Opinion
D041598.
7-11-2003
In re DEVIN T., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KIMBERLY T., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Kimberly T. and Raul T., parents of Devin T., Dallas T., Elijah T., Angel T., Sadie T. and Nelson T., appeal the termination of their parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Kimberly, joined by Raul, contends the juvenile court should have granted an evidentiary hearing on her petition to modify (§ 388) the courts earlier order terminating reunification services. Both Kimberly and Raul contend the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception to adoption (& sect; 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Kimberly and Raul married in 1981 and had nine children. The six children who are the subject of this appeal are: Devin, who was born in 1991; Dallas, who was born in 1992; Elijah, who was born in 1994; Angel, who was born in 1996; Sadie, who was born in 1998; and Nelson, who was born in 2, 2000. In approximately December 2000, Raul moved out of the family residence but would "come and go" at will.
The couples oldest son, Raul Jr., is an adult. Sabella, the second child, tested positive for cocaine when she was born in January 3, 1990, and was declared a dependent of the court. Reunification efforts were unsuccessful and the maternal grandmother became Sabellas legal guardian. Kimberlys and Rauls youngest child, Sveva, was born during these dependency proceedings and removed from parental care.
On January 21, 2001, Kimberlys sister, Danielle M., concerned after talking on the telephone to Kimberly, who sounded drunk, and Devin, who said she was hungry, asked police to check on the welfare of her nephews and nieces. When police arrived at the residence at 10:30 p.m., Kimberly appeared intoxicated and disoriented, but insisted she could care for her children. Several of the children were awake, and most of them were lying on the living room floor. Clothing, toys and trash were scattered throughout the apartment. Devin told the officers their dinner consisted of french fries only. The police removed the children from the home and took them to Polinsky Childrens Center.
Devin told a social worker that Kimberly is drunk three or four times a week and "gets mean when she drinks." Devin also reported her parents yell at each other a lot and her father threw a box at her mother. Dallas, Elijah and Angel also told the social worker that Kimberly is mean when she is drinking, the parents fight often and the children are hungry because there is no food to eat. The social worker placed the children with the maternal grandmother, and later moved the infant Nelson to the home of the maternal aunt, Danielle.
Kimberly denied having a drinking problem and maintained it was not wrong to be intoxicated in her own home. Kimberly told the social worker that Raul often hit her and twice attacked her in the bathroom, resulting in bruises on her arm and broken fingernails.
Raul admitted there were domestic violence incidents and said he would benefit from domestic violence classes.
On January 25, the San Diego County Health and Human Resources Agency (Agency) filed petitions on behalf of each child under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging the child was at risk because Kimberlys drinking rendered her unable to provide care and Raul was unable to protect the child.
On February 22, the juvenile court sustained the petition and declared the children dependents. The court also ordered services for the parents and supervised visitation, with each parent visiting the children separately. The court also directed Kimberly to participate in the Substance Abuse Recovery Management System (SARMS), the juvenile courts substance abuse treatment case management program.
Initially, Kimberlys compliance with SARMS was good, but in July the court found her in contempt for unexcused absences during May and sentenced her to two days in jail. In August, the court ordered Kimberly to participate in dependency drug court.
Kimberly claimed that in May she was distraught after learning that Raul had fathered a child with a long-time mistress.
On July 19, a social worker made an unannounced visit to Kimberlys residence and did not find any alcohol or evidence of alcohol in the home. Kimberly told the social worker she had stopped drinking on January 22 — her "clean date." However, Raul Jr. said his mother had come to his residence intoxicated at least four times in the past six months and had consumed alcohol at his residence on four other occasions — one as recently as July 8.
Also in July, Raul, who was now living with Kimberly, completed an anger management course. Raul told the social worker Kimberly was not currently drinking.
As of July 1, Kimberly had seen Nelson twice since he was removed from her custody; Raul had not seen Nelson at all. This lack of visitation was attributed to the hostility between Kimberly and her sister Danielle, who was Nelsons caregiver. However, Danielle offered to bring Nelson to the maternal grandparents home for visits with his parents. Agency arranged weekly visits with each parent and Nelson at a visitation center starting July 16, and the social worker reported Kimberly and Raul complied with the visitation schedule. As to the older children, the social worker reported that as of August 1, Kimberly had visited them at the maternal grandmothers house only 15 times; Raul had visited them only five times.
