Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIJ116356, Matthew C. Perantoni, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Hassan Gorguinpour, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant P.S.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant D.E.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI J.
Defendants and Appellants P.S. (Father) and D.E. (Mother) appeal from the termination of their parental rights as to their 10-year-old son D. Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Mother contends the juvenile court should have applied the “beneficial parental relationship” exception to termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Finally, the parents each contend the juvenile court failed to apply the sibling relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) We find no error and affirm the judgment.
The parents have two younger children, four-year-old P.S. and two-year-old N.S., who are not subjects of this appeal.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in May 2008, after an investigation revealed Mother had used inappropriate physical discipline on then seven-year-old D. D. reported that Mother threw items at him and hit him with a stick, a belt, her fist, or an open hand when he misbehaved. D. also stated that Father disciplined him with his hand or with a belt. D. explained that he had a “‘rough’” relationship with Mother and that “‘it’s good [living with Mother] when she’s not hitting [him].’” D. was afraid of Mother and planned to run away, believing Mother did not want him to stay in the house.
Mother acknowledged physically abusing D. and failing to benefit from her court-ordered parenting classes. She explained that she had attempted different parenting methods with D. but that she tended to “‘lose [her] temper with him.’” Father and the paternal grandparents corroborated Mother’s anger issues. Mother was subsequently arrested for violating her probation.
Mother was placed on probation in 2007, following her arrest for battery on a spouse and child abuse/endangerment. As part of her probation, she was required to complete a parenting class and a domestic violence program. We also note that Mother was about 13 years old when she gave birth to D.
Father is D.’s stepfather. When Father began a relationship with Mother, he took on the responsibility of caring for D. Father admitted to spanking D. with his hand or with a belt over a year earlier; however, he had ceased that “practice due to the fact that he did not see the benefit of spanking [D.]”
D.’s biological father is J.P. However, J.P. never showed any interest in caring for D. and is not a party to this appeal.
Father was later declared the presumed father of the children, including D.
On May 6, 2008, D. and his two half siblings were taken into protective custody, and a petition was filed on their behalf pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The children were formally removed from the parents’ custody at the detention hearing and placed in a confidential foster home. The parents were provided with supervised visits with their children and services pending the jurisdictional hearing.
D. later equivocally denied the physical abuse allegations, and desired to return home. The social worker observed that D. “appears to believe it is necessary to protect his parents from possible discipline, ” and that D. “presents with a burden of responsibility regarding his family being separated.” The parents had been consistently visiting the children and had been affectionate and nurturing toward them. Mother was the primary disciplinarian during the visits and disciplined the children by talking to them.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on June 3, 2008. The juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true as amended and declared the children dependents of the court. The parents were provided with reunification services and ordered to participate. The court authorized placement with Father upon a suitable home evaluation, compliance with his case plan, and on the condition that Mother did not also reside in the home.
On June 13, 2008, the children were placed with Father on family maintenance status. D. was developing well, enjoying his time with Father, and succeeding in second grade. He was described as an “inquisitive, curious, articulate, intelligent, strong-willed, and sociable child” with “a very active imagination.” However, he struggled with feelings of sadness due to Mother not residing in the home and “his feeling ‘that [his] Mom and Dad wish[ed] [he] wasn’t there sometimes.’” D. had asked for Mother to return home.
Although D. desired to live at home with Mother and Father, he had run away on two different occasions in September 2008. When questioned, D. stated he was frustrated “he was not getting what he wanted at home.” D. had been participating in therapy and appeared to be working through some of his feelings. In November 2008, the court authorized psychotropic medication for D. to combat his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder.
Mother had been participating in her services and making progress. She had begun Parent Child Interactive Therapy (PCIT) with D. and was reportedly making “significant” and “dramatic” progress. Due to her positive progress in PCIT, she was authorized to go home on an extended visit. In December 2008, Mother spent “a successful two-week visit in the home” and was allowed to return permanently on January 7, 2009. D. had also adjusted positively.
