that he had access to individual therapy there on an “as-needed” basis. At the hearing, it was stipulated that if the minor were called as a witness he would testify that from August 2005 until May 2006, he participated in an informal sex offender treatment group weekly, which was led by a correctional officer, and that he received no individual therapy while at DJJ. Beginning in May of 2006, however, he no longer participated in these weekly meetings, due to his enrollment in a formal substance abuse program. He did continue to take victim empathy and victim impact classes, during which he discussed his sexual offense. The minor’s probation officer testified that a report she received from DJJ indicated that the minor was in a “formal sex offender program, ” but other information she received stated that the program was “informal.”
The minor’s probation officer had previously recommended that the minor be removed from Trinity Whitewater as he was not receiving sufficient sex offender treatment there.
In denying the minor’s section 779 motion, the juvenile court stated, “[T]he Court is going to deny the 779, as the Court does not believe that [the minor]’s best interests would be promoted by a change of circumstances. I also have to say the change of circumstances in the Court’s mind is quite limited. It’s quite a small change of circumstances.” On appeal, the minor argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his section 779 motion, arguing that the minor was “not receiving the treatment from DJJ envisioned by the juvenile court when it ordered him placed there.” We disagree.
As summarized in our prior opinion upholding the juvenile court’s original commitment of the minor to DJJ, “the juvenile court found that the minor would benefit ‘from the various programs provided by the Department of Youth Authority’ and that ‘. . . the mental and physical conditions are such as to render it probable that the minor will be benefited by the reformatory, educational, discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJJ].’ ” (Devon I, supra, A110373.) We determined that, given the minor’s history, these findings were supported by substantial evidence. The minor’s probation officer also believed that the minor needed programs and services, in addition to sexual offender treatment, offered by DJJ, including tutoring and education, anger management, assistance with decision-making skills, family counseling, and substance abuse counseling. (Ibid.) As the probation officer summarized, in DJJ the minor would “ ‘be afforded a structured and secure environment where he can address his educational and psychological needs, and where he can be protected from himself while protecting the community.’ ” (Ibid.) We noted that “there was overwhelming evidence that the minor was a danger to the public, had failed to follow through on requirements such as drug testing and court appearances, and (due to his repeated absconding) would benefit from placement in a secure facility.” (Devon I, supra, A110373.) The juvenile court had, indeed, relied upon the minor’s intention to run from any placement as one of its reasons for the original DJJ commitment, and had further noted his involvement in a gang while housed at Juvenile Hall. (Ibid.) Although DJJ had notified the juvenile court that the minor would not be given priority placement in their formal sex offender program, and that they could not assure the court when or whether he would be placed in the program, we upheld the minor’s commitment to DJJ.
As the juvenile court noted in ruling on the minor’s section 779 motion, the minor has demonstrated very little change in circumstances since the original commitment order. While the minor may not be receiving as much formal sex offender counseling as he did at a prior placement, he did receive weekly sex offender group therapy (albeit not conducted by a therapist), was “on a caseload of wards who are all sex offenders; the group concentrates on sex offender work and relapse prevention, ” was enrolled in an anger management group and participated in a Life Skills Resource group, and was participating in a formal substance abuse program. Even after his weekly sex offender group meetings ceased due to his participation in the substance abuse program, he continued to take victim empathy and victim impact classes in which he discussed his sexual offense.
The minor’s argument that it is not probable he will benefit from his placement at DJJ takes too narrow a view of the juvenile court’s reasons for his commitment and is not supported by the record. While the minor’s need for additional sex offender therapy initially motivated the probation department to change his placement from Trinity Whitewater, it was his running away from his next placement at Breaking the Cycle, remaining at large for almost three months, and then absconding when he was transferred to yet a third placement, which brought him before the court and led to his DJJ commitment. The probation department noted many areas where DJJ would benefit the minor, as did the juvenile court in its original commitment there. The minor has been participating in several programs which address many of these needs, and has been showing progress. As his counsel indicated at the section 779 hearing, “The most recent reports we have from [DJJ] with respect to the underlying offense indicate he had a paradigm shift in his thinking that he is accepting responsibility for his behavior, that he is appearing to mature and to see his behavior in a new light and to see the offense in a new light—beginning to understand what is appropriate and inappropriate in sexual behavior.” Whether or not DJJ is providing formal sex offender therapy on a regular basis to the minor, the combination of programs they have implemented for him, along with his restricted environment, appear to be having a positive effect. Nothing in the record would support a finding of a change of circumstances such that the minor would no longer benefit from the programs available at DJJ; the trial court’s decision in accord was certainly not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court, denying the minor’s motion pursuant to section 779, is affirmed.
We concur:
Reardon, Acting P.J., Rivera, J.