Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J081627.
JENKINS, J.
Defendant and appellant D.C., a minor, appeals the juvenile court’s restitution order. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
On September 10, 2008, police officers saw a group of five juveniles punching and kicking a motorcyclist at an intersection. The victim’s motorcycle was lying on the ground, where he dropped it in order to defend himself. The juveniles ran when police approached. Officers gave chase and apprehended defendant along with two other juveniles.
In October 2008, the Contra Costa District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) charging defendant with misdemeanor battery, in violation of Penal Code sections 242 and 243, subdivision (a). Defendant admitted the allegations of the petition and was subsequently adjudged a ward of the court. The juvenile court placed defendant on in-home probation with various conditions, including that he pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the probation officer.
Further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
In January 2010, defendant’s counsel wrote to the court objecting to the restitution amount proposed by the probation officer and requesting a hearing. In February 2010, the probation officer filed a restitution supplement report stating that the victim submitted estimates for damages to his motorcycle totaling $4,594.55.
A restitution hearing was held on September 10, 2010. The prosecution offered two estimates, which the juvenile court received into evidence. One estimate was from Marin Cycleworks listing twelve parts for replacement at a total cost of $3,437.84. The other estimate was from Maaco Collision Repair for repainting costs in the amount of $1156.71.
Defense counsel called Taylor Miller, an investigator for the public defender and former motorcycle officer with the Oakland Police. Miller testified he has been a motorcycle enthusiast since his high school days. Over the years he has owned and ridden a string of Harley Davidson bikes as well as a BMW 900. As a motorcycle officer, Miller’s duties included investigating the cause of an accident and the resulting damages.
Defense counsel asked Miller to review the estimate from Marin Cycleworks and opine on which items “would be reasonable damage as a result of someone dropping a motorcycle?” Miller prefaced his remarks by stating “I’m not a motorcycle mechanic, but I’ve worked closely with mechanics.... I’ve had four motorcycles totaled out... so I know motorcycle parts. I know where they are in relation to the frame and whether they’re easily damaged when you drop it.” According to Miller, only five of the twelve items listed on the Marin Cycleworks estimate would almost certainly require replacement if the bike was dropped on its side from a stationary position. The value of those items as shown on the estimate was $259.38, and no re-painting would be required if only those items were replaced, with the possible exception of the rear-view mirror. The remaining items on the Marin Cycleworks estimate, including the body cowling (the fiberglass body part that gives a Japanese racing-style motorbike a streamlined look), would likely not be damaged “if someone drops a motorcycle” because the fiberglass material is very durable. On cross-examination, Miller acknowledged that if the body cowling is replaced, repainting is required because the parts only come primed.
At the conclusion of Miller’s redirect examination, the court asked, “So this particular bike though, did you have a chance to inspect this bike?” Miller replied he attempted to inspect the bike but was unable to locate the victim, adding “there was a whole series of questions I was going to ask him” about the bike. The court next asked, “Okay. So there’s no way for us to know if the parts that you testified he would not necessarily think they would be broken or demolished [sic]. We don’t know if they were scratched or cracked, we just don’t really know; is that fair?” Miller replied, “Right.”
After the matter was submitted, the court ruled as follows: “I really appreciate all of the experience that Mr. Miller has with motorcycles, but we have the estimates from the victim here indicating the cost to repair... stated on the estimate, the cost to replace certain parts and also to paint. [¶] And even though the testimony was that Mr. Miller would not think that... some of these parts would be demolished or broken, it is likely that they could have been cracked or scratched. [¶]... [W]e really don’t have anything before us to dispute whether or not these parts needed to be replaced in order to put the motorcycle in a condition that it was in prior to the crime that was committed by the minor in this case. [¶] And that is the part that is troubling me. [¶] Mr. Miller has not seen the motorcycle. So he doesn’t know what it looked like before, and he doesn’t know what it looked like after. [¶] He cannot really tell us with any certainty whether any of these parts were damaged or cracked or scratched because he doesn’t have that knowledge. [¶] So I don’t find there’s evidence... to dispute the estimates... for the repair and the painting that the victim has provided to us. [¶]... [¶]... I will award the restitution to the victim as requested.” The court awarded $4,594.55 in restitution to the victim. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 22, 2010.
