Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. JVSQ 09-6049
Jenkins, J.
Before this court is a petition for extraordinary writ (writ petition) seeking relief from a juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting a date for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26. Petitioner Darren C., Sr. (Darren) seeks this relief on the ground that no clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that real party in interest, the Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services (the department), provided reasonable reunification services to him before those services were terminated. Darren reasons that the juvenile court’s finding fails to account for a mental health professional’s recommendation that he receive further services in the form of an assessment for possible post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We deny the writ petition.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Detention.
Darren and Danielle L. are the parents of D.C., Jr. (minor), born in December 2008. On February 16, 2009, the minor was detained, along with the minor’s two half siblings, A.H. (age 1) and C.C. (age 10). According to the department’s detention report, filed February 19, 2009, Danielle was arrested for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant after law enforcement arrived at the parents’ home to respond to a domestic violence complaint. Danielle later told a social worker that, in the children’s presence, Darren hit her on the head with a whisky bottle, and she responded by punching him in the nose. C.C. told the social worker that “I know what to do when this happens, I have to help my Dad.... they don’t do this a lot but I’ve seen it a lot... I tried to get Danielle off my Dad.”
Danielle L. and the minor’s half siblings are not parties to these proceedings. We thus limit our discussion of this case to that which is relevant to Darren and his claims with respect to the minor.
Darren admitted drinking alcohol before the incident. Danielle admitted smoking marijuana and cigarettes inside the trailer in the children’s presence, and using methamphetamines until she became pregnant with A.H.
At the time of the minor’s detention, the home in which he lived with his family was found by a social worker to be both unsafe and very dirty. Strewn about were piles of clothing, garbage, paper, loose tobacco and cigarette butts, prescription bottles, and dirty dishes. There was no running water or heat. Marijuana paraphernalia was found on the counters, as well as a glass pipe laying close to a baby pacifier. A toddler’s bed was about two and a half feet from two cook-top burners that were lit to heat the home. The toddler bed had a board partition used to separate A.H.’s and minor’s sleep areas, and there was an exposed nail within A.H.’s reach. Dice and other small objects were found within the minor’s reach. The refrigerator contained only Pedialyte, and the freezer contained only some frozen meat.
The children appeared healthy but dirty, and appeared not to have recently bathed. Their clothes and blankets were dirty and smelled of smoke, and A.H.’s hair was matted with an unknown substance. The minor and A.H. had severe diaper rash.
B. The Case Plan.
In a disposition report, dated March 20, 2009, the department recommended reunification services for both parents. A case plan was thereafter filed, identifying several objectives to facilitate reunification. With respect to Darren, the case plan recommended completion of a domestic violence program called Men Experiencing Non-Abusive Directions (MEND), completion of an alcohol and drug program, and completion of the Incredible Years Parenting program. Finally, the case plan called for Darren to maintain a suitable home for his family, and to receive five hours per week of visitation.
In a 6-month status review report, filed September 18, 2009, the department recommended that the minor remain a dependent of the juvenile court, that reunification services for both parents be terminated, and that a permanency planning hearing be set pursuant to section 366.26. The department explained its recommendation as follows. Darren had been terminated from the MEND program due to excessive absences on June 11, 2009, after initially completing the program assessment and attending four sessions. Prior to Darren’s termination, Pasquale Romano, a licensed clinical social worker with the MEND program, provided a status report, dated April 30, 2009, that indicated Darren had both victim and batterer issues. In a handwritten notation at the end of this report, Romano wrote the following: “We recommend individual also txment to R/O or Treat P.T.S.D.”
The status report further noted that, on July 1, 2009, Darren was assessed by the Alcohol and Other Drugs program, during which it was determined he was not presently in need of services. Subsequently, however, Darren twice tested positive for alcohol and marijuana at random drug tests and, thus, was referred back to the Alcohol and Other Drugs program for a reassessment. Darren failed to complete the reassessment.