On January 15, 2009, the matter was placed in family maintenance status. Unfortunately, however, on June 8, 2009, DPSS filed a section 387 petition on behalf of D. On June 3, 2009, D. had run away from home again, and the parents had failed to implement safety measures to prevent D. from running away during the middle of the night. It was also reported in May and June 2009 that Mother was frustrated with D. and felt like hitting him and that she did not want to raise him. Mother had also discontinued her intensive 20-week in-home therapy services after merely three weeks, claiming she did not feel those services were helping, as evidenced by D.’s tantrums and failing to follow directions. Father reported that the services were cancelled because D. was using the services against the parents when they imposed discipline. Mother stated she was worried about D., that D. was causing family problems and instability, that someone had to help D. learn “‘there are consequences and he has to do homework and listen to what he is told to do, ’” and that D. did not want her to parent him. Mother believed D. was out of control, jeopardizing the safety of the younger children in the home, and required a foster home or “boot camp.” The paternal grandmother reported that Mother still did not know how to properly parent or love the children.
Mother agreed with the social worker’s assessment that she had more of a “sibling rivalry relationship” with D. than a parent/child relationship. She explained, “‘[D.] absolutely never wants me to parent him. He is okay with me when we are just playing together. He likes that. But he hates for me to parent him at all or ever tell him what to do.... I was only 13.... My mom was not supportive or helpful. She did not understand how hard it was. I was just a child and I had to figure out how to care for a child that I had not wanted. And I did not know anyone who had a child like [D.], with problems like his, so who could I talk to or learn from? The things that work for my younger children never worked with [D.] I love him, but nothing was working with him.’”
When D. was informed that therapy would continue and that he would be moving to a foster home, he became thrilled and ran to his room to pack. He appeared to be excited about leaving his home and settling into his new foster home. D. reported: “‘I think my mom is tired of having me around and she gets mad at me, but “mommy and me” time is fun.’” When asked what his relationship with his parents was like, D. replied. “‘Well, they get mad at me because I be bad and won’t do my homework and clean my room. I get mad because they tell me to do stuff and it’s boring at my house.’” Mother noticed that D. seemed to not miss his parents or his half siblings. However, it appeared as though D.’s younger half brother missed D.; he had asked about D. a few times.
D. was formally detained on June 9, 2009. He was adjusting well to his foster home and had displayed one tantrum due to his unwillingness to attend school. However, the foster father was able to effectively redirect D.
On June 30, 2009, the juvenile court found the allegations in the section 387 petition true, and ordered family reunification services. Father’s case plan required him to attend individual and conjoint family therapy, individual counseling, and at least six parenting classes for the purpose of implementing learned strategies and skills into his interactions with D. during visits.
D. was removed from his foster home in July 2009, due to his “‘manipulative and impossible-to-control behaviors, ’” and was making a “positive adjustment in the new foster home.” D. had developed a bond with an older child who had been adopted by the foster parent. By November 2009, D. reported that he loved living with his foster father and hoped he could be adopted like his older foster brother. D. was physically, mentally, emotionally, and educationally developing well in his new foster home. He did, however, continue to exhibit signs of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), such as hoarding, bed wetting, and vomiting. D.’s therapist believed that D. had the most severe case of PTSD he had ever seen. D. remained on medication for depression, anger management, and aid in sleeping. D. feared Mother’s power and control over him and reported that he wanted to permanently live with his foster parent but still see his parents. The foster parent was willing to adopt D., as well as maintain D.’s contacts with his parents and half siblings.
On August 8, 2009, D.’s half siblings had been removed from the parents’ home, after the parents had engaged in acts of domestic violence, and a section 387 supplemental petition was filed on their behalf. The juvenile court found the allegations in the supplemental petition true. D.’s half siblings were eventually placed together in a family friend’s home. When D. was informed that his half siblings had been removed from their home, he stated that his parents had always fought, and he believed that the parents should not have had children.