Discussion
A. Applicable Legal Principles
The California Constitution provides that crime victims have a right to restitution when they suffer losses as a result of criminal activity. (Cal. Const., art I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A) & (B); see People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652 (Giordano).) This constitutional mandate is implemented by section 1202.4 (see Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 656), which provides in pertinent part: “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim....” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The restitution order “shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim... for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct....” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) Further, “[t]he court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states those reasons on the record.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (g).)
A trial court’s restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663.) The abuse of discretion standard “ ‘asks in substance whether the ruling in question “falls outside the bounds of reason” under the applicable law and the relevant facts [citations].’ [Citation.] Under this standard, while a trial court has broad discretion to choose a method for calculating the amount of restitution, it must employ a method that is rationally designed to determine the [] victim’s economic loss.” (Id. at pp. 663-664.) The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.) “Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim. (Citation.) The defendant has the burden of rebutting the victim’s statement of losses, and to do so, may submit evidence to prove the amount claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of damaged or stolen property. (Citation.)” (Id. at p. 1543.)
B. Analysis
Here, the victim submitted repair estimates from Marin Cycleworks for repairs totaling $3,437.84 and from Maaco Collision Repair for repainting costs in the amount of $1,156.71. Defendant did not challenge the authenticity of these repair estimates. Nor does defendant dispute that these estimates were for repairs to the victim’s motorcycle, a 2000 Suzuki GSXR 750. Accordingly, these estimates were solid, prima facie evidence of the victim’s losses.
In light of the repair estimates submitted to the court, the burden shifted to defendant to disprove the amount of losses set forth in the estimates. (See People v. Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.) Defendant sought to disprove the amount of losses set forth in the estimates through the testimony of former Oakland Police Motorcycle Officer Miller. Miller’s testimony, however, failed to disprove the amount of losses. Despite defendant’s protestations to the contrary, Miller’s testimony was essentially speculative: Miller never examined the victim’s motorbike after the accident and before repairs were undertaken; nor did he interview the victim regarding the condition of the bike before the accident. Thus, whereas Miller was able to render opinions about whether, hypothetically, a given item would need to be replaced after a bike fell to the ground, he was unable to provide any information about whether the particular damage to the victim’s bike necessitated the repairs listed in the estimates. Accordingly, the trial court acted within the bounds of the considerable discretion accorded to it in finding that Miller’s testimony failed to rebut prosecution evidence of the amount of losses claimed by the victim. (See People v. Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.)
In sum, we conclude that the repair estimates submitted by the victim provided substantial evidence of economic loss. (See People v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1217 [billing summary of therapy charges showing the specific amount billed for each therapy session constituted substantial evidence of the amount of loss sustained by the victim].) Thus, the restitution order entered by the trial was not an abuse of discretion. (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045 [no abuse of discretion where there is a “factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court”].)
Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, the trial court should not have awarded victim restitution for $98 charged for “crash estimate” on the Marin Cycleworks document. Defendant bases this contention on Business and Professions Code, section 9884.9, subd. (a), which provides in part, “No work shall be done and no charges shall accrue before authorization to proceed is obtained from the customer.” (Ibid.) Even if this contention has not been forfeited for failure to raise it below (People v. Garcia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218 [“An objection to the amount of restitution may be forfeited if not raised in the trial court. ‘The unauthorized sentence exception is “a narrow exception” to the waiver doctrine that normally applies where the sentence “could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case, ” for example, “where the court violates mandatory provisions governing the length of confinement.” [Citations.]’ ”), defendant provides no authority for the proposition that it is illegal under Business and Professions Code section 9884.9 for an automotive dealer to charge for estimation costs after authorization to proceed with repairs has been obtained from the customer. Thus, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the trial court erred by awarding that item in restitution.
Disposition
The juvenile court’s order of restitution is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.