Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK70409 Patricia Spear, Judge.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, J.
S.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders establishing jurisdiction over D.B. and denying mother reunification services. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under Welfare and Institution Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e). The court denied mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). Mother argues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e); and (2) substantial evidence did not support the court’s order denying her reunification services. We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 15, 2007, four-month-old D.B. was admitted at White Memorial Hospital. Mother claimed that D.B. had fallen from a bed. Doctors determined that D.B. had a brain hemorrhage and prior healed brain trauma. These injuries were not consistent with mother’s report of D.B. falling one and a half feet from a bed to a carpeted floor. The hospital notified police and the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). On October 18, 2007, DCFS filed a petition alleging that D.B. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e).
Detention Report and Proceedings
According to the detention report, mother told a DCFS social worker that on the evening of October 14, 2007, she was lying in bed with D.B. Mother reported that she went into a diabetic seizure. She awoke two hours later and found herself on the living room floor. Mother claimed to have no recollection of anything that happened during the seizure or immediately after. When she was eventually able to orient herself and stand, she went into the bedroom and found D.B. lying on the floor without a diaper. She put a new diaper on D.B. but did not notice that anything was wrong with him.
Mother and D.B. lived with the maternal grandmother. When the maternal grandmother came home that evening and picked D.B. up, he opened his eyes, began screaming, and looked “horrified.” The maternal grandmother examined D.B. and noticed scratches and bruises on his face, stomach, and legs. She called D.B.’s father at work. Father did not live with mother, but he visited D.B. four or five times each week and helped care for him. When father received maternal grandmother’s call, he immediately left work and went to mother’s house. D.B. did not respond to father’s touch. Father also saw that D.B. was scratched and bruised. Father, along with mother and maternal grandmother, took D.B. to the hospital.
Doctors initially determined that D.B. had healed brain trauma and new brain hemorrhaging. They also discovered fractures in D.B.’s right and left femurs, and his left arm. One of the examining physicians, Dr. James Wolfsen, told the DCFS social worker that D.B.’s injuries appeared to be nonaccidental. He explained that D.B. had subacute and chronic brain injuries, and that D.B. had experienced different episodes of trauma. Dr. Wolfsen opined that D.B. was in an unsafe environment and that mother’s statement about the events of the evening before was not consistent with D.B.’s injuries. Doctors and the social worker observed new bruises on D.B.’s wrists, left arm, left thigh, under his nose, and on his stomach. The social worker reported that on October 16, 2007, medical staff were “in the process of draining [D.B.’s] brain to relieve the bleeding inside of his skull,” and they expected to perform a second procedure the next day to eliminate additional fluids. D.B. was also to be examined by an ophthalmologist.
In an interview with the social worker at the hospital, mother advised that she had experienced one previous diabetic seizure in June 2007. Paramedics were called, but mother was not hospitalized. Mother admitted that D.B.’s immunizations were not current, but she stated that she would never do anything to harm D.B. Mother interrupted the interview with the social worker because her blood sugar was low and she wanted to find something to eat. She did not return to complete the interview.
Father told the DCFS social worker that when he went to mother’s house he always found D.B. dirty and in soiled diapers. Father asserted that mother was not affectionate with D.B. According to father, he would tell mother “‘to pick up the baby and show some love but she didn’t seem to bond with him at all.’ . . . Father indicated [that] when he would tell [mother] to change the baby that she seemed not to care.” He also thought that mother and maternal grandmother were too rough when handling D.B. and changing his diaper.
The maternal grandmother told the social worker that she had never before seen scratches or bruises on D.B. She said that mother did not want to seek treatment for her diabetes. But she did not believe mother would harm D.B., and denied that mother or father abused or neglected D.B. The social worker also interviewed father’s sister, who lived one block away from mother. Father’s sister claimed that mother had not provided a healthy environment for D.B. She told the social worker that when she visited mother, she found D.B. dirty and wearing a soiled diaper. She had never seen bruises or marks on D.B.
On October 18, 2007, the parties appeared for a detention hearing. The juvenile court considered the detention report and found there was a prima facie case that D.B. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e).
D.B. remained in the hospital until October 29, 2007. Medical workers noted that D.B. was suffering from several major health problems upon his release, including decreased head control, decreased strength, and high risk of developmental delay. He was released to his paternal grandparents with a shunt on the side of his head that was to remain in place for approximately six months.