Mother had regularly participated in supervised visits with D. once every two weeks. The visits appeared to be detrimental to D.’s emotional and physical health, as evidenced by D. vomiting before the visits or “when thinking about the family visits and dynamics.” In one instance, during an August 2009 visit with D. and his half siblings, the parents appeared to pamper the younger children while ignoring D. The social worker observed that it was almost as if D. were invisible. Following that visit, the foster father reported that D. was angry, needy, and combative. D. also refused to speak with Mother when she tried to reach him by telephone. On a visit on September 14, 2009, the foster father reported that while D. hugged and sat close to Father, he appeared to avoid contact with Mother. Additionally, while Father told D. that he missed him and loved him, Mother never mentioned that she cared for D. During a visit on September 24, 2009, D. and Mother showed little affection to each other, and Mother made numerous comments about D. needing to be in control and having his own way. In addition, the parents failed to maintain a consistent telephone schedule, at times making random and late telephone calls. Eventually, D. became upset as a result of the visits and telephone contacts and suffered from unexplainable vomiting, insomnia, facial tics, and terror.
While the parents participated in their respective case plans, the social worker concluded they had failed to benefit from the services provided to them. The social worker noted that the parents had failed to demonstrate maturity and control and the ability to safely, appropriately, and protectively parent the children.
At a December 9, 2009, hearing, the juvenile court authorized Father to participate in unsupervised visits with D.’s half siblings upon certain conditions. He was not provided any unsupervised visits with D. The court also ordered the parents to limit telephone contact with D. to once a month.
Sometime in late December 2009, Mother moved into an apartment to allow Father to participate in unsupervised visits with D.’s half siblings. The parents, however, intended to remain married and to eventually reunify.
D. was continuing to thrive in his foster home and had formed a strong bond with his foster family. He desired to remain in the foster home on a permanent basis and be adopted, while still maintaining contact with his biological family. The foster parent was also committed to adopting D. and allowing D. to maintain contact with his family. D. had expressed relief in regard to his decreased contact with Mother. D.’s therapist noted that although D. still desired to be with Mother and his family, he exhibited “overwhelming fear and distress related to her.” D.’s therapist further noted that extending the matter would be “very harmful and detrimental to [D.], ” that D. had “come... far” with his foster father’s help, and D. “needs to know he is safe and able to remain permanently” with his foster father.
The parents continued to participate in their respective case plans and make progress. Mother had accepted D.’s “growing bond” with his foster father and had also acknowledged that D. was doing well in his foster father’s home. D. had confronted the parents about the abuse imposed on him and desired to know about his biological father. He seemed uninterested in their responses, however, and maintained an emotional distance from them.
The contested 18-month review hearing was held on March 2, 2010. At that time, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ reunification services as to D. and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Mother’s services in regard to D.’s half siblings were also terminated. The half siblings were placed with Father on family maintenance status.
By June 30, 2010, D. had been residing with his foster father for 11 months and had been doing very well. D. was bonded to his foster father, enjoyed living in his placement, and reported that he wanted to be adopted. D. also stated that it would “be awesome to not have to clear visits through [DPSS] anymore.” D. appeared to have a good understanding of adoption and shared positive aspects of being adopted. D.’s foster father continued to maintain his desire to provide D. with a permanent home, as well as allow D. contact with his parents and half siblings. D. continued to participate in regular visitation with Mother; however, Mother’s interaction with D. appeared to be “forced.” She was described as apathetic. D. also continued to participate in conjoint therapy with Mother, which was characterized as “‘strained.’” In addition, it appeared to trigger increased anxiety for D. during the following week.
When D. discovered his half siblings had returned home, he was distraught and cried. He wondered why he could not also go home. He had asked his foster father if Father could still “‘earn’” him back so that he “‘could end up being there with them.’” When the foster father responded that it was unlikely, D. accepted the response without issue and stated, “‘Oh. Okay.’” D. informed the social worker he was “‘fine.’” However, it appeared as though he was still emotionally torn between his biological family and foster parent. By the end of March 2010, D. had refused to shower or do his homework. He had also run away earlier that month after Mother had cancelled a visit. D. was also fascinated about his biological father. D.’s therapist confirmed that D. was conflicted between his family and his foster father and noted that D. was trying to sabotage his prospective adoptive home situation by antagonizing his foster father to see if his foster father would hurt him, as others had done in the past.
