1981) (en banc); Motes v. Hall County Dep't of Family Children Servs., 251 Ga. 373, 306 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1983) ("We therefore conclude that the seriousness of an individual's interest at stake in a state initiated sterilization proceeding is such that due process requires `clear and convincing evidence' to authorize the sterilization of an individual."); In the Matter of P.S., 452 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1983); In the Matter of the Guardianship of Matejski, 419 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1988) (en banc); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.Ct.App. 1968); In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985) ("In the exercise of that right [of reproductive autonomy], `the interests of the parents of a retarded person cannot be presumed to be identical to those of the child.' Thus a judicial determination is necessary to ensure that the child's personal right is protected.") (quoting In the Matter of Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1980) (en banc)); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244 (Md. 1982); In the Matter of Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass.
E.g., In re Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 5, 763 A.2d 1163, 1166 (termination of parental rights); Baizley v. Baizley, 1999 ME 115, ¶ 8, 734 A.2d 1117, 1119 (imposition of constructive trust for constructive fraud); Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1995) (common law fraudulent misrepresentation); Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 658 A.2d 1065, 1070 (Me. 1995) (punitive damages); Davis v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657, 661 (Me. 1993) (establishment of boundary by acquiescence); Dolloff v. Dolloff, 593 A.2d 1044, 1045 (Me. 1991) (undue influence); Estate of Richard, 556 A.2d 1091, 1092 (Me. 1989) (existence of will); Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 n. 1 (Me. 1988) (mutual mistake); In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985) (involuntary sterilization). [¶ 12] Madison contends that these decisions in appeals from trial courts have limited applicability to the interpretation of section 312 of the Workers' Compensation Act. It suggests that the requirement of clear and convincing evidence must be read in the context of the purpose to prevent a "battle of the experts" in workers' compensation cases.
See id. "Where factual findings must be made on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, the standard of review is `whether the factfinder could reasonably have been persuaded that the required factual finding was or was not proved to be highly probable.'" Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 658 A.2d 1065, 1069-70 (Me. 1995) (quoting In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985)). [¶ 9] Competent evidence supports the court's finding to a high degree of probability that a relationship of trust existed between grandmother and grandson and that the parties agreed that Robert would share the property with his siblings.
Where factual findings must be made on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, the standard of review is "whether the factfinder could reasonably have been persuaded that the required factual finding was or was not proved to be highly probable." In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985) (quoting Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 481 A.2d 139, 153 (Me. 1984)). In the absence of a motion to the trial court for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we assume that the trial court found all of the facts necessary to support its decision.
Several courts have adopted best interests tests to determine whether to order sterilization of incompetent adults. E.g., C.D.M., 627 P.2d at 612-13; In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985); Grady, 426 A.2d at 483; Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d at 806-07; Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383-84. An individual who is incompetent to make some decisions is not necessarily incompetent to make all decisions.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court could rationally find that the requisite factual findings were proved to a high probability. In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781 (Me. 1985). The entry is:
"Where clear and convincing evidence is required, the appropriate standard of appellate review is `whether the fact finder could reasonably have been persuaded that the required factual finding was or was not proved to be highly probable.'" In re John Joseph V., 500 A.2d 628, 629 (Me. 1985) (quoting Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 153 (Me. 1984) (overruling Horner v. Flynn, 334 A.2d 194 (Me. 1975)) (emphasis added); see also In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985). The District Court found that Teresa is unable to protect her children from jeopardy and that the circumstances are unlikely to change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs and also that she is unable to take responsibility for her children within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs.
Where clear and convincing evidence is required, the appropriate standard of appellate review is "whether the factfinder could reasonably have been persuaded t that the required factual findings was or was not proved to be highly probable." Taylor, 481 A.2d at 153; In Re Debra B, 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985). On appeal the Probate Court's findings must be sustained if there is rational or competent support in the record to do so.
In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 n.3 (Me. 1985).