Jurisdiction Report
DCFS filed a jurisdiction report on November 8, 2007. The report asserted jurisdiction was proper under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e), based on one repeated allegation:
“On or about 10/14/07, four month old child [D.B.] was physically examined, hospitalized and found to be suffering from a detrimental condition consisting of a brain injury, head trauma, brain swelling, bilateral subdural hematomas to the child’s brain. Further, the child suffered a left distal fracture, a right femur fracture, a left arm torus fracture and a left humerus fracture. Further, the child suffered bruises and scratches to the child’s face, legs, stomach and wrists. Further, the child’s [mother’s] explanation for the manner in which the child received the child’s injuries are inconsistent with the child’s injuries. Further, the child’s father [S.B.] gave no explanation for the manner in which the child received the child’s injuries. Further, the child’s injuries are consistent with non accidental inflicted trauma and child abuse. Further, such a detrimental condition would not ordinarily occur except as the result of deliberate, unreasonable and neglectful acts by the child’s mother . . . and father . . ., who had care, custody and control of the child. Further, such deliberate, unreasonable and neglectful acts on the part of the child’s parents, to the child, endangers the child’s physical and emotional health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, placing the child at risk of serious physical and emotional harm, damage, danger and death.”
In a separate interview with the social worker, mother disputed the allegations and stated that she did not deliberately hurt D.B. She said that on October 14, 2007, she had a seizure and woke up two hours later to find D.B. under the chair in her mother’s room. She claimed that he was not in that room before the seizure. Mother was unaware that D.B. had suffered previous fractures and she did not know how he had been scratched. She reported that after her first seizure in June 2007, she regained consciousness and found D.B. unharmed in his crib. She told the social worker: “I can protect my child if it weren’t for the seizures.” Mother had seen two doctors in the past for her diabetes, but she had not received any treatment for seizures.
Father told the social worker that mother did not hold or cuddle D.B. He had not noticed any bruises on D.B. two days before the incident. Father said that he had never hit D.B., and he never saw mother hit or grab D.B. or do anything inappropriate. He had once noticed that mother was rough with D.B. when changing his diaper. However, on October 14, 2007, father saw marks on D.B.’s arms and legs, as well as a bite mark on his arm. Mother said she did not remember what had happened, but father could not believe this statement. Father reported that the maternal grandmother had told his mother (the paternal grandmother) that mother was suffering from postpartum depression.
The maternal grandmother told the social worker that mother took care of D.B. during the day, and father went to their house during the day to help. The maternal grandmother did not know how D.B. could have been scratched and said that D.B. had no marks prior to October 14, 2007.
The jurisdiction report indicated that the police officer handling the case had not completed his investigation. He reported that D.B. had old and new bruises and fractures, and that father would probably not be charged.
The jurisdiction report identified the detention report and a police report as “supporting evidence.” The detention report was not attached to the jurisdiction report. Instead, other evidence was attached, including the initial police report and a series of D.B.’s medical records.
The Medical Records
The medical records attached to the jurisdiction report addressed two separate issues: D.B.’s brain injuries and the operation to address them, and bone surveys that were evaluated for child abuse.
Subdural Hematomas
An October 15, 2007 report noted several findings and indicated that DCFS had been alerted. A separate report noted no discrete evidence of skull fracture. An additional October 15 report offered the impression: “Possible chronic subdural hygromas. Correlate clinically for child abuse.” An October 16 operative report provided a brief history: “This is a 4-month-old male, who presented with sudden increase in intracranial pressure, bulging fontanelle and depressed mental status of unknown origin. The CT scan of the head confirmed the presence of a 1.5-2 cm bifrontal subdural hygroma with local mass effect.”
There were five findings: “The head is turned and tilted within the gantry and the calvarium appears asymmetrical. There are bilateral frontal subacute blood products. There does not appear to be any significant midline shift. There is a subjective prominence of the ventricles noted. Basal cisterns are not particularly remarkable.”