On June 24, 2010, Mother filed a section 388 petition to modify the court order. She claimed she had completed her services and asked to have D. placed with her on family maintenance services. On June 28, 2010, Father also filed a section 388 petition, and requested that D. be placed in his custody on family maintenance status. He claimed he had changed circumstances by taking custody of D.’s half siblings and living separately from Mother.
A combined hearing on the petitions for modification and selection and implementation were held on June 30, 2010. Following argument from all parties, the juvenile court denied the parents’ section 388 petitions, finding no changed circumstances and that it was contrary to D.’s best interest. The juvenile court then proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing. The court found D. to be adoptable, found that that no exception to adoption applied, and ordered parental rights terminated. The court thereafter referred the matter to mediation regarding a postadoption contract.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Section 388 Petition
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petition. In his view, the evidence established that he had made significant changes in his parenting skills and circumstances by ending his relationship with Mother and that it was in D.’s best interest for him to have further opportunities to develop and maintain a relationship with Father and the half siblings.
“A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new or changed circumstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The parent bears the burden to show both a ‘“legitimate change of circumstances”’ and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 959-960 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.), orig. quote marks corrected.)
Here, assuming, without deciding, that Father had shown material changed circumstances, he did not establish that return of D. to his custody on family maintenance status would be in D.’s best interest. After reunification services have ended, “the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; accord, In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235.)
Although D. was emotionally conflicted between his biological family and the foster parent, he had repeatedly stated that he wished to be adopted by his foster father and live with his foster father on a permanent basis. D. had been residing with his foster father for almost a year and had made exceptional progress in his foster father’s home. D.’s behaviors associated with his PTSD had subsided, and he was educationally, developmentally, physically, and emotionally excelling. In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that D. had overcome his feelings of not being wanted by his parents. When D. was first returned home to Father, he had run away on two different occasions in September 2008. After the matter was placed on family maintenance status in January 2009 and Mother had returned home, D. had again run away from the home during the middle of the night. At that time, the parents believed D. was out of control, jeopardizing the safety of the younger children in the home, and required a foster home or boot camp. Indeed, D. was thrilled upon being informed that he would be moving to a foster home and appeared to be excited about leaving his home. Mother noticed that D. seemed to not miss his parents or his half siblings. By November 2009, D. reported that he loved living with his foster father and hoped he could be adopted like his older foster brother. Even if D. was conflicted between his foster father and parents, that did not mean providing Father with custody would afford stability for D. Instead, Father must show that he is capable of providing permanence and stability, a showing he failed to make.
Father focuses on factors advanced by the appellate court in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-532 (Kimberly F.) to evaluate D.’s best interest. In that case, the Court of Appeal rejected a trial court’s use of a simple best-interest test of comparing the household and upbringing offered by the natural parent or parents with that of the caretakers in analyzing a section 388 petition. (Kimberly F., at pp. 526-530.) The appellate court then determined a list of factors, not meant to be exhaustive, which should be considered: the seriousness of the problem leading to dependency and the reason that problem was not overcome by the time of the final review; the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system in relationship to the parental bond; and the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Id. at pp. 530-532.)
These factors, however, appear to focus primarily on the parent, not on the child’s need for permanency and stability. (Compare Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Kimberly F. also fails to take into account our Supreme Court’s analysis in Stephanie M. of best interests once reunification efforts have failed. Thus, we do not find Kimberly F. persuasive in this regard.
Accordingly, the issue here is whether Father rebutted the presumption that continued out-of-home placement was in the best interest of D. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) On this record, he did not establish that the child’s need for permanency and stability would be advanced by reunification efforts or, certainly, by the immediate return of the child to his custody. It is important to keep in mind that, where, as here, the court’s ruling is against the party who has the burden of proof, it is extremely difficult for Father to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a ruling in his favor. Unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the moving party, we presume the trial court found Father’s evidence lacked sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. (See Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241; Kunzler v. Karde (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [judgment appealed from is presumed correct].) We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. (Kimble v. Board of Education (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1427.)
