Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. J515759A/B, Carol Isackson, Judge.
O'ROURKE, J.
Deborah H. appeals judgments terminating her parental rights to her children, David O. and Elizabeth A., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. We affirm the judgments.
Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Deborah H. is the mother of David O., born November 1992 and Elizabeth A., born February 1999 (together, children). The children's fathers were not involved in their lives, and do not appeal the termination of parental rights. In July 2005 the court found that the children required the protection of the juvenile court because Deborah had a pattern of becoming homeless and leaving the children with others without making arrangements for their support. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Deborah described herself as a "recovering alcoholic."
In February 2006 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) placed the children in the care of an older half-brother and his partner (caregivers). The children did well in their care and became "quite bonded" to their brother. The social worker described the children as studious and well-mannered. They enjoyed Deborah's visits, which were unsupervised after January 2006.
Deborah received reunification services for 18 months. She visited the children regularly, but her compliance with other case plan requirements was sporadic. Deborah was often homeless or without a stable residence. After conducting a psychological evaluation, Dr. Steven Griggs, Ph.D., recommended against reunification, concluding that Deborah was chronically dependent on others for emotional and financial support, and had a long history of unstable living. Dr. Griggs opined it was unlikely Deborah would intentionally harm her children, but "sooner or later" her personality disorders would result in neglect of the children.
The section 366.26 hearing was held on April 30 and May 2, 2007. The social worker testified that her observations of the relationship between Deborah and the children was consistent with those of Dr. Robert Kelin, Psy.D., who had conducted a bonding study. Deborah's interactions with her children were loving. David and Elizabeth loved Deborah and had fun visiting her. The children's relationship with Deborah vacillated between a peer-to-peer relationship and a parent-child relationship.
The social worker opined that Deborah did not have a significant parent-child relationship with the children. The children relied on the caregivers for stability, security and their physical and emotional needs. The caregivers intended to adopt the children and to allow Deborah to continue to visit. Both Elizabeth and David stated they wanted to continue living with the caregivers.
The court determined Deborah maintained consistent and regular visitation with the children. The court found that the children were happy to see Deborah and had a warm and emotionally significant relationship with her, but the relationship was not parental in nature and its severance would not cause the children great harm. The court found the children were adoptable, identified the caregivers as the children's prospective adoptive parents and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Deborah asserts the court erred when it determined the beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to
preclude termination of her parental rights. She contends the evidence showed the children had a significant and important bond with her, and this bond was at times parental in nature. Deborah argues terminating her parental rights does not provide the children a "new forever family," but instead merely rearranges the legal relationships within an existing family. She posits that, under these circumstances, guardianship is the more appropriate permanency plan.
The Agency contends substantial evidence supports the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Minor's counsel joins the Agency's arguments, and further asserts the children's relationship with Deborah remains that of the quintessential "friendly visitor" rather than that of a parent providing the care and comfort arising from a parent-child relationship. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576 (Autumn H.); In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52.)
At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of three alternatives—adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. (In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) If a child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans. (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882, 888; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 808-809.) Once the court determines that a child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides an exception to termination of parental rights when "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." To overcome the statutory preference for adoption, the parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment of the child to the parent. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
We recognize that interaction between parent and child will almost always confer some incidental benefit to the child. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) In the context of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), "benefit" means the parent-child relationship "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (Ibid.) "If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (Ibid.)
We determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling by reviewing the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) If the court's ruling is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm the court's rejection of the exceptions to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the court's determination that the children would not be greatly harmed were parental rights terminated. Dr. Kelin, Psy.D., observed that the children's relationship with Deborah vacillated between a peer-to-peer relationship and a parent-child relationship. Dr. Griggs, Ph.D., concluded Deborah was dependent on others for emotional support, and would continue to focus on her own unmet needs. The social worker opined that Deborah did not assume a parental role in the children's lives and the children did not look to her to meet their emotional and physical needs for stability and security. The court reasonably concluded Deborah did not show she occupied a significant parental role in the children's lives. (In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827.)
In view of the children's ages, the court carefully questioned the social worker about the children's views on adoption. Over several months, the social worker had discussions with the children about adoption and their feelings about adoption. Based on those conversations, the social worker believed the children favored adoption by the caregivers. Elizabeth said Deborah could "come to visit us." Elizabeth understood that adoption meant that the caregivers would be her "mom and dad," and she was willing to be adopted by her caregivers. On occasion, Elizabeth called the caregiver "mama." David said adoption was "cool." The court reasonably interpreted the children's statements as "a plea for permanency," and concluded the children would benefit from adoption by their caregivers.
Further, David is 15 years old, and the court cannot terminate parental rights to him over his objection. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) David's willingness to be adopted by his caregivers permits the reasonable inference that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to him. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The record also shows Elizabeth had an age-appropriate understanding of adoption and was willing to be adopted by her caregivers.
The record supports the finding that the pleasant and friendly relationships the children have with Deborah do not outweigh the well-being the children will gain in a permanent home with adoptive parents. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Substantial evidence supports the court's findings that the beneficial parent-child exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(a) did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McINTYRE, Acting P. J., AARON, J.