For the six-month review hearing, Agency initially recommended services be terminated for Kimberly and Raul in relation to the two younger children — Sadie and Nelson — and a section 366.26 hearing be set. As to the four older children, Agency initially recommended the parents receive another six months of services. Eleven days later, Agency changed its recommendation urging a section 366.26 hearing be set for all six children after receiving a psychiatric evaluation of Kimberly and more reports of her drinking. Among other things, Kimberly told the psychiatrist that she is not an alcoholic and her sister had made a false police report on the night the children were removed. Kimberly also blamed her family for many of her problems and "takes little responsibility." Kimberlys son from a former marriage told the social worker that his mother had drunk a fifth of vodka the night before her birthday. Then on her birthday, June 1, 2001, Kimberly took two bottles of alcohol from her cousin and drank half of one of the bottles in less than five minutes while waiting for breakfast.
On August 28, Angel and Sadie were placed in the home of Anita P., a maternal aunt. Devin, Dallas and Elijah remained in the maternal grandmothers home, and Nelson remained in the home of Danielle.
Meanwhile, the six-month review hearing was continued until November 20. On that date, Agency changed its recommendation again, proposing the parents receive another six months of services with respect to all of the children.
Kimberly had been in compliance with SARMS since August. On November 15, the presiding judge of the juvenile court wrote a letter on Kimberlys behalf:
"Ms. [T.] is an active participant in the juvenile dependency drug court. She attends Parent Care on an outpatient basis and has 184 days of sobriety as of [11/15]. At one point during the course of Ms. [T.]s treatment, there was an allegation that she had relapsed seriously on alcohol. A number of random tests were done on Ms. [T.] and she continued to test negative at all times. Ms. [T.] has continued to exhibit behavior that we consider consistent with sobriety. She has been compliant with our program and we credit her with six months of sobriety."
On January 30, 2002, the court authorized unsupervised visitation. In early February, Agency recommended six more months of reunification services and requested discretion to allow a 60-day trial visit after the parents started conjoint therapy, but later that month recommended that overnight visits not occur. Kimberly, who was pregnant, walked out of a Family Unity meeting on February 12, and Raul did not want to participate without his wife.
On February 20, the court granted the de facto parent application of the maternal grandmother for Devin, Dallas and Elijah and the de facto parent application of Danielle for Nelson. On February 21, Kimberlys obstetrician wrote a letter stating she was at high risk for a miscarriage and needed to be on complete bed rest.
In March, the court granted the de facto parent application of Anita for Angel and Sadie.
At the 12-month review hearing on March 28, the court continued services and set an 18-month permanency hearing for July 22. The court ordered a 60-day trial visit for Dallas, Elijah and Angel in the parents home on the condition the children remain in therapy and continue attending the same school. The court also gave the social worker discretion to begin a 60-day trial visit with the three other siblings. Initially, Sadie and Nelson were to have unsupervised visits in the parents home every Tuesday and Thursday and Saturday-to-Sunday overnight visits. Devin was to have unsupervised, overnight visits on the weekends.
The trial visit with Dallas, Elijah and Angel, which began March 28, did not go well. Kimberly and Raul argued and yelled at each other on a daily basis and in front of the children. Elijah saw Kimberly slap Raul. Kimberly and Raul did not continue their conjoint therapy and did not take Angel to his therapy sessions. Kimberly was terminated from drug court and SARMS on April 11. On April 16, the court terminated Angels 60-day trial visit, and he was returned to the home of his maternal aunt, Anita. The court also terminated the overnight visits of Angel, Sadie and Nelson and found Devin did not have to begin her trial visit. On April 18, the court, at Kimberlys request, ordered her back into SARMS.
On April 30, Raul was arrested for possession of a concealed firearm.
Rauls criminal record dates back to 1981, with convictions for drug sales and domestic violence.
On May 2, the trial visit for Dallas and Elijah was terminated and they were returned to the home of the maternal grandmother. When Kimberly returned the boys, she confronted Devin, accusing her of making statements that led to the termination of her brothers trial visit.
On May 20, the court ordered all visitation between Kimberly and the children be supervised.
A contested hearing was held on May 29 and June 6 regarding the termination of the trial 60-day visit for Dallas and Elijah. The parties made the following stipulations: (1) Kimberlys obstetrician would testify he saw her in February and saw no evidence of alcohol abuse and she had a high-risk pregnancy; (2) Kimberlys midwife would testify she saw Kimberly in March, April and May and saw no evidence of alcohol abuse; (3) Elijah would testify he was well taken care of and liked living with Kimberly during the approximate 30 days, he saw his mother drink alcohol once when she poured what he believed beer into a glass, he saw marijuana being used with a bong when he visited a cousins house with Kimberly, he saw Kimberly touch Raul with an open hand on the shoulder, he saw a telephone being thrown out the residence door during another argument, and Raul was only in the home for about a week of the visit; and (4) Dallas would testify he did not see Kimberly drink any alcohol, he was well taken care of and he did not see any arguments.