At this point in the proceedings the focus of the case has shifted to D.’s interest and what is best for him. Although Father believed D. would be better off with him, there is no evidence to support those beliefs. It is not enough for Father to merely assert, without evidence, that he should receive custody of D. because D. can safely be maintained in his home. It is not in the child’s best interest for permanence to be delayed for an unknown or indefinite period of time, with no certainty or even likelihood Father could progress to the point of obtaining custody of D.
We reject Father’s argument that the juvenile court failed to consider the factors set forth in Kimberly F. in denying the section 388 petition. Although the court simply noted that D. was in a “stable, good, loving pre-adoptive home” and that “[t]he child wishes to be adopted” in denying the section 388 petition, this does not imply that the court failed to consider appropriate factors or that “the court focused almost exclusively on the benefits of the foster home” in making its determination. We also reject Father’s claim that the juvenile court misinterpreted D.’s “‘wishes to be adopted’” or that the record shows D. did not know what being adopted really meant because he indicated wanting to continue to see his biological family. The record belies this contention. The social worker reported that D. is a “bright and articulate young man” who appeared to have a good understanding of what adoption means. D.’s statements merely indicated he was torn between his foster family and his biological family and that he wanted to continue to see his biological family; it does not show that he misunderstood the meaning of adoption or that he did not want to have his foster father adopt him. The record shows that the prospective adoptive father had open communication with D.; that the prospective adoptive father and the biological family had a good relationship; and that the prospective adoptive father represented that he would continue to facilitate visitation between D. and his biological family.
Father’s reliance on In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074 is misplaced, since that case is distinguishable from the present matter. In In re Michael D., the mother, through visitation, had built such a strong, nurturing parental role with her child that he was terrified at the prospect of separation from her. The child repeatedly stated spontaneously that he wanted to live with his mother. When, at the close of a hearing, the child’s caregiver requested that he spend the evening with her, he became distraught; he burst into tears, saying he wanted to stay with his mother. This was powerful evidence of a parental bond that should not be severed. (Id. at pp. 1087-1088.) In contrast, although Father had visited regularly with D. and had had unmonitored visits and custody of D. at one point, D.’s statements are not similar in nature. D. had been inconsistent about his desire to live with his parents. He had wavered about whether he wanted to stay with his parents and whether he wanted to be adopted. Moreover, it appears that D. still had not overcome his feeling of not being wanted by his parents.
Our conclusion is also not affected by In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452 (Scott B.), upon which Father relies. The child’s court-appointed special advocate in Scott B. stated repeatedly in her reports that Scott and his mother had a very close relationship and it would be detrimental to Scott for the relationship to be disrupted. Scott had insisted repeatedly that he would prefer to live with his mother, was strongly bonded to her, and believed that adoption meant his mother would be included in his adoptive family. (Id. at p. 471.) Moreover, he was emotionally unstable and had threatened to run away if he was adopted because he wanted to live with his mother. (Id. at pp. 466, 471.) His “regressive” behavior had stabilized with “wraparound services and the support of Mother.” (Id. at pp. 465, 472.) On those facts, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court should have applied the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights. (Id. at p. 472.) Such facts do not exist here. D. did not unambiguously insist on living with Father; rather, he had repeatedly stated that he desired to be adopted by his prospective adoptive father while still maintaining contact with his parents and siblings.
In sum, there is insufficient evidence that immediate placement of D. with Father or the delay in permanency planning would be in the child’s best interest. As much as Father was to be commended for his efforts to become an effective parent, the fact remained that D. could not safely be maintained in Father’s home. Under these circumstances, Father’s showing did not compel the juvenile court to find that return of custody would promote D.’s best interests. Therefore, under Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 317, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in denying Father’s section 388 petition.
B. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. She contends substantial evidence showed she regularly visited D., resulting in D.’s positive, emotional attachment to her, and severing the parent-child relationship would greatly harm D.
