Indeed, the record reflects that the stress experienced by the children manifested itself in disruptive behavior at school and bedwetting, symptoms that improved dramatically once the telephone contact ceased. Family Court credited this evidence, which constitutes a sound and substantial basis for its determination that a change in circumstances had occurred that warranted a modification of the prior order ( see Matter of Rauschmeier v. Rauschmeier, 237 A.D.2d 702, 703, 654 N.Y.S.2d 54 [1997] ). Further, given this evidence that the telephone contact had a detrimental impact upon the emotional well-being of the children, we cannot say that Family Court abused its discretion in determining that monitored, written contact with the father was in their best interests ( see id. at 703, 654 N.Y.S.2d 54;Matter of James U. v. Susan U., 125 A.D.2d 921, 922, 510 N.Y.S.2d 286 [1986] ).

Family Court found Hunt, on the other hand, to be a very credible, hardworking person with a stable lifestyle, close relationship with his daughter and good parental traits. With respect to the issue of supervised visitation, itself a much closer call, we note that such determination is also left to Family Court's sound discretion and it will not be disturbed as long as there is a sound and substantial basis in the record to support it ( see Matter of Custer v Slater, 2 AD3d 1227, 1228; Matter of Simpson v Simrell, 296 AD2d 621; Matter of Kryvanis v Kruty, 288 AD2d 771, 772; Matter of Rauschmeier v Rauschmeier, 237 AD2d 702, 703). Given respondent's past conduct in permitting the children to be around convicted sex offenders, once in direct violation of an order of protection prohibiting same ( cf. Ulmer v Ulmer, 254 AD2d 541, 543-544, supra), we find no basis to disturb Family Court's conclusion that limiting her to supervised visitation was in each child's best interest ( see Matter of Custer v Slater, supra; Matter of Simpson v Simrell, supra; Matter of Rauschmeier v Rauschmeier, supra). Respondent's remaining contentions, to the extent properly preserved, have been reviewed and found to be unpersuasive.

Although petitioner understandably wanted no contact herself with respondent because of his abusive conduct toward her, she expressed no concern for the child's well-being or safety while in his presence. Moreover, no evidence was offered demonstrating that unsupervised visitation would be inimical to the child's welfare (see e.g. Matter of Susan GG. v. James HH., 244 A.D.2d 731, 734; Matter of Rauschmeier v. Rauschmeier, 237 A.D.2d 702, 703; Valenza v. Valenza, 143 A.D.2d 860, 862). Petitioner has not filed a brief on appeal.

To this end, Supreme Court found, and the record supports, that "[p]laintiff appears to be embittered and angry about the marital breakup and has allowed such emotions to adversely affect his relationship with his daughters". We note that both children expressed their wishes by indicating their desire to live with defendant and have limited visitation with plaintiff. Given the totality of the circumstances, as set forth in the record before us, we discern no basis to disturb any aspect of the judgment of divorce concerning custody or visitation (see, Matter of Rauschmeier v. Rauschmeier, 237 A.D.2d 702). To the extent that plaintiff takes issue with that aspect of the judgment granting him a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment, he is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of CPLR 5511, the court having granted him the very relief he requested (see, Russo v. Russo, 275 A.D.2d 406, 712 N.Y.S.2d 622; see also, Tongue v. Tongue, 61 N.Y.2d 809, 810). Finally, upon our review of Supreme Court's distribution of the parties' marital property, we find no abuse of discretion in any aspect thereof.

In this instance, neither the parties nor the Law Guardian appear to have requested home studies or a psychological evaluation of the child, nor did Supreme Court conduct an in camera interview. Thus, there is no proof that plaintiff had failed to bond with her son or that the exceedingly restrictive remedy of supervised visitation "was indicated because of the detrimental impact of her behavior on the child" ( Matter of Rauschmeier v. Rauschmeier, 237 A.D.2d 702, 703; see, e.g., Matter of Middleton v. Middleton, 252 A.D.2d 689). There was no substantive testimony that the child was injured in plaintiff's care. Of greater significance was the testimony of the child's kindergarten teacher who stated that the boy was well-adjusted and happy and showed no change in his behavior at school regardless of which parent had custody during a given week when the parties were alternating custody. The teacher also indicated that the boy was always clean, appropriately dressed and that both parents attended parent-teacher conferences and aided him with his school work.

The record contains troubling evidence of inappropriate contact between respondent and his daughters. Significantly, the Department never took steps to remove any of the children from respondent's care nor were criminal charges ever lodged against him. Because there was insufficient proof of sexual abuse by respondent ( see, Matter of Krywanczyk v. Krywanczyk, 236 A.D.2d 746, 747; Matter of Karpensky v. Karpensky, 235 A.D.2d 594, 595-596; cf., Matter of Tracy V. v. Donald W., 220 A.D.2d 888; Matter of Alan YY. v Laura ZZ., 209 A.D.2d 902, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 806) or that unsupervised visitation would have a detrimental impact on the children ( see, Matter of Rauschmeier v. Rauschmeier, 237 A.D.2d 702, 703), we cannot say that Family Court abused its discretion in awarding unsupervised visitation. Nonetheless, in order to adequately protect these children, we find that the conditions imposed by Family Court are inadequate and require modification.

There can be no question that an interview in private will limit the psychological danger to the child and will also be far more informative and worthwhile than the traditional procedures of the adversary system—an examination of the child under oath in open court." (See also, Rauschmeier v Rauschmeier, 237 AD2d 702 [3d Dept 1997] [it was not error not to include the participation of two litigants and their counsel in the Lincoln hearing].)

There can be no question that an interview in private will limit the psychological danger to the child and will also be far more informative and worthwhile than the traditional procedures of the adversary system — an examination of the child under oath in open court. See also, Rauschmeier v. Rauschmeier, 237 A.D.2d 702, 654 N.Y.S.2d 54 (3rd Dept., 1997), (it was not error not to include the participation of two litigants and their counsel in the Lincoln hearing).