Bone Surveys
An initial bone survey did not produce sufficient results. The addendum to a record bearing an October 15, 2007 exam date stated:
“With the additional strong history of possible child abuse, it is felt that the symmetrical metaphyseal changes visualized adjacent to the long bones of the upper and lower limbs, are insufficiently evaluated on these images to determine whether these metaphyseal changes are related to child abuse, and therefore, this examination should be repeated in the department using digital-control radiographs for better detail. An attempt was made to obtain images portably, which are not satisfactory films. [¶] There is now a better history presented. CT exams and MR brain studies showed bilateral frontal subacute blood products with no midline shift and subjective prominence of the ventricles on the CT exam, and the MR examination demonstrated the bilateral extra-axial frontoparietal collections of fluid suspect for chronic subdural hygromas. With contrast administration, there was no abnormal enhancement noted in the brain or in the extra-axial collections. Therefore, because of concern for possible metaphyseal injuries, there should be re-evaluation of the long bones using digital-controlled imaging.”
In the last bone survey report attached to the jurisdiction report, the following impression was reported with an October 19, 2007 exam date: “Vague areas of irregular cortical bone, as described. These are relatively soft findings and may not meet the criteria for nonaccidental trauma. However, nonaccidental trauma is not excluded on the basis of plain film findings alone. Clinical correlation and correlation with other imaging will be needed. Historical correlation will be needed as well.”
Earlier in the report the author listed several “soft findings,” such as: “There is a vague irregular lucency at the posterior medial aspect of the distal right femur, which may represent a tiny cortical buckled fracture. This is only a single finding and is a relatively soft finding. [¶] There may also be an irregular margin at the medial tibial plateau on the right, but this is a relatively soft finding as well.”
Police Report
The initial police report contained statements from mother, father, and maternal grandmother that were similar to those included in the detention report. This included mother’s statement that she was home with D.B. on October 14, 2007, when she went into a diabetic seizure. Mother told the police that she awoke on the living room floor but remembered nothing. She found D.B. naked on the bedroom floor. She put a new diaper on him and put him to bed without noticing anything wrong with him. Maternal grandmother reported coming home and noticing that D.B. had soiled the bed. She saw that he had scratches and bruises on his face, stomach, and leg, and he screamed when she picked him up. Father told the police that when he arrived at mother’s house, he saw that D.B. was scratched and bruised. D.B. was lethargic and did not respond normally to father’s touch. Father took D.B. to the hospital.
According to the police report, the hospital’s Dr. Ho advised that D.B.’s injuries were not consistent with mother’s explanation that he fell from a bed, which led the hospital to notify police. According to another report, mother seemed nervous and became “very hostile” toward hospital staff. Dr. Ho informed police that D.B. appeared to have a brain hemorrhage and that X-rays showed healed prior brain trauma. The DCFS social worker later informed the police that D.B. had sustained “a fractured right and left femur, a radially fractured left arm and fractured left humerus.”
The jurisdiction report recommended that reunification services be provided to father, but not to mother. DCFS also recommended that mother participate in and successfully complete a counseling program to address physical abuse and anger management, and suggested that mother have monitored visits with D.B. A January 7, 2008 interim review report informed the court that the criminal investigation was still ongoing. The detective handling the investigation told the social worker that it was “undeterminable who was actually involved in this incident.”
On April 14, 2008, the day of the jurisdiction hearing, mother and father submitted on the petition. The court advised them of their rights, and confirmed that they understood “that by submitting on the petition, the court will consider the reports I’ve received from the department and basically sustain the petition as it’s been changed by agreement with yourself, [the other parent’s] counsel, and counsel for the county[.]” The juvenile court indicated that it had read and reviewed the November 8, 2007 jurisdiction report and a January 7, 2008 interim review report. The court then admitted those two documents into evidence, without objection from counsel. The court repeated that it had read and considered the admitted documents, and sustained the petition’s allegations as amended. The amended petition asserted allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e), charging that D.B. had suffered brain injury, head trauma, brain swelling, bilateral subdural hematomas, and bi-lateral retinal hemorrhages. Allegations regarding D.B.’s bone fractures were eliminated. The petition further alleged that the injuries were consistent with nonaccidental trauma and child abuse. Father was included in only the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation.
Mother and father completed written waiver forms indicating that they wished to “submit the petition on the basis of the social worker’s or probation officer’s report and other documents, if any.”