On June 6, the court ruled Kimberly was to have supervised visitation and ordered her to enroll again in SARMS.
In July, Kimberly, who had moved to her uncles residence, told the social worker that she was unable to participate in SARMS programs because of her difficult pregnancy and her change of residence. By the third week of August, Kimberly had not visited the children since the June 6 hearing. Kimberly rejected the social workers proposal to arrange visits at a visitation center; she wanted the children brought to her house.
After a contested hearing on August 26, the court found the parents had made minimal progress in solving the problems that led to the removal of the children; the court terminated reunification services and ordered a section 366.26 hearing.
In September and October, Kimberly stayed at the maternal grandmothers home while she was having trouble with her pregnancy. Kimberlys oldest daughter Sabella (see fn. 2, ante) was having panic attacks and asked Kimberly to stay with her. During this period, Kimberly helped with the child care of Devin, Dallas and Elijah and household tasks. When Agency found out Kimberly was staying overnight, the maternal grandmother was reprimanded and that arrangement ended. Kimberly then visited the children about twice a week until January 2003, when the grandmother stopped the visits because of a quarrel. During this period, Kimberly also visited Angel and Sadie often, staying overnight about seven times. She helped with child care and household tasks. Kimberly only saw Nelson if he was at the maternal grandmothers house.
Raul did not want the children to visit him in jail; the sight of Raul in shackles during a court hearing after his arrest had upset the children. Raul telephoned and corresponded with the children. After Raul was released from jail on December 24, he had two supervised visits with the children.
The adoption assessment social worker observed five visits between Kimberly and her children. The social worker reported Kimberly was more preoccupied with her infant, Sveva, who was born October 13, 2002, than interacting with the other children. The social worker summarized: "The children have a familiarity with their biological mother similar to that of an older sibling and wish she could be more available to them. Mrs. [T] relates to the children on a surface level during the visits. She was not necessarily tuned in to meeting the internal needs of the children." Because none of the children had a child-parent relationship, the social worker concluded terminating parental rights would not be detrimental to any of the children.
According to the report, the children were likely to be adopted. The maternal grandmother, who had been the caregiver for Devin, Dallas and Elijah, was willing to adopt them. Otherwise, one approved adoptive family was seeking to adopt a sibling group like Devin, Dallas and Elijah. There were eight approved adoptive families seeking to adopt a child like Devin, eight approved adoptive families seeking to adopt a child like Dallas, and nine approved adoptive families seeking to adopt a child like Elijah. The maternal aunt, Anita, who had been the caregiver for Angel and Sadie since August 28, 2001, was willing to adopt them. Otherwise, there were 28 approved adoptive families seeking to adopt a sibling group like Angel and Sadie. There were 20 approved adoptive families willing to adopt a child like Angel and 58 approved adoptive families willing to adopt a child like Sadie. The maternal aunt, Danielle, the caregiver for Nelson, was willing to adopt him. Otherwise, there were 56 approved adoptive families willing to adopt a child like Nelson. The agency recommended these caregivers adopt the children to enable the children to remain in contact with their siblings.
On January 17, 2003, Kimberly filed a motion to modify the courts earlier order scheduling a section 366.26 hearing. As changes of circumstances, Kimberly alleged she was complying with SARMS, undergoing counseling, visiting the children regularly, and was now healthy enough to provide for all of the children, whom she said were bonded to her. Also, Kimberly alleged she was in compliance with the reunification plan for Sveva. On January 28, the court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, finding the petition did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances and failed to show how the requested modification would promote the best interests of the children.
On January 30, after a two-day contested hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that each child was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated, none of the statutory exceptions to adoption ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) applied, and adoption was in the best interest of each child. The court terminated Kimberlys and Rauls parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for each child.
DISCUSSION
I
No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Section 388 Evidentiary Hearing
Kimberly, joined by Raul, contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition. The contention is without merit.
Section 388 provides that a parent may petition the court for a hearing to change, modify or set aside any previous order of the court on the grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. The statute goes on to state: "If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . ." (Id., subd. (c).)
However, if the petition fails to state a change of circumstances or new evidence that might require a change of order, the court may deny the application ex parte. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1432(b).) The parent must make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to a full hearing. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310, 851 P.2d 826; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416.) "A prima facie showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited." (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593; see also In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 673.) The petitioners burden includes making a prima facie showing that the requested change would promote the best interests of the child. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450-1451.)
