Opinion
No. 12–P–672.
2013-02-14
ADOPTION OF DARIAN.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, MEADE & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The mother appeals from a decree of the Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights and dispensing with the need for parental consent for the adoption of her son. See G.L.c. 210, § 3. She claims the judge erred in not adopting the permanency plan of the Department of Children and Families (the department) after terminating her parental rights, and that the judge's failure to issue findings of fact until two years after trial deprived her of due process. Because the mother had no standing to raise objections to the change in permanency plans, and the mother has not demonstrated prejudice from the delay, we affirm.
1. Termination of the mother's parental rights. The mother challenges the termination of her parental rights on the basis that the judge erred in not approving the adoption plan set forth by the department. We disagree. In her brief, the mother claims the judge failed to meet her obligation to fully “consider” the department's proposed adoption plan because the department's initial plan was not adopted by the court. See G.L.c. 210, § 3( c ); Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 472, 474–476 (2001). The record does not support this assertion. The judge's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was amply supported by the evidence underlying the judge's multiple findings that the mother was unfit to be a parent, and the judge did not err in finding that dispensation of parental consent to adoption was in the best interests of the child. Once the mother's rights were terminated, she had no further rights to determine her son's future. Adoption of Scott, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 274, 277 (2003). See Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 644 n. 8 (2001) (“To take into account information concerning posttrial events would diminish finality and efficiency, interests that are important in these proceedings”). At the time of termination, the department's proposed adoption plan involved adoption by recruitment. Due to changes in the circumstances, permanency hearings held after termination of the mother's rights focused on reunification with the father or adoption by the foster mother. Allowing the mother to challenge the changes made to the adoption plan after her rights had been terminated would violate G.L.c. 119, § 26(4); the mother had no rights to advocate on her behalf or have any input as to the final plans for her son. Unlike Adoption of Cesar, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 708, 715 (2006), no material changes have occurred posttrial that would suggest modification of the decree terminating the mother's rights would serve the child's best interests. The mother did not participate in the trial adjudicating her parental rights and therefore is not entitled to be involved posttrial in determining future plans for her child. Adoption of Scott, supra at 279.
The mother also challenges termination of her parental rights when the parental rights of the father were not similarly terminated, arguing the judge's determination during the permanency hearings to seek possible reunification with the father demonstrated that termination of the mother's rights was premature. We disagree. A judge can terminate the parental rights of one parent and not the other, assuming termination is in the child's best interests and parental unfitness is demonstrated. Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. at 646. The mother does not appear to challenge that the judge's findings, amply supported by the record, provide clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit to care for the child and that termination was in her son's best interests. The changes to the department's plan that sought reunification occurred after termination of the mother's rights, and therefore have no correlation to that adjudication. Adoption of Willow, supra. See 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.02(4) (2008) (stating the department shall seek to “direct their efforts toward reunification of child[ren] and parent[s]”). This argument therefore lacks merit.
We note that in many cases involving termination of parental rights—especially cases involving adoption by recruitment—there are proceedings and issues litigated after the decision to terminate parental rights. Often “no preadoptive parents have been identified when the parental rights of the biological parents have been terminated,” Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 564 (2000), and even though a fully developed adoption plan is preferable in such instances, it “is not an essential element of proof” in a petition brought pursuant to G.L.c. 210, § 3. Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. 716, 722 n. 7 (1995). After a finding of unfitness pursuant to G.L.c. 210, § 3, the parent named in the petition loses all further rights to challenge posttrial plans for his or her child. Adoption of Scott, 59 Mass.App.Ct. at 279.
2. Due process. The mother also claims the judge's delay in issuing her findings of fact after termination of the mother's rights denied her due process by preventing her involvement in subsequent findings related to her child. The judge entered her findings of fact and conclusions of law approximately two years after she issued the decree terminating the mother's rights, and these findings included findings concerning the period after the entry of the termination decree.
As we noted above, once the mother's rights were terminated at trial, the decree prohibited her from further participating in subsequent proceedings concerning her son's custody. See G.L.c. 119, § 26(4). While Juvenile Court Standing Order 1–04 III.C (2004) states that judges should issue findings of fact within ninety days after the close of evidence, see Adoption of Willamina, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 230, 239 (2008), the mother has failed to show that she was in any way prejudiced by the judge's delay in issuing his findings of fact. Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 170 (2001). The mother did not seek to “reopen evidence to allow all parties to submit relevant, updated information concerning parental fitness” in the two years before findings were issued. Adoption of Rhona, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 479, 486–487 (2003). The circumstances of this case do not lend themselves to “calling into question the accuracy of the judge's findings.” Id. at 486. The mother was not denied due process.
While this standing order encourages judges to issue findings in a timely manner, it does allow for judges to “extend time periods and vary requirements in the interest of justice.” We believe that cases where certain aspects regarding resolution of the adoption remain open beyond the close of evidence, such as this, warrant such judicial discretion. We note that the judge announced her decision to issue the decree terminating the mother's parental rights shortly after the close of evidence, even though published findings of fact did not come until later.
Decree affirmed.