Opinion
B201241
7-3-2008
In re DANIEL S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL S., Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela J. Voich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
Daniel S. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that he possessed a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). He was placed home on probation and contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he possessed a controlled substance and that the court erred by imposing a maximum term of confinement. For reasons stated in the opinion, we strike the maximum term of confinement and affirm the order of wardship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On January 27, 2007, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Darell Edwards was in a marked patrol car in the area of the 100 block of 61st Street in Los Angeles when he saw appellant standing in front of an apartment complex at that location. It appeared that appellant looked in the officers direction and immediately ran north to the complex. Deputy Edwards sped up and then he and his partner, Officer Tolmasoff, exited their vehicle and pursued appellant on foot. While pursuing appellant, Deputy Edwards saw him throw an object to the ground. The officers detained appellant and Deputy Edwards retrieved the thrown object, which was an off-white powder resembling cocaine inside plastic packaging. The deputy described the packaging as "actually torn off at one end as if it was grouped to a larger object and torn off and tightened into a knot at the other end." Deputy Edwards then placed the object inside his shirt pocket and transported it to the station where he booked it into evidence.
Other items relating to different people were recovered that day, and all of the items were booked under the name of "Padilla." The individual items were separated by lab receipt numbers and the evidence in the present case against appellant was given the lab receipt number of "J860366." That night, Mr. Padilla was also arrested for possession of cocaine. The items recovered relating to Mr. Padilla were found inside the apartment complex and had different lab numbers. Upon an analysis of the evidence booked under lab receipt J860366, it was determined to be a net weight of approximately .09 grams of powder containing cocaine.
After appellant was arrested, his mother, Ms. S., went to the Sheriffs station, where she was shown the object her son had tossed to the ground. At the adjudication hearing, Ms. S. was shown a photograph of the object, Peoples Exhibit 1, and she testified the item the officers showed her did not look like the object depicted in the photograph. The package the deputy showed her was small and "not sealed like this, it had a knot." Ms. S. admitted she had been in the courtroom during the adjudication hearing and had had a chance to listen to the testimony prior to her testimony.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding he possessed cocaine. We disagree. "`The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.] [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court `must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.] [Citations.]" (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) "This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]" (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
"`Although it is the duty of the [finder of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [finder of fact], not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "`If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of facts findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." [Citations.] "Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.] [Citations.]" (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1587.)
Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant possessed the controlled substance. Deputy Edwards testified he saw appellant standing in front of an apartment complex. Appellant attempted to evade the deputy the moment he saw the deputy and his partner. Deputy Edwards testified he saw appellant, while being pursued, throw an object onto the ground. Deputy Edwards testified he kept the object under continuous observation until he picked it up and placed it in his shirt pocket. He booked the object into evidence under lab receipt number J860366. Mr. David Hong, a senior criminalist employed by the Los Angeles Sheriffs Scientific Services Bureau, testified he analyzed the substance booked under that lab receipt number and determined the substance had a net weight of approximately .09 grams of powder containing cocaine.
While there was testimony that this piece of evidence, and other evidence relating to other individuals, was booked under the general name of Padilla, the record established that the individual items were separated by lab receipt numbers. The item relating to appellant had a specific lab receipt number and the criminalist testified he analyzed the substance booked under that number. While appellant argues the photograph received into evidence as Peoples Exhibit 1 was not a photo of the drugs found on the ground and attributed to appellant, Deputy Edwards testified the picture was a fair and accurate depiction of the object appellant tossed to the ground and which was given receipt number J860366. Mr. Hong, the criminalist, testified Peoples Exhibit 1 was photographed by him and was a fair and accurate representation of the item he tested under lab receipt number J860366. Appellants claim of insufficient evidence is without merit.
II
Appellant contends the trial court erred by imposing a maximum term of confinement as appellant was not removed from his parents home. The minute order of June 8, 2007, indicates appellant may not be held in physical confinement for a period to exceed three years.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) provides, "If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."
By its express terms, Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) only applies if a minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian. Appellant was not removed from the physical custody of his parents, there was no confinement, and the courts order setting a maximum term of confinement is erroneous. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573.) The maximum term of confinement, therefore, must be stricken.
DISPOSITION
The theoretical maximum period of confinement of three years is ordered stricken and in all other respects the order of wardship is affirmed.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
WILLHITE, J.