In any event, contrary to respondent's contention, the record shows that the court properly denied respondent's request. The record is devoid of evidence of any serious conflict between respondent and counsel (see Matter of Desmond K., 59 A.D.3d 240, 241 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 711 [2009]), or that counsel's representation was deficient. Further, the court made appropriate inquiry into respondent's reasons for the request and made its determination after it considered respondent's statements.
A party seeking to vacate a judgment on the basis of excusable default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense ( Mutual Mar. Off., Inc. v Joy Constr. Corp., 39 AD3d 417, 419). The court properly denied defendant's third request for an adjournment of plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment ( see Matter of Desmond K., 59 AD3d 240, lv denied 12 NY3d 711; Treppeda v Treppeda, 212 AD2d 592). While in support of the motion to vacate the default, defendant claimed that he had had a "previously scheduled engagement," he offered nothing to substantiate this claim. Moreover, at no time after the motion for partial summary judgment was submitted did defendant seek leave to submit opposition.
Even assuming, arguendo, that respondent was properly determined to be a notice father, we conclude that he nevertheless had the right to "notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard concerning the [child's] best interests" ( Matter of Alyssa M., 55 AD3d 505, 506). The record establishes that respondent appeared at each court date of which he had notice, either in person or by counsel, thus manifesting his intention to exercise his rights even if those rights were limited to those of a notice father ( cf. Matter of Desmond K., 59 AD3d 240). The record, however, contains no indication that respondent was informed of the date on which the dispositional hearing on the termination of parental rights petition was to be conducted. We conclude that the failure to afford respondent an opportunity to be heard on the issue of his son's best interests at that hearing in accordance with his right as a notice father, at which hearing he also would have been afforded the opportunity to submit evidence that he was a consent father, amounts to a denial of due process ( see Matter of Samantha L. J., 155 AD2d 980; see generally Matter of Roy Anthony A., 59 AD2d 662).