Opinion
B161999.
7-29-2003
In re DELORES O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. YVONNE G., Defendant and Appellant.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, and Williams Sias, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Yvonne G. is the mother of Delores O., a dependent of the juvenile court. She challenges the juvenile courts finding that she was offered adequate family reunification services. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Yvonne is the natural mother of Delores and Denzel H. On September 5, 2001, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of Delores and Denzel. The petition alleged, inter alia, that Yvonne had physically abused the children, that Odessa G., Yvonnes mother, had known of this abuse and failed to protect the children, and that Delores suffered from suicidal ideation and depression due to her home environment.
Denzel is not a subject of this appeal.
All further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
The accompanying reports indicated that Yvonne and the children lived in Odessas home. According to Odessa, Yvonne had Downs Syndrome and, although then 41 years old, displayed the mental capacity of a 15-year old. Delores was a special needs child who, like Yvonne, received services from a regional center. DCFS stated that Delores had told a social worker that Yvonne and Odessa constantly disciplined her by hitting her.
Section 4620 et seq. authorizes the creation of regional centers to provide services for the developmentally disabled. (In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 1329-1330, 255 Cal. Rptr. 498.)
On September 5, 2001, the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining the children and ordered family reunification services. The children were placed in foster care, and later, with a relative.
On October 22, 2001, DCFS filed a first amended petition on behalf of Delores. The adjudication hearing took place on January 14, 2002. Yvonne waived her trial rights, and the juvenile court sustained allegations that (1) Delores had special needs that Yvonne, who is developmentally disabled, was unable to meet without engaging in physical violence, and that (2) Yvonnes limitations hindered her ability to protect the children from Odessas physical discipline.
A contested dispositional hearing occurred on March 11, 2002. Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued a case plan that directed Yvonne to participate in individual counseling that addressed "all case issues." It further stated: "All referrals are to be at mothers cognitive level."
In ordering this case plan, the juvenile court stated: "Well, [DCFS] is going to have to provide the appropriate referrals. The first thing that [DCFS] is going to have to do is to check with South Central Regional Center to determine whether they provide the necessary counseling. If South Central Regional Center does not, then Regional Center, since [Yvonne] is a regional center client and [DCFS] is going to have to work together to find her an appropriate counseling. The court has no problems with the counseling wherever it might be or whatever facility, as long as it addresses all of the issues that need to be addressed, and it is DCFS approved. So, the fact that it — that its a regional center does not in and of itself mean its either appropriate or not appropriate. Its going to have to be checked out carefully and its going to have to be done immediately, and if there is not an appropriate regional center counseling program available, then [DCFS] is going to have to — . . . I am ordering that [Yvonnes] counseling has to be on her cognitive level."
The six-month review was set for May 7, 2002. On May 2, 2002, DCFS requested a continuance of the six-month review, which was continued to June 10, 2002. On that date, DCFS reported that Yvonne had enrolled in parenting classes and attended weekly therapy sessions with Joan McKenzie. According to DCFS, Odessa had stated that these therapy sessions were conducted at Yvonnes cognitive level. The DCFS social worker (CSW) had tried to contact McKenzie to confirm this point, but had not been successful.
McKenzies name is also sometimes spelled "MacKenzie" in the record.
At Yvonnes request, the six-month review was set for a contested hearing on August 26, 2002. In connection with the hearing set for that date, DCFS reported that Yvonne had participated in eight classes of a 24 class parenting program. According to the program director, the classes could be completed at Yvonnes cognitive level. DCFS also stated that the CSW had left four voicemail messages with McKenzie, who was conducting Yvonnes therapy, but McKenzie had not responded.
DCFS also submitted a last minute information report to the juvenile court, stating that on August 22, 2002, McKenzie had contacted the CSW. McKenzie stated that she had held therapy sessions with Yvonne two or three times a month, and also had met with Odessa. During these sessions, McKenzie discussed child safety, the unacceptability of corporal punishment, and other topics. McKenzie also indicated that she could not prepare a written report for the juvenile court by August 26, 2002.
The contested six-month review was again continued to October 8, 2002, the date also set for the 12-month review. On that date, DCFS reported that Yvonne had participated in 11 parenting classes and needed to attend seven classes more to receive a certificate. In addition, Yvonne and Delores had begun conjoint therapy with Susan Bailes. Finally, Yvonne stated that she continued to participate in therapy with McKenzie. The CSW had repeatedly left voicemail messages for McKenzie and had sent her a letter, but McKenzie had not responded.
In a last minute informational report, DCFS stated that McKenzie had not answered the CSWs calls or certified letter. Odessa had also tried unsuccessfully to contact McKenzie, whose last session with Yvonne had been on August 21, 2002. Otherwise, Bailes had continued to see Yvonne and Delores in conjoint counseling, and Yvonne had attended 15 of the 18 required parenting classes.
At the contested six- and twelve-month review hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence, inter alia, the DCFS reports and last minute informational reports dated October 8, 2002, and August 26, 2002. In addition, it heard testimony from the CSW and Odessa regarding the adequacy of reunification services.
The CSW testified that she began working on the present case in September 2001. In October 2001, she contacted the provider of Yvonnes parenting classes, which operated through the regional center, and determined the content and frequency of these classes. The CSW believed that the classes were appropriate for Yvonnes cognitive level, in view of this information and their connection with the regional center.
In April 2002, the CSW learned that Yvonne was in therapy with McKenzie, and that Yvonne had been referred to McKenzie through the regional center. The CSW contacted the regional center to determine how it made this referral, and she made repeated attempts to speak with McKenzie. McKenzie returned the CSWs phone calls only once. During the ensuing conversation, the CSW explained that Yvonne had lost custody of Delores due to physical abuse. However, the CSW conceded that she had never sent McKenzie any written reports or documents from the dependency proceedings. During the phone conversation with the CSW, McKenzie stated that she provided counseling for the developmentally delayed, and that she had such clients other than Yvonne.
Odessa testified that she located McKenzie through referrals that she sought from the regional center. McKenzie met with Yvonne once a week from April to August 2002, when McKenzie said that she was going on vacation. Odessa participated in two of these sessions, which were about parenting and the use of violence in disciplining children. At some point, McKenzie gave Odessa a letter for the court. Since August 2002, Odessa had been unable to contact McKenzie, and thus Yvonne had not been in therapy with McKenzie since that time.
The letter was marked as an exhibit, but was not admitted into evidence. The letter, which is poorly typewritten, is dated May 1, 2002, and states that McKenzie had met with Yvonne and Odessa three times in April, and a further appointment was scheduled for early May. It also states that McKenzie was aware that Yvonne was mildly retarded, and that she was counseling Yvonne and Odessa about hitting the children and about money matters, a source of friction between Yvonne and Odessa.
The juvenile court found that Yvonne had received reasonable reunification services up to the 12-month review, and ordered reunification services to continue until the 18-month review, then set for March 2003. It also instructed DCFS to ensure that further services would be adequate. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Yvonne contends that DCFS failed to offer her reasonable reunification services in accordance with the juvenile courts orders. We disagree.
At the six- and twelve-month reviews, if a child is not returned to his or her parents custody, the juvenile court must make a finding regarding whether "reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent . . . in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent . . . ." ( § 366.21, subds. (e), 8th par., (f).) The appellate standard of review applicable to this finding is not trial de novo, but review for substantial evidence. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) Under this standard, we will affirm the finding if examination of the record, reviewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the order, discloses evidence that is "reasonable, credible and of solid value" which would allow a reasonable trier of fact to make the pertinent finding. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1080, 261 Cal. Rptr. 903, quoting In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d 198.)
The reunification plan "must be specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family [citation], and must be designed to eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding. [Citation.]" (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) Accordingly, when, as here, the problems requiring removal of a child from a parents custody stem (at least in part) from the parents developmental disability, DCFS and the juvenile court "are required to tailor the reunification plan to accommodate his or her special problems and limitations." (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) However, the standard for the adequacy of such services "is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
Here, DCFS was directed to provide Yvonne with services at her cognitive level, and to consult with the regional center and service providers to ensure that Yvonne was receiving appropriate services. The record discloses considerable evidence that DCFS complied with these directives. The CSW consulted with the regional center and the provider of Yvonnes parenting classes, and she received direct assurance from the latter that the classes were offered at Yvonnes cognitive level. Furthermore, the CSW contacted McKenzie, the therapist to whom the regional center had referred Yvonne, and confirmed that McKenzies therapy was appropriate for Yvonnes cognitive level.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record indicates that Yvonne had received reasonable services up to the 12-month review. Yvonne disagrees, contending: (1) DCFS improperly delegated its responsibility for providing reasonable reunification services to the regional center and Odessa; (2) there is insufficient evidence that the services provided were likely to resolve the problems that caused Yvonnes loss of custody, that they were offered at Yvonnes cognitive level, and that McKenzie was competent to act as Yvonnes therapist; and (3) DCFS failed to provide referrals to Odessa, which impaired the services offered to Yvonne.
Regarding items (1) and (2), the record supports the inference that there was no improper delegation of responsibility, and that the services offered were adequate. Regional centers are charged by statute to provide services for the developmentally disabled (In re Victoria M., supra, 207 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1329-1330), and thus there is a reasonable basis for inferring that service providers acting through regional centers are qualified and competent. However, the CSW did not merely assume that programs and therapists offered through the regional center were appropriate for Yvonne, and she directly contacted Yvonnes parenting program and therapist to assess them.
The juvenile court recognized that there was some reason to suspect that McKenzies services might be inadequate or inappropriate, but it concluded otherwise, pointing to Odessas testimony about the content of the two sessions with McKenzie that Odessa had participated in with Yvonne. In our view, the juvenile court did not err on this matter. Although the record indicates that McKenzie had repeatedly failed to respond to the CSWs phone calls and letter, it also discloses evidence that McKenzie had met regularly with Yvonne from April to August 2002, that the therapy sessions addressed the problems underlying the section 300 petition, and that the sessions had been interrupted by McKenzies vacation in late August 2002. The latter evidence is found in Odessas testimony and the last minute information report dated August 26, 2002. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the inference that McKenzies therapy adequately targeted the problems raised in the section 300 petition.
To the extent that Yvonne asks us to reweigh the evidence on these matters in the record, we decline to do so. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.) Our review for substantial evidence "begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination [of the trier of fact], and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the [trier of fact]." (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal. App. 3d 870, 873-874, 197 Cal. Rptr. 925, italics omitted.)
Regarding item (3), we recognize that at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court asked DCFS to provide Odessa, who had been deemed a de facto parent of the children, with referrals to counseling and parenting programs. Yvonne lacks standing to assert error here, independent of the effect of any such error on the reunification services offered to Yvonne. (In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261.) To the extent that Yvonne contends that Odessas failure to participate in counseling and parenting programs may have undermined the adequacy of the reunification services extended to Yvonne, we observe that the juvenile court was also presented with evidence that the services offered to Yvonne were adequate, and that Odessa had participated in some counseling with Yvonne. Again, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court on a factual question.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that Yvonne was offered reasonable reunification services.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, Acting P. J., HASTINGS, J.