Despite a referral, Darren never attended a session with the Incredible Years Parenting program. Further, Darren attended only about 81 of 156 scheduled visits with the minor. Some of these absences were explained, but others were not. In June 2009, parents were placed on 30-minute early arrival status for several weeks based upon their pattern of missed visits. Neither parent visited minor during September 2009, resulting in suspension of their visitation rights pending a meeting with the social worker.
The status report indicated that Darren had three Emergency Room discharge notices, which explained some of the absences. One such visit was for back pain and spasms, the second was for a hand fracture, and the third was for a fever and night sweats.
C. The Dispositional Hearing and Order.
On October 7, 2009, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing. The department’s social worker, Georgia England, testified that, at the time of detention, she and her colleagues identified the following areas of need to be addressed in the case plan for both parents: domestic violence, parenting, and drug and alcohol treatment. In March and April, the department provided bus passes for parents at their request to help them participate in services related to these areas. England also tried to schedule regular Tuesday appointments with parents to ensure their progress with the case plan. In particular, England was concerned that Darren seemed overwhelmed by the case plan’s requirements. Nonetheless, neither parent maintained the regular meetings with England, attending only two before stopping them altogether.
England acknowledged that Pasquale Romano of MEND recommended that Darren be referred for possible diagnosis of or treatment for PTSD. England did not follow up on his recommendation, however, because Darren had been referred to MEND for the limited purpose of being assessed for domestic violence issues. As such, Romano’s recommendation was “beyond the scope” of Darren’s referral.
England once suggested to parents that they utilize counseling services provided by a local mental health facility, but Darren denied needing such counseling.
Romano testified that he met with Darren following his referral to MEND for domestic violence issues. After the meeting, Romano made a note that “We recommend individual also txment to R/O or treat P.T.S.D.” Romano explained that he believed it was possible Darren suffered from PTSD, but he did not formally diagnose Darren with such condition. Romano believed, based on his observation, that Darren had symptoms associated with PTSD, including depression, anxiety and withdrawal, but acknowledged those symptoms could also be associated with other conditions such as drug addiction.
When asked by the juvenile court to clarify his testimony, Romano acknowledged his written notation to the department was unclear. Romano explained, however, that he believed Darren should be treated for PTSD if in fact he was diagnosed with that condition. But Romano was not making a formal diagnosis, he was merely recommending to the department that someone (other than him) assess Darren for PTSD.
Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court noted that, “in a perfect world,” Darren would have been assessed for PTSD. However, the lack of such an assessment, when considered in light of the record as a whole, did not render the services received by Darren insufficient to help him succeed with his case plan. In particular, the juvenile court noted that the somewhat ambiguous handwritten notation from Romano was simply not a basis for finding “the whole panoply of services” provided by the department was “unreasonable.”
Thus, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that parents failed to participate regularly in and make substantial progress with the court-ordered case plan. Moreover, the department made a good faith effort to help Darren succeed with the case plan, identifying the problems that led to the minor’s removal and providing services that were reasonable under the circumstances. While the department’s efforts may not have been perfect in this regard, perfection was not the applicable standard. Accordingly, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for Darren and ordered that the case proceed with a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. This petition for extraordinary writ soon followed.
DISCUSSION
Darren seeks reversal of the juvenile court’s order to terminate reunification services and to set the case for a permanency planning hearing. Darren contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the department provided him with reasonable reunification services. Darren reasons that he was “diagnosed preliminarily [with] PTSD,” a condition that could affect his ability to take advantage of the services offered to him. Nonetheless, Darren continues, the department failed to address this “diagnosis,” and thereby failed to provide services “ ‘appropriate for each family and... based on the unique facts relating to that family.’ In re Dino E. (1992) 6 CA4th 1768, 1777 quoting In re Edward C. (1981) 126 CA3d 193, 205.”
We review for substantial evidence a juvenile court’s finding that reasonable reunification services have been provided to a dependent’s parent or legal guardian. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) Further, such finding by the juvenile court must be based on clear and convincing evidence. (Ibid.) Accordingly, in reviewing the juvenile court’s finding, we must bear in mind the heightened burden of proof and determine whether any substantial evidence–that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value–supports it. (Ibid.; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) In doing so, we draw all legitimate inferences in support of the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.)
