Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0701119.
Marchiano, P.J.
Dennis R. appeals from a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court, ordering him detained in juvenile hall for 60 days, and placing him on probation, after he pleaded no contest to violating Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c) (grand theft, person). The appeal challenges the condition of probation that forbids appellant from attending the same school as the victim of the theft and another minor appellant menaced when the theft occurred. We conclude that the arguments against this condition were waived, and that they are untenable in any event. We therefore affirm the dispositional order.
I. BACKGROUND
15-year old Anders P. and 14-year old Alex P. were walking along a street on the night of May 4, 2007, on the way to Anders’s home when a vehicle with five occupants passed by and stopped about 100 feet in front of them. Appellant and Eric W., both age 16, got out of the vehicle and ran toward Anders and Alex. Appellant and Eric tackled Anders; Alex managed to run away. Anders heard one of his assailants say, “Do you have any money?” Eric held Anders’s head down with his knee, appellant held Anders’s legs, and appellant removed a cell phone from Anders’s pant’s pocket. Appellant and Eric fled back to the vehicle and rode away.
A witness noted the vehicle’s license plate number, and Anders was able to identify appellant and Eric because they all attended the same school. Anders suffered “minor ‘road rash’ injuries” to his left hand, wrist, elbow, shoulder, and knee, and he “complained of pain to the right side of his head which had been pushed into the ground.”
Appellant was arrested, and the cell phone was recovered. Appellant initially told the police that he targeted Anders and Alex at random, and only subsequently learned that they were his schoolmates. He later admitted to the probation officer that he knew Anders and Alex, and wanted to confront Anders for “spreading rumors about him [appellant] and his girlfriend.” He said he had wanted to scare Anders, not hurt him. He said that he took Anders’s cell phone “because cell phones are a teenager’s ‘social lifeline,’ ” and that he intended to return it after a few days.
According to the probation report, appellant “had gravitated to a negative peer group beginning in the 10th grade. He and his friends would routinely cut classes and hang out. . . . After the present offense, [appellant] disassociated himself from this peer group and sought out new, more positive friends as he began to realize his old friends were not helping him. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [F]ollowing the present matter, school records indicate [appellant] has made significant improvement in his overall attendance and academic progress.”
At the dispositional hearing, the probation department representative advised that “we did receive a letter from the victim. However, the victim wanted just the Judge to read the letter and did not want it to be made—his feelings to be made public. And we told him we had to give it to everybody. So we could not disclose the letter. . . . [T]he victim is very fearful of [appellant] and the co-responsible and has been supposedly labeled a snitch at his school and is really apparently suffering a lot of repercussions still from this.”
The court found the offense “really vicious [and] cowardly,” and told appellant: “This is not a little thing. You intentionally inflicted harm, and you intentionally terrified people.” The court asked whether appellant was attending the same school as Anders, the deputy district attorney said, “Yes,” and the court stated: “Well, I don’t want him going to the same school as the victim. I don’t want that. That’s not fair. It’s not fair to the victim in this case to have to see this young man at the same school every single day. So I’m going to order that he go to a different school.”
The court proceeded to order that appellant have no contact with Anders and Alex, and that he not attend the same school as either of them, which prompted the following discussion:
“[Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, I’m concerned about the order to go to a different school. I believe this is a public school. I’m just concerned about the
“The Court: All I’m saying is he cannot be in the same school where the victim, the two victims, the one who ran and was terrified by this minor and the other victim are, he cannot go to the same school.
“[Deputy District Attorney]: They can do an inter district transfer.
“The Court: There’s all sorts of inter district transfers they can do. It is simply not fair to them. They are terrified, and they are the innocent victims in this case.”
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the different-school probation condition was an abuse of discretion and violated his constitutional right to freedom of association.
Appellant did not raise these objections below and cannot properly do so for the first time on appeal. “[T]o preserve for appeal the issue of the reasonableness of a condition of probation, a juvenile offender must object to it in the juvenile court, unless some exception applies to excuse the failure to object.” (In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 814.) Counsel below raised a “concern” about the different-school condition, which the deputy district attorney and the court interpreted as a concern about the feasibility of a transfer to a different public school. If appellant had other concerns about the probation condition like those he now asserts, he should have raised them in the trial court.
Appellant notes that an objection may be preserved for appeal if the court cuts a party off when the objection is attempted (see People v. Leffel (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1317-1318), but there was no attempt below to advance the present objections. Appellant submits that “it was probably in [his] best interests [for his counsel] to stop when she did” in objecting to the condition because “the court had worked up a considerable head of steam in excoriating appellant for his behavior” by the time the condition was broached. However, the fact that the court was justifiably angry with appellant does not establish that his current objections to the conditions of probation would necessarily have been futile. Accordingly, the objections were waived.
Even if they were not waived, the objections lack merit.
“The juvenile court is empowered to impose conditions of probation in juvenile cases and has broad discretion when formulating such conditions. A juvenile probationer may be therefore subject to ‘any and all reasonable conditions’ the court ‘may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ In deciding what probation conditions are appropriate, the court shall consider not only the circumstances of the offense but also the minor’s entire social history. Such conditions are valid and enforceable unless they bear no reasonable relationship to the underlying offense or prohibit conduct that is neither criminal in nature nor related to future criminality. On appeal, the court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 6-7, fns. omitted.)
The different-school condition was not an abuse of discretion under these standards. Appellant maintains that the condition had no reasonable relationship to the underlying offense because the offense did not take place at school or during school hours. However, this argument overlooks appellant’s admission that he committed the offense in retaliation for the rumors Anders was allegedly spreading, presumably among their peers at school, about appellant and his girlfriend. He had targeted the victim before and, in the close proximity at school, could encounter and confront him again. The condition was also related to future criminality because it would help ensure that appellant continued to avoid the “bad crowd” at the school that he blamed for his delinquent behavior.
Nor was there any violation of appellant’s constitutional rights. “The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. And a parent may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of . . . constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent’s own constitutionally protected “liberty” includes the right to “bring up children” [citation,] and to “direct the upbringing and education of children.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941, italics added.) The different-school condition is “consistent with the [reformative and] rehabilitative purpose[s] of probation and constitutional parental authority. [Appellant’s] constitutional right of association has not been impermissibly burdened.” (In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1243.)
III. CONCLUSION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur: Swager, J., Margulies, J.