Mother contested the recommended disposition. At a May 21, 2008 disposition hearing, mother’s counsel offered stipulated testimony that mother had been attending counseling and parenting classes since mid-February 2008. D.B.’s counsel argued against reunification services, contending that mother had offered only an unbelievable explanation for D.B.’s serious injuries. D.B.’s counsel also pointed out that mother had not started parenting classes until February 2008, even though D.B. was detained in October 2007.
The juvenile court denied reunification services, stating:
“In order to offer mother [family reunification], where I sustained an [(e)] count under 361.5(b)(6), the court is very concerned about the reports in the jurisdiction disposition report that mother seemed to have a disinterest or detachment from the child. And the court’s concerned that although mother’s condition is a medical condition, it really endangers the child, so I cannot -- so I think that does support the factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with mom under 361.5(b)(6). [¶] And also, under 361.5(c), I’m not supposed to offer [family reunification] unless I find by clear and convincing evidence that it’s in the best interests of the child, and I don’t see clear and convincing evidence that it’s in the child’s best interest. So I think at this point, given that father is being offered [family reunification], which is helpful, mother does have time to do well at Project Peacemakers [a counseling program], get letters from them showing how well you’re doing, that you’re medically stable, that you understand kind of what’s going on and visit the child regularly, and come up with a 388. Certainly at [the] next court hearing [the] department should address any progress mother’s made, and we’ll deal with that then.”
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings
“On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court’s findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]” (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.)
Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e). Mother’s argument is based in part on the contention that the detention report should not be considered in assessing whether there is substantial evidence since it was not attached to the jurisdiction report, and was not moved into evidence at the jurisdiction hearing. However, the detention report was filed with the court. The court received it, read it, and considered it in connection with the detention hearing. The jurisdiction report referenced the detention report as “supporting evidence.” Although the detention report was not attached to the jurisdiction report, it was already in the juvenile court record. The best practice would have been for DCFS to attach the detention report to the jurisdiction report, or explicitly move it into evidence at the jurisdiction hearing. But under the circumstances of this case, we determine that the detention report was sufficiently incorporated into the jurisdiction report for us to conclude that the juvenile court considered it in asserting jurisdiction.
Mother does not argue that the detention report was inadmissible, or that the court could not consider it at the jurisdiction hearing. (See § 355, subds. (a), (b)(1).)
We also note that mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). When the juvenile court finds jurisdiction on several grounds, we may affirm the judgment if the evidence supports its assertion of jurisdiction under any one of the statutory bases. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875-876.) However, the court’s denial of reunification services here was based on its jurisdictional findings of nonaccidental infliction of serious physical harm under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e). Thus, despite mother’s concession that jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) was appropriate, we address the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e).
A. Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Under section 300, subdivision (a), the court may assert jurisdiction if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” Mother concedes that D.B. suffered serious physical harm, but asserts that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that she deliberately inflicted the harm on D.B. We disagree.
The record contained evidence that D.B. had been seriously and nonaccidentally injured. Doctors reported that D.B. had sustained both old and new serious injuries, and further that the injuries appeared to be nonaccidental. Doctors also advised DCFS that mother’s explanation of what happened on October 14, 2007, was not consistent with D.B.’s injuries. Moreover, mother was apparently alone with D.B. when he sustained his most recent injuries, which included a subdural hematoma, bruises, and scratches. Although some of this information came from the detention report, the jurisdiction report was also supported by key pieces of evidence. The police officer’s report from the night D.B. was admitted to the hospital included the statement from a physician that D.B.’s injuries were inconsistent with mother’s explanation of the incident. A medical report relating to D.B.’s brain injuries noted: “Correlate clinically for child abuse.” The juvenile court could interpret this statement to mean that the doctor’s observation was that D.B.’s injuries indicated that he was a victim of child abuse.
The jurisdiction report and attached evidence also revealed that D.B. had old and new brain injuries. Mother had no explanation for any of the injuries other than her statement that D.B. once fell from a bed to a carpeted floor. Mother also reported that she did not notice anything wrong with D.B., even though maternal grandmother and father quickly recognized that something was amiss when they saw him. The juvenile court reasonably could have concluded that mother’s claimed failure to observe what was immediately obvious to the maternal grandmother and father cast doubt on mother’s entire account of what happened.
Mother did not offer a credible explanation that suggested that D.B.’s injuries occurred accidentally, or were inflicted by someone else. (See In re Richard H. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1363-1364.) Instead, the jurisdiction report indicated that mother simply had no explanation for what may have happened to D.B. to cause him to be scratched, bitten, bruised, and suffering from old and new brain injuries. While mother claimed to have suffered a diabetic seizure and did not know what happened for a two-hour period, it was within the juvenile court’s purview to believe or reject mother’s assertions. (In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333-1334 (Christopher L.).)
On appeal, mother suggests that she might have harmed D.B. during her seizure, but that her actions were not deliberate. However, mother submitted on the petition at the jurisdiction hearing. Although she did not concede the truth of the petition’s allegations by doing so, she did waive her right to introduce other evidence to refute the allegations. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) As a result, the juvenile court had to consider and weigh the evidence before it, and draw inferences from the reports at hand. We do not reweigh the evidence. (Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1333-1334.)
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a).
B. Section 300, Subdivision (e)
Under section 300, subdivision (e), the court will assert jurisdiction if “[t]he child is under the age of five years and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child. For the purposes of this subdivision, ‘severe physical abuse’ means any of the following: any single act of abuse which causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disability, or death . . . or more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness; or the willful, prolonged failure to provide adequate food.”
Mother’s only argument is that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find that either she, or someone she knew or should have known, “abused” D.B. This is essentially the same as mother’s contention under section 300, subdivision (a) that there was insufficient evidence that D.B.’s injuries were nonaccidental. For the same reasons we just explained, we reject this argument.
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying Mother Reunification Services
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied her reunification services. We disagree.
We review a juvenile court’s order denying reunification services for substantial evidence. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 852 (Tyrone W.);In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839-840.) Section 361.5, subdivision (b) identifies situations in which the juvenile court need not provide reunification services to a parent. Under subdivision (b)(6), the court need not provide reunification services when it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm to the child . . . by a parent or guardian, as defined in this subdivision, and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian. [¶] . . . [¶] A finding of the infliction of severe physical harm, for the purposes of this subdivision, may be based on, but is not limited to, deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child’s body . . . by an act or omission of the parent or guardian, or of another individual or animal with the consent of the parent or guardian . . . .”
Section 361.5, subdivision (h) provides that in determining whether reunification services would benefit the child pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), the court is to consider any information it deems relevant, including a list of several specific factors. Section 361.5, subdivision (i) requires the court to “read into the record the basis for a finding of . . . infliction of severe physical harm under paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual findings used to determine that the provision of reunification services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit the child.” But if subdivision (b)(6) applies, the court may not order reunification services unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the best interests of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).)
The factors are: (1) the specific act or omission comprising the severe physical harm inflicted on the child; (2) the circumstances under which harm was inflicted on the child; (3) the severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child; (4) any history of abuse of other children by the offending parent or guardian; (5) the likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with no continuing supervision; and (6) whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending parent or guardian. (§ 361.5, subd. (h).)
Mother argues that the juvenile court’s dispositional order was incorrect because there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that D.B.’s injuries were “inflicted nonaccidentally or deliberately by mother, or that they were inflicted by omission with her actual knowledge that they were occurring[.]” We have already rejected this argument. Mother relies heavily on Tyrone W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 839, but that case does not support her argument. In Tyrone W., the juvenile court held that a parent who reasonably should have known that the child was being abused but failed to prevent the abuse could not be denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). The court concluded that the provision “applies to the parent or parents who inflicted severe physical harm to the child whether by act, omission or consent, and does not apply to a negligent parent.” (Tyrone W., at p. 851.)
In this case, the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) was not based on an allegation or evidence indicating that mother was merely negligent. Instead, the juvenile court found that D.B. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (a), meaning that mother had nonaccidentally inflicted serious physical harm on D.B. We have concluded that substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional finding. As explained above, the record included evidence that doctors viewed D.B.’s injuries as nonaccidental and indicative of child abuse. The evidence pointed to mother as the person who inflicted the harm. The juvenile court apparently did not credit mother’s statements that she did not know what had happened to D.B. (In re Richard H., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1364.) Thus, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) properly applied.
The juvenile court also found on the record that reunification services with mother would not benefit D.B. This finding was supported by sufficient evidence. As the court noted, the record contained evidence that mother was detached from D.B., specifically father’s statements to the social worker that he had noticed mother being rough with D.B., and that she did not show affection or any bond with D.B. As the court further noted, mother admitted to the social worker that her seizures prevented her from protecting D.B. Although mother acknowledged this problem, she delayed several months before starting the parenting classes DCFS suggested.
Moreover, the jurisdiction report and the attached supporting evidence indicated that after the October 14 seizure, mother did not immediately seek medical attention for D.B. The maternal grandmother quickly realized something was wrong with D.B., as did father. On the other hand, mother did not act in response to D.B.’s scratches, bruises, or the other behavior that alerted the maternal grandmother and father that D.B. was in distress. Mother’s actions were consistent with a finding that she inflicted the harm upon D.B., and further supported the finding that providing reunification services to her would not benefit D.B.
Mother contends that the juvenile court did not make a finding that “mother was unable to benefit from reunification services” but this is not the finding the court was required to make. The juvenile court was properly concerned with whether reunification services would benefit D.B., not whether they would benefit mother. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(6), (h).)
Mother also argues that the court did not indicate that it was considering the factors identified in section 361.5, subdivision (h), and therefore erred in denying reunification services. Although the juvenile court did not explicitly state that it was considering these factors, we follow the general principle that the court is presumed to have followed the law and we imply findings that support the judgment. (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563.) We therefore presume that the juvenile court considered the section 361.5, subdivision (h) factors. The court was not required to explicitly consider the factors on the record.
Mother further asserts that juvenile court’s order denying reunification services cannot stand because there were no express findings under section 361.5, subdivision (i). She relies on In re Rebekah R. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1638 to support this argument. In Rebekah R., the court held that because the juvenile court had not made a preliminary determination of severe sexual abuse or physical harm within the scope of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), the court could not rest its decision to deny reunification services on that section. However, the same appellate court later clarified its holding in In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260. The S.G. court noted that it had reversed the juvenile court’s ruling in Rebekah R. because there was insufficient evidence to warrant denial of reunification services on the one bypass provision that was applicable to the situation. The S.G. court held that “Rebekah R. does not stand and should not be read to stand for the proposition advocated by appellant, namely the failure to make findings necessary for a denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) mandates reversal . . . . We did not hold that absent explicit findings we could not uphold a denial under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). Indeed, in the next portion of our opinion, we reiterated the pertinent rule of appellate review, that is, we will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]” (S.G., at p. 1260.)
Similarly, here the juvenile court’s failure to read into the record the basis for its finding of infliction of severe physical harm under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) at the disposition hearing does not mandate reversal. We may imply the juvenile court’s factual findings based on substantial evidence, as explained above. Indeed, the juvenile court at least partially specified the factual findings it used to determine that the provision of reunification services to mother would not benefit D.B.
The juvenile court cited mother’s detachment from D.B., and expressed concern about mother’s claimed medical condition since it was endangering D.B. Although the juvenile court mentioned the medical condition, it impliedly rejected mother’s explanation that she was not to blame for D.B.’s injuries because she had a diabetic seizure and claimed to not know what had happened during or after the seizure. Thus, we do not construe the juvenile court’s statement about mother’s “medical condition” to mean anything other than a statement that even if mother’s explanation about what happened was to be credited—which the court did not—D.B.’s safety would still be jeopardized in mother’s care. This was a problem mother failed to seriously address or rectify.
We also note that mother attempts to turn section 361.5, subdivision (c), on its head. Mother asserts that “clear and convincing evidence does not support a finding that reunification services are not in [D.B.’s] best interests based on the record.” This argument confuses the two standards set forth in section 361.5, subdivisions (b) and (c). Under section 361.5, subdivision (b), the juvenile court was not required to provide reunification services to mother if there was clear and convincing evidence that mother had inflicted severe physical harm on D.B., and it would not benefit D.B. to pursue reunification services with mother. Once the court made this finding, it could only order reunification services if it found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services would be in D.B.’s best interests. Here, the juvenile court properly found that there was no such clear and convincing evidence that would warrant providing reunification services to mother in spite of the court’s finding under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s judgment is affirmed.
We concur: FLIER, Acting P. J., O’NEILL, J.
Judge of the Ventura Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.