At a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, the court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over alternative permanency plans. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 808-809.)
After the court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345; but see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to termination of parental rights when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
“[C]ourt[s] ha[ve] interpreted the phrase ‘benefit from continuing the relationship’ to refer to a ‘parent-child’ relationship that ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207.) Where the parent has continued to regularly visit and contact the child, and the child has maintained or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment to the parent, “the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.).)
The exception does not require “proof that the child has a ‘primary attachment’ to a parent or that the noncustodial parent has maintained day-to-day contact with the child. [Citations.]” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 300.) However, “[a] parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] ‘Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child.... The relationship arises from the day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.’ [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent. [Citations.]” (In re Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 207, fn. omitted.) “In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt. [Citation.]” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)
“We must affirm a trial court’s rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) “We... review[] the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling. [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1235.) Because the parents had the burden of proof, we must affirm unless there was “indisputable evidence [in their favor, ] evidence no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected....” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)
On review, under the substantial evidence standard, our task is not as difficult as that of the trial court. We do not reweigh the evidence. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Substantial evidence supports the decision to terminate parental rights here. The record shows that to the extent D. derived some benefit from his relationship with Mother, the quality and strength of that relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. (Id. at p. 575.) The beneficial relationship exception must be considered in light of the Legislature’s preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed. The exception does not allow a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to stymie an adoption simply because there is evidence that the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship with the parent. Although Mother argues she has a bond with her son, she does not attempt to show why this bond outweighs the benefits of adoption. D.’s needs, wishes, and age weigh in favor of adoption. D. consistently and repeatedly stated he wished to be adopted by his foster father. D. was almost 10 years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, and seven years old when the dependency action commenced. Additionally, D. had lived with his prospective adoptive father for about one year. The length of time D. had been in the foster care system and his need for a permanent, stable home also supports the juvenile court’s finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply.
Although the record shows that Mother had consistently and regularly visited D. and that D. arguably had a bond with Mother, he also was bonded to his prospective adoptive father and felt comfortable in his home. As acknowledged by Mother, D. was bonded to his foster father and was making progress in his foster father’s home. Further, D. repeatedly stated he desired to be adopted by his foster father. We reject the parents’ assertion that D. did not have a “true understanding of the implications of adoption.” D. was characterized as an “inquisitive, curious, articulate, intelligent, strong-willed, and sociable child.” Contrary to the parents’ contention, there is nothing in the record to suggest that D. did not truly understand the meaning of adoption, or that he did not have the capabilities of understanding the meaning of adoption.
Moreover, even though D. desired to maintain contact with Mother, the record indicates that Mother’s interactions with D. were harmful to D. and that D. did not have a secure, emotional attachment to Mother. D. had run away from Mother many times; he believed she did not want him in her home; and he had displayed physical symptoms, such as vomiting, before and after visits. In addition, Mother had treated D. as if he were invisible during shared visits with his half siblings, and D. had not shown any affection toward Mother at some visits. On the other hand, it appears that D. looked up to his foster father and respected him. The record also indicates that the foster father satisfied D.’s need for protection, guidance, food, and shelter and occupied the parental role in his life. Moreover, the foster father had been open to including Mother and Father and D.’s half siblings in D.’s life. The foster father and the parents had a good relationship with each other, and the foster father was willing to allow the parents postadoption contact with D.
The juvenile court assessed the credibility of witnesses, weighed the evidence, and determined that Mother did not fulfill a parental role. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [“[t]he juvenile court’s opportunity to observe the witnesses and generally get ‘the feel of the case’ warrants a high degree of... deference”].) Contrary to Mother’s contention, she did not establish that this was “an extraordinary case” where the parental relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applies. (In re Jasmine D., at p. 1350.)
We conclude the court correctly determined that D.’s interest in a continued relationship with Mother did not outweigh his interest in the security of an adoptive placement with a safe, stable, and loving family, who are capable of meeting the child’s need for attentive, consistent, and highly competent care. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; see also In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229-231.)
Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 452, upon which Mother relies, does not alter our conclusion. In Scott B., Division Three of the Second District Court of Appeal reversed an order terminating parental rights where the record showed that the exception to adoption contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied. However, the relationship between the mother and child in that case was not similar to the relationship between Mother and D. here. In that case, as previously noted in section II.A., ante, the child’s court-appointed special advocate stated repeatedly in her reports that Scott and his mother had a very close relationship, and it would be detrimental to Scott for the relationship to be disrupted. Scott had insisted repeatedly that he would prefer to live with his mother and was strongly bonded to her. (Scott B., at p. 471.) Scott would greet his mother with a hug when he saw her for a visit and he had consistently reported he did not want to be adopted. (Id. at pp. 459-460, 462, 464, 466.) Under the circumstances of that case, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court should have applied the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights, noting that given Scott’s strong emotional attachment to his mother, his precarious emotional state, and his history of regressing and running away when stressed, there was a good chance he would have a “meltdown” unless his frequent visitation with his mother continued-something the court could not ensure if the mother’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at p. 472.) Such facts do not exist here. As Mother acknowledged, it appeared that Mother and D. had more of a sibling relationship than a parent/child relationship. In addition, Mother made numerous statements that she did not believe D. would ever let her parent him. Mother and D. did not have such a strong emotional attachment as found in Scott B. More importantly, the record contains evidence that D. would not be greatly harmed by termination of the parent-child relationship.
In short, while the record indicates that D. has affection for Mother and wants to continue to see her, he lacked a substantial bond of the type apparent in Scott B. There is no evidence in this case that D. would be greatly harmed by the severance of his relationship with Mother. The juvenile court accordingly did not err in failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption.
C. Sibling Relationship Exception
Mother and Father argue the juvenile court erred in finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) did not apply. This subdivision provides an exception to the termination of parental rights if the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to a “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
The juvenile court undertakes a two-step analysis in evaluating the applicability of the sibling relationship exception. First, the court is directed “to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. [Citation.] If the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952.) “[T]he concern is the best interests of the child being considered for adoption, not the interests of that child’s siblings.” (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 822.)
“Reflecting the Legislature’s preference for adoption when possible, the ‘sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a “compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ [Citations.] Indeed, even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption. [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) We review the court’s finding on this issue for substantial evidence. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017, disapproved on another ground in In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537, fn. 5.)
Here, arguably, even though there was evidence demonstrating a sibling relationship between D. and his half siblings that was so strong its severance would cause them detriment, there remains substantial evidence that the benefits of adoption outweigh the benefits of maintaining the sibling relationship. D. had suffered years of uncertainty while family reunification and family maintenance were attempted. The reunification efforts failed. Now, “‘the needs of the child for permanency and stability’” are paramount. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 52.) Adoption will provide a permanent home and stability. D. had lived with his prospective adoptive father for about a year, was emotionally attached to him, and had repeatedly indicated his desire to be adopted by him. Moreover, it did not appear as though D. missed his half siblings. Rather, an examination of the entire record reveals that D. was apparently jealous of his half siblings and their relationship with the parents and that D. longed for his own biological father. Furthermore, even though D. cried and was distraught when he discovered his half siblings had returned home to Father, there is no indication in the record to suggest that those feelings showed “he was deeply troubled by the pending termination of that [sibling] relationship, ” as Father suggests. Other than his first initial reaction, D. did not demonstrate any further sadness by the half siblings’ return to Father. Indeed, D. stated he was fine when he spoke with the social worker later that day.
Additionally, there is no evidence to support the parents’ contentions that the half siblings would not maintain contact with D. if he was adopted. The record belies this contention. D.’s prospective adoptive father had maintained his willingness to foster the sibling relationships and had indicated a willingness to allow sibling visitation and contact. There is no indication in the record to suggest that the prospective adoptive father would no longer maintain the sibling relationships. The record shows that the prospective adoptive father and the parents had an amicable relationship with each other.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the benefits of adoption outweigh the benefits of continuing the relationship with D.’s half siblings.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., CODRINGTON J.