mination of parental rights and adoption, the [petitioner] shall establish a program for concurrent permanency planning"); General Statutes § 17a-111a (a) (1) (requiring petitioner to file petition to terminate parental rights when "the child has been in the custody of the [petitioner] for at least fifteen consecutive months, or at least fifteen months during the twenty-two months, immediately preceding the filing of such petition"); General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1) (A) (requiring motion for review of permanency plan to be filed with court "[n]ine months after placement of the child ... in the care and custody" of petitioner); see generally In re Darien S. , 82 Conn. App. 169, 174–76, 842 A.2d 1177 (2003) (reviewing history of federal permanency plans for children who have been removed from parents and observing that "our legislature passed several pieces of legislation to keep the state in compliance with federal law and thereby to continue to receive federal funds"), cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904, 852 A.2d 733 (2004). Notably, each component of this statutory scheme providing for permanency planning, including reunification services with parents, requires notice to parents and an opportunity to be heard.

As the respondent's claim meets all three prongs of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness, we will review it on appeal. Cf. In re Darien S., 82 Conn. App. 169, 173, 842 A.2d 1177 (claim by juvenile no longer in commissioner's custody challenging court order approving permanency plan for his future placement reviewable under exception), cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904, 852 A.2d 733 (2004). We now turn to the law applicable to the merits of the respondent's claim.

Family Court Act § 355.5 does not define the term "reasonable efforts" for purposes of a permanency hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding and there is little guidance to be found in case law. As one appellate court has observed, "[w]e know of no . . . case, and the parties have cited none, that discusses the constituent elements of a permanency plan for a juvenile delinquent" (In re Darien S., 82 Conn App 169, 174, 842 A2d 1177, 1180-1181 [2004], cert denied 269 Conn 904, 852 A2d 733 [2004]). However, in another case it was observed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a state which has adopted permanency planning for juvenile delinquents, that

Family Court Act § 355.5 does not define the term "reasonable efforts" for purposes of a permanency hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding and there is little guidance to be found in case law. As one appellate court has observed, "[w]e know of no . . . case, and the parties have cited none, that discusses the constituent elements of a permanency plan for a juvenile delinquent" (In re Darien S., 82 Conn App 169, 174, 842 A2d 1177, 1180-1181, cert denied 269 Conn 904, 852 A2d 733). However, in another case it was observed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a state which has adopted permanency planning for juvenile delinquents, that