A juvenile court has extremely broad discretion in ruling on section 388 motions. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319, 867 P.2d 706.) A juvenile courts ruling on a section 388 motion should not be reversed absent an ""arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination."" (In re Stephanie M. , at p. 318.) On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. The juvenile court could quite properly conclude there was no prima facie showing of changed circumstances such that a renewed reunification effort or placement with Kimberly was in the childrens best interests.
Kimberly alleged she was currently compliant with SARMS, undergoing counseling, and visiting the children regularly. She also alleged she was now in compliance with the reunification plan for Sveva. Assuming that these allegations were true and that they would have been proven at an evidentiary hearing, "a change of circumstance warranting renewed reunification efforts . . . would not have been established." (In re Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 591.) To establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, Kimberly needed to allege the circumstances that caused the removal of her children were no longer present. She failed to do this. Over the two— year course of these proceedings, Kimberlys record of compliance with SARMS, visitation and other reunification services was akin to a roller coaster. She was in total compliance for a period of months, followed by no compliance, followed by another period of compliance and so forth. At one point, the court tried a 60-day trial visit and, as observed by the court, "it blew up." Moreover, throughout these proceedings, Kimberly had been in denial that her excessive drinking led to the removal of the children; instead, putting the entire blame on her relatives. Kimberly did not allege facts showing she had broken the vicious cycle of recovery and relapse or that she was no longer denying that she had a drinking problem. Kimberlys allegations were merely temporal changes of circumstances, with no showing that Kimberly had broken her roller coaster pattern of compliance and accepted her responsibility for the dependencies. This case is analogous to In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424, and In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610, where the alleged changed circumstances were also recent substance abuse rehabilitation. In In re Cliffton B., supra, at pages 423 to 424, the court found seven months of sobriety after multiple relapses was insufficient to show changed circumstances. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding these allegations did not constitute changed circumstances.
On appeal, Kimberly continues to maintain she did not have a drinking problem.
We assume Kimberlys allegation that she was healthy enough to care for all of the children refers to the end of her at-risk pregnancy. Kimberly was not pregnant for most of these lengthy dependency proceedings, and her pregnancy was not the cause of the dependency nor a significant aggravating factor for her failure to reunify. This is not the type of change of circumstance envisioned by section 388.
Kimberlys allegation that the children are bonded to her also fails as a change of circumstance sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Kimberlys offer of proof did not point to any evidence that would show the level of bonding between her and each of the children had changed. (See In re Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 250-251.)
Kimberly claims she could have presented Raymond Murphy, a psychologist who authored a bonding study and testified at the section 366.26 hearing. Murphy opined Elijah had a strong and well-bonded relationship with Kimberly and identified her as a primary care provider. The psychologist opined Devin and Dallas were attached to Kimberly but not in a primary way; their relationship to Kimberly was more like a sibling or friend relationship. Angel and Sadie had a well-developed relationship with Kimberly, but Nelson showed little emotional connection to her. However, Murphy was not mentioned in Kimberlys offer of proof on the section 388 petition.
Kimberly also did not make a prima facie showing that a change of circumstances would be in the best interests of the children. At this point of the proceedings, the eve of the section 366.26 hearing, the childrens interest in stability and permanence was the courts paramount concern. During the course of their dependencies, the five older children had flourished in the homes of their relative caregivers and gained a sense of permanency while two-year— old Nelson had spent practically his entire life being parented by Kimberlys sister. The childrens needs for permanence and stability were being met by the caregivers with whom they had bonded. The juvenile court may consider "the facts established as without dispute by the courts own file" in determining whether a prima facie showing has been made that modification would be in the childs best interests. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.) The record up to that point reflects that the children were bonded to their caregivers and Kimberly did not have the type of parent-child relationship with them envisioned by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). The childrens need for stability and permanence would not have been promoted by reinstituting reunification services or returning them to Kimberly in the hope that she might be able to provide a permanent home for the minor in the future.
It would not have been in the childrens best interests to have their status delayed by modifying the order; accordingly, the court was justified in denying a full hearing. (See In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 323; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799.)
II
Court Properly Found No Exception to Adoption
Kimberly and Raul contend the court erred by finding the "beneficial relationship" exception to adoption ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) did not apply in this case. The contention is without merit.
Our standard of review is the substantial evidence test. (In re Autumn H . (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) We determine if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the conclusions of the juvenile court, resolve all conflicts favor of the prevailing party, and draw all legitimate inferences to uphold the lower courts ruling. (In re Brison C . (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.)
Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) At the selection and implementation hearing, the court must terminate parental rights if the child is adoptable. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
The parent bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the statutory preference for adoption applies. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Evid. Code, § 115.)
The beneficial relationship exception is codified at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), which provides that once the court finds the minor adoptable, the court shall not terminate parental rights if it finds termination would be detrimental to the minor because "the parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." The exception applies only if both prongs are met.
The juvenile court found the first prong of section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) — regular visitation or contact — was met. Contrary to the position of Agency and the childrens appellate counsel, substantial evidence supported this finding as to all of the children except Nelson. For the better part of the dependencies, Kimberly visited the children regularly and lived with some of them part of the time. Raul had regular contact by telephone and correspondence with the older children while he was in jail.
The court, however, found the benefit to the children from continuing the child-parent relationship with Kimberly and Raul would not outweigh the benefit they would gain from the permanence an adoptive home. Substantial evidence supports this finding as well.
As to Nelson, there was no parent-child relationship.
Each of the five other children did have a child-parent relationship with Kimberly and Raul. Each had lived a significant part of his or her life with Kimberly and Raul, knew them as his or her parents, and felt varying degrees of love and affection toward them. However, the existence of such relationships does not by itself satisfy the second prong of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
In In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575, this court explained that to come within the beneficial relationship exception to adoption, a parent must show the "relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (Italics added.) The court must balance "the strength and quality of the . . . parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer." (Ibid.) In balancing these interests, relevant factors, include "the age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs . . . ." (Id. at p. 576.) Further, the parent must show the benefit arises from a parental rather than a caretaker or friendly visitor relationship. We reaffirmed this balancing test, explaining the standard "reflects the legislative intent that adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51, italics added.)
The five older children suffered greatly from a lack of security and permanence in their lives. They were removed from their parents home in January 2001 because Kimberly was drunk and the children were hungry. Raul was not present; the couple had separated — something they repeatedly did during the dependencies. Although the section 300 petitions did not mention domestic violence, this clearly was a contributing factor to the chaos surrounding the familys life. After 18 months of reunification services, these problems were still extant. At various points, the parents had made progress, but then they would revert to their harmful behaviors. At one point, there was sufficient progress to merit an 60-day trial visit for three of the children and overnight visits for the others, but these attempts were either cut short or not put into effect because Kimberly and Raul were fighting in front of the children and did not take Angel to his therapy. The childrens contacts with the parents were unstable and presented significant protective issues. Given the on— again, off-again pattern of attempts to reunify, the five older children had no constancy in their lives for two years other than they were being well cared for by the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt, Anita.
Furthermore, the wishes of the child are relevant at a section 366.26 hearing. (Id., subd. (h).) Devin and Dallas indicated they wanted to be adopted if it meant they would live and grow up in the maternal grandmothers home. Elijah, who had the strongest bond with Kimberly and Raul, did not give a clear answer whether he wanted to be adopted; however, he offered: "I wish things had not happened the way they did." Angel and Sadie were too young to express their views on being adopted.
Kimberly points to the testimony of psychologist Murphy, who authored the bonding study, as proving termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children. The social worker, however, disagreed, opining there would be no long-term detriment. The court, as trier of fact, was entitled to find the social worker more credible than Murphy, who had only limited time to observe Kimberly with the children, and to give her assessment greater weight. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
Kimberly also argues the fact that Devin telephoned her when the children were left alone and a safety issue arose shows there was the type of beneficial parent-child relationship envisioned by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). It was up to the juvenile court to give whatever weight it determined was appropriate to this incident. Moreover, Devin, who is the oldest of the five children, also expressed "some anxiety regarding [Kimberly] and her . . . ability to care for the children."
Raul urges that terminating his parental rights was error because he was the only father the children ever knew. We are not persuaded. The childrens need for stability and permanence at this stage outweighed the benefits of maintaining their child-parent relationship with Raul.
The parents argue that the court should have selected guardianship rather adoption as the childrens permanent plan. However, while the relative caregivers — all of whom had done an excellent job in allowing the children to thrive in their placement despite the uncertainty of their two-year dependencies — were willing to adopt them, they were not interested in legal guardianships. Furthermore, given the evidence of the familial history and relationships, the court could reasonably infer that Kimberly and Raul would not be foreclosed from contact with the children if Kimberly made a commitment to sobriety.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J., and MCINTYRE, J.