Not surprisingly, defendant argues that the savings clause should not be deemed to define rape as a sex offense. In support of his position, defendant relies heavily on the First District Appellate Court case of In re Detention of Lieberman, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1020 (2001). In Lieberman, the respondent was convicted in 1980 of a series of rapes.
" The appellate court granted respondent's application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court answered the certified question in the negative, and reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 319 Ill. App. 3d 1020. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
Upon concluding that rape was incorporated into the offense of criminal sexual assault, the court orally denied Lieberman's motion on February 1. As promised, Lieberman responded by filing an interlocutory appeal, and an Illinois appellate court reversed the trial judge's ruling. See In re Det. of Lieberman, 319 Ill. App.3d 1020, 253 Ill.Dec. 576, 745 N.E.2d 699 (2001). The Illinois Supreme Court later overturned that decision, concluding that the state legislature intended to include the offense of rape within the statute's definition of "sexually violent offense."
The appellate court is directed to reconsider its judgment in light of A.P Properties v. Goshinsky, 186 Ill.2d 524 (1999). (91344) In re Detention of Lieberman 319 Ill. App.3d 1020 Allowed. (Fitzgerald, J., took no part.)
The circuit court denied respondent's petition and certified a question for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, this court reversed the circuit court's order denying respondent's motion to dismiss. In re Detention of Lieberman, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1020 (2001). The State appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed our decision, and the proceedings against respondent were reinstated.