As Darren points out, California courts have long held that a proper plan for reunification services “must be tailored to the specific needs of the dysfunctional family.... [T]o make the requisite findings, the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult (such as helping to provide transportation and offering more intensive rehabilitation services where others have failed).” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414; see also In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.)
Here, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that Darren had been offered reasonable reunification services by the department from the time of detention until the six-month review hearing. In particular, the juvenile court noted that the department had identified three problem areas leading to the minor’s removal from Darren’s care: (1) domestic violence in the children’s presence; (2) inadequate parenting skills; and (3) substance abuse. These problem areas were identified based on the following facts. The minor was detained after police responded to a complaint of domestic violence between Darren and Danielle at their home in the children’s presence. Danielle, who was arrested for punching Darren in the face, accused Darren of hitting her in the head with a whisky bottle before her attack. Darren admitted drinking alcohol at the time. Darren’s son, C.C., told a social worker that he had “seen [parents fighting] a lot....” Social workers thereafter examined the family’s home, finding it unsafe and very dirty with drug paraphernalia, garbage and clutter strewn about; no heating, no running water, and very little food; and unsafe objects, including an exposed nail and lit propane burners, within the children’s reach.
The juvenile court further noted that, following the minor’s detention, the department provided a “whole panoply of services” to Darren to assist him in reunifying with his son. In particular, the department offered Darren: (1) referrals to programs for domestic violence (MEND), parenting (Incredible Years Parenting) and substance abuse (Alcohol and Other Drugs); (2) bus tickets for transportation to services; (3) supervised weekly visits with the minor; (4) temporary accommodations for the family at a local motel; (5) regular contact between Darren and the department, including weekly meetings with a social worker to help him successfully complete the case plan; (6) a clothing allowance for the children and Wal-mart vouchers; and (7) ongoing drug testing.
This evidence, we conclude, is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable reunification services were provided to Darren. Specifically, the evidence set forth above establishes that the department “identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with [Darren] during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist [Darren] in areas where compliance proved difficult....” (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) That is all the law requires. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973 [reunification services need not be perfect, and are not unreasonable merely because more could have been provided].)
The record also demonstrates that, although Social Worker England scheduled weekly meetings to help Darren complete the requirements of his case plan, Darren stopped attending the meetings after only a handful of times. Darren also regularly missed scheduled visits with minor; failed to regularly attend, much less complete, the programs for domestic violence, parenting, and substance abuse; and rejected England’s suggestion that he seek counseling at a local mental health facility. “Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge Darren’s complaint that the department failed to address the possibility that he suffered from PTSD, a condition that, if he had it, could affect his ability to successfully complete his case plan. Specifically, Darren contends the department “mechanically ignored” a handwritten notation by social worker Pasquale Romano of MEND suggesting that Darren should be assessed for PTSD, because the department believed the notation was “outside the scope” of Darren’s referral to MEND.
In rejecting Darren’s complaint, the juvenile court found that Romano’s handwritten notation was uncertain and ambiguous, and thus insufficient to trigger any duty by the department to assess Darren for PTSD as part of the reunification plan. We agree. Indeed, Romano himself acknowledged to the juvenile court that his notation was unclear, and was merely intended as a recommendation for someone else to assess Darren’s condition rather than as a formal diagnosis of PTSD. Moreover, there was no other evidence in the record suggesting that Darren actually suffered from PTSD. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the department’s failure to arrange for Darren to be assessed for PTSD rendered its provision of services unreasonable. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971 [all legitimate inferences must be drawn in support of the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable services].)
Accordingly, we conclude that no basis exists for reversing the juvenile court’s order. That Darren could have received more services or assistance to facilitate reunification with his son does not render the department’s efforts unreasonable. As the juvenile court noted, perfection is not the relevant standard. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973.) Darren’s writ petition must therefore be denied.
DISPOSTION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
We concur: McGuiness P. J., Pollak J.