The debtor's equitable interest in the Congers property extends to at least the amount of the funds he contributed toward the mortgage and other expenses. The plaintiff also cites In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1968), but to some degree that case is distinguishable. In Davis, the bankrupt transferred his interest in a home to his wife and father-in-law for no consideration, while continuing to reside there. However, he had indicated in several written financial statements that he had an interest in the home.

The issue then is whether, upon reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite belief that the bankruptcy judge clearly erred in concluding that the bankrupt had sustained the burden of establishing that he had not defrauded his creditors and intentionally falsified his initial petition for discharge. See In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1968). In In re Tabibian, supra, 289 F.2d at 795, we expressly rejected the proposition, accepted by some other circuits, e.g., Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1956), that findings by the bankruptcy judge of "ultimate facts" should be reviewed more closely by both the district court and the court of appeals.

On top of it, it's . . . tenuous to say that someone who moved in a house in 1984, of which he has never had an interest in, is going to have an equitable interest. The Court agrees with Judge Conrad's decision with regard to the property at 92 Plainview Road. While the debtor's actions surrounding the credit application to Chase Bank and the financial statement to the Bank of Smithtown may justify criminal proceeding and/or civil liability on the part of the debtor, the Court is of the view that Judge Conrad properly concluded that the debtor had no legal or equitable interest in the property located at 92 Plainview Road. The Second Circuit cases which the plaintiff relies, including In the Matter of Davis, 404 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1968) and In re Vecchione, 407 F. Supp. 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) are inapposite as they both involve situations where the debtor originally owned a legal interest in the relevant property and thereafter transferred title in order to circumvent the bankruptcy implications. The uncontroverted facts indicate that Schultz did not pay the mortgage or any part of the down payment on the property at issue.

Courts will not sanction the use of wives as conduits through which funds of a debtor may be tapped while the same funds remain unreachable by creditors. Matter of Vecchione, supra; In re Gugliada, 20 B.R. 524 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. St. Mary, 334 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.Pa. 1971); In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1968). That Mr. Kaiser considered the Florida property his own militated in favor of such a finding.

We must accept the factual findings of the court unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Lurie, 385 F.Supp. 784, 786 (E.D.N.Y.1974) (citing In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312, 314 (2d Cir. 1968)).         The record reveals a dispute between the OSCC and the Trustee concerning both the value and allocation of the purchase price of Elmwood Farm.

But, as previously noted hereinabove, a transfer, like a false oath in certain circumstances, may also constitute a fraudulent concealment continuing into the statutory one year period of § 14(c)(4) or the period after the filing under § 14(c)(1). 1A Collier §§ 14.22, 14.45, p. 1409; 2A Collier § 29.10; 1 Cowans §§ 124, 125; Green v. Toy, 171 F.2d 979 (1st Cir. 1949); Duggins v. Heffron, 128 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1942), cc. 115 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1940); Farmers' Saving Bank v. Allen, 41 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1930); In Re James, 181 F. 476 (4th Cir. 1910); Matter of Vecchione, 407 F. Supp. 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); In Re Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.Pa. 1948); In Re Perkins, 40 F. Supp. 114 (D.C.N.J. 1941); In Re Baxter, 27 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); United States v. Fallman, 28 F. Supp. 251 (D.Mass. 1939); see also, In Re Davis, 404 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1968); Burchinal v. United States, 342 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1965); Sultan v. United States, 249 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1957); In Re Quackenbush, 102 F. 282 (N.D.N.Y. 1900). A reading of the foregoing authorities clearly establishes that many transfers, because of the strong inferences of the surrounding facts and circumstances, are held to be continuing concealments or implied secret trusts.

The circumstances undoubtedly alluded to were that it was the bankrupt's wife who not only made the total cash down-payment for the house but also paid the mortgage, taxes and all other expenses out of funds either earned or inherited by her. Here, all expenses relating to the houses were paid both before and after the conveyances out of money earned by the bankrupts. See In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312, 313-14 (2 Cir. 1968); In re Walter, 67 F. Supp. 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). See also In re Elliot, 83 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.Pa. 1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 895 (3 Cir. 1949), in which a concealment was found and a discharge denied because the bankrupt had failed to list as an asset an interest in the house in which he lived and on which he had repaid a $1600 mortgage.

Factual findings must be accepted unless found "clearly erroneous" under the test of Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P. In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312, 314 (2 Cir. 1968); In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793, 795 (2 Cir. 1961); see Bankruptcy Rule 810. And where the credibility of the bankrupt is an important factor, "the scope of review should be relatively narrow."

In those cases where a debtor's discharge was denied for concealing an equitable interest in property, the property in question, usually a house, was transferred to the debtor's spouse while the debtor's income was used to pay off a mortgage, thus creating equity for the debtor and the spouse. In re Walter, 67 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); In re Elliott, 83 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.Pa. 1948); In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Vecchione, 407 F. Supp. 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Gugliada, 20 B.R. 524 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1982). In this case, the debtors gave approximately $50,000 to their daughter and son-in-law who purchased a home jointly in their own names and who paid the mortgage and other carrying charges.

Accordingly, the discharge denied on the basis of section 14(c)(1) is affirmed. In conclusion, it is obvious that the findings of fact in the bankruptcy proceeding can in no respects be termed clearly erroneous, Bankruptcy Rule 810; In re Cadarette, supra; In re Davis, 404 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1968); Simon v. Agar, 299 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Steinberg, 143 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1942); Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Henderson, supra, and thus, they will not be upset. Moreover, the bankruptcy judge's application of the law to these facts was proper.