Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK55893, Albert Garcia, Juvenile Court Referee.
Janice Jenkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
Crystal A. (“Mother”), the mother of minor Daniel R., appeals from the dispositional order of the juvenile court which denied Mother reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), based on the court’s finding that Mother had failed to reunify with Daniel R.’s siblings, that her parental rights were terminated, and that Mother had not made a reasonable effort to address her drug problems that led to the removal of those children. Mother argues that the juvenile court’s dispositional order was not supported by substantial evidence. She asserts that she had “worked to correct” her substance abuse problems. For the reasons articulated below, we reject her arguments and affirm the order of the juvenile court.
All further code references, unless indicated otherwise, are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior Dependency Cases involving Mother and Daniel R.’s Sibilings.
Mother first came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“Department”) in 2004, when a section 300 petition was filed pertaining to Daniel R.’s siblings: Robert, Ruben, Anthony, and Dominic. The petition alleged, among other things, that Mother abused amphetamine, methamphetamine and marijuana making her incapable of providing adequate care for her children (“2004 Petition”). The petition also alleged that Mother, then 23 years of age, had been abusing drugs since she was 13 years old. The allegations in the 2004 Petition were sustained and Mother received family reunification services. In December 2005, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services for Mother because they proved unsuccessful in addressing Mother’s substance abