Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD226444 & JD226445
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Appellant, the mother of the minors, appeals from orders made at a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing at which she was denied reunification services. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; further statutory references are to this code. Appellant claims the juvenile court erred by denying her services. For the reasons stated below, we shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2007, two petitions were filed by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) concerning David W. (two months old) and Michael W. (13 months old), alleging drugs were found in the family residence and appellant left David in the care of a registered sex offender. Appellant admitted the allegations. After the children’s biological father was identified, the petitions were amended to include allegations that he has a substance abuse problem rendering him incapable of caring for the children.
Appellant’s history with DHHS began when she was 14 years old and her first child was made a dependent of the juvenile court because appellant’s substance abuse problem and incarceration prevented her from caring for the child. Since then three more of appellant’s children were declared dependents of the juvenile court because of appellant’s substance abuse problems.
In January 2006, appellant’s fifth child, Mark W., Jr. was removed not just because of her substance abuse problem, but also because appellant left Mark W., Jr. alone with a registered sex offender, her then husband Mark W., Sr. Eight months later, appellant gave birth to her sixth child, Michael W., and accepted DHHS’s offer of informal supervision services. David W. was born 11 months later, and in July 2007, appellant’s parental rights as to Mark W., Jr. were terminated when he was adopted into another family.
In 1987, Mark Sr. was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, or oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 220).
By September 2007, appellant’s drug tests had come back clean every week for nearly one year with one exception, which was excused by a prescription. Appellant also had been compliant with the public health nurse who was assisting in the care of Michael and David. Accordingly, appellant’s social worker recommended closing the case.
On October 4, 2007, however, law enforcement officers performing a probation search in appellant’s residence found David alone with Mark W., Sr. and two other adults, one of whom was under the influence of an illegal substance. The officers also found heroin hidden in a pack of cigarettes in appellant’s living room. Michael was found at his maternal grandmother’s home and both boys were taken into protective custody.
A detention hearing was held on October 10, 2007, at which the juvenile court found a prima facie showing was made that the children came within the provisions of section 300. Mother was granted supervised visits and reunification services “without prejudice to further recommendations by the Department.” A combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was set for November 6, 2007, but was continued numerous times and was not completed until March 4, 2008.
At the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, appellant explained that she had been participating in rehabilitation for her substance abuse problem since Michael and David were taken from her home. She described being released from one program for missing five days due to illness, though she was already signed up to begin a new program. Appellant also testified that, since the children were detained, she had been participating in the “STARS” program, through which she was regularly tested for drugs. She admitted to one test coming back “dirty” on the day the children were taken, but every test after that was clean.
In addition to these two rehabilitation programs, appellant testified she participated in Narcotics Anonymous, attending a meeting every day. She acknowledged that she had a sponsor, and described the fourth step she was on in the 12-step program. Appellant also said she was signed up to begin a parenting class, though she indicated she had completed a class in the past, which she thought may be sufficient.
When asked about the children, appellant described visiting the children, unsupervised, twice a week for one hour visits; she never missed a visit, though she was once told to leave because she was sick. Counsel then asked appellant about her relationship with her now ex-husband, Mark W., Sr. Mother admitted he was living with her at the time Michael and David were detained, though he was only there on the weekends, she claimed, because he was a truck driver. Appellant also admitted that Mark continued to live with her even after the boys were detained. She did, however, ask Mark to leave approximately one month before the hearing, after he threatened her and the children during an argument.
Following appellant’s testimony, the court concluded DHHS had established that section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) [failure to reunify with a half sibling and the parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problem that led to removal of the half sibling], (b)(11) [parental rights of parent over half sibling terminated and the parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problem that led to removal of the half sibling], and (b)(13) [parent has chronic substance abuse problem and resisted prior court-ordered treatment for that problem within three-year period prior to petition being filed, or refused on at least two occasions to comply with substance abuse program described in case plan] applied as bases for denying appellant services. The court found that, based on DHHS’s reports and appellant’s testimony, the minors’ half siblings were removed as a result of appellant’s substance abuse issues as well as her decision to allow a registered sex offender access to her children.
The court also found that appellant’s decision to continue living with Mark W., Sr. until one month prior to the hearing did not constitute reasonable efforts to treat one of the problems that led to removal of the minors’ half siblings. Additionally, the court found that appellant’s single, positive drug test was evidence that she was not benefitting from the services in which she already was participating. Thus, the court noted, appellant had failed to make reasonable efforts to resolve her substance abuse problem as well. As a consequence, the court denied appellant reunification services.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court's order denying her services is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d1206, 1214.) In making this determination, we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3dat p. 1214.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Appellant argues there is insufficient to evidence to support the following findings made by the trial court: (1) that any of the boys’ half siblings were removed because she allowed a registered sex offender, Mark W., Sr., access to them; (2) that she failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent Mark W., Sr. from having access to Michael and David; (3) that she failed to make reasonable efforts to treat her substance abuse problem; and (4) that she was resistant to court-ordered treatment.
Appellant contends the section 300 removal petition for Mark W., Jr., listing her decision to allow Mark W., Sr., a registered sex offender, access to Mark W., Jr. as a basis for removal, is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Mark W., Jr. was removed because she left him in the care of a registered sex offender. In support of her contention, appellant argues that the petition is merely an allegation, and without the court’s order of removal, it was error for the juvenile court here to presume the allegation was sustained. Appellant’s argument fails.
The section 300 petition was admitted into evidence at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Appellant did not argue the allegations were untrue, nor did she offer any evidence that the allegations were not sustained. In fact, appellant herself testified that the reason she lost custody of Mark W., Jr., was because of her relationship with Mark W., Sr. Additionally, the jurisdictional report prepared by DHHS, and considered by the court, lists as a basis for Mark W., Jr.’s removal, that appellant allowed Mark W., Sr. access to the child. Thus, the only evidence before the court was that Mark W., Jr. was removed, at least in part, because appellant allowed a registered sex offender access to him.
Appellant next contends that she made reasonable efforts to correct the problem, and preclude Mark W., Sr. from having access to David and Michael because at the time of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Mark W., Sr. was no longer living with her. We are not persuaded.
It is uncontroverted that the presence of Mark W., Sr. in appellant’s home was one of the bases for which David and Michael were removed. It also is uncontroverted that appellant continued living with Mark W., Sr. after David and Michael were removed, and did so up until one month before the dispositional/jurisdictional hearing. Appellant’s refusal to separate herself from Mark W., Sr. for more than two years after Mark W., Jr. was removed, and nearly five months after Michael and David were removed does not constitute reasonable efforts to cure the problem. Accordingly, we find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that appellant failed to make reasonable efforts to correct at least one of the problems that led to the removal of the boys’ half sibling, Mark W., Jr.
As we conclude the juvenile court properly denied appellant services under this subdivision, it is unnecessary for us to address the other grounds relied on by the juvenile court for denial of services. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [“reviewing court may affirm a juvenile court judgment if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several grounds”].)
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE, J., ROBIE, J.