Opinion
14-24-00118-CV
12-12-2024
IN RE DEK-M NATIONWIDE, LTD, Relator
On Appeal from the 2nd 25th District Court Colorado County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23859.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Spain and Hassan.
MEMORANDUM M OPINION
Tracy Christopher, Chief Justice.
DEK-M Nationwide, Ltd., brought this proceeding as an appeal to challenge the trial court's order signed January 16, 2024, and styled as an Amended Judgment. We agree with the adverse parties David Hill d/b/a DOH Oil Co., Cassie Moseley, and David Moseley that this proceeding is more properly considered an original proceeding for a writ of mandamus.
After the trial court loses its plenary power over the judgment, "it retain[s] only its inherent power to clarify or enforce the judgment." Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. 1986). The final judgment in this case was rendered and affirmed many years ago, and in their post-judgment motion for the release of funds, Hill and the Moseleys sought only to give effect to that judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 308 (trial court "shall cause its judgments and decrees to be carried into execution"). The trial court granted no additional relief, and "when a final judgment exists, a subsequent order that has no effect except to enforce provisions of the judgment does not qualify as another final judgment subject to appeal." McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 2018); see also Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956). We accordingly treat this proceeding as a petition for writ of mandamus rather than an appeal.
To obtain mandamus relief, a relator generally must show not only that the relator lacks an adequate remedy at law such as by an appeal, but also that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. In re Gruss, 693 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, we defer to the trial court's factual determinations if the evidence supports them, but we review the trial court's legal determinations de novo. Id. at 665 (citing In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)).
In two issues, DEK-M contends that the trial court erred (a) in failing to abate the disbursement of funds to Hill and the Moseleys because a "collateral attack" allegedly is pending by a different entity in a different suit, and (b) in failing to order disbursement to DEK-M of interpleaded royalty payments for production that occurred prior the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a prior appeal in this case.
Relator has not established that it is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny relator's petition for writ of mandamus.
In addition, Hill and the Moseleys have asked that we sanction DEK-M under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45 for bringing a frivolous appeal. Because we treat this as a mandamus proceeding, we construe this as a request for sanctions for filing a groundless petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.11. Although we may impose just sanctions against a party or a party's counsel for filing a petition that is clearly groundless, we are not required to do so. We decline to do so in this instance, and we deny the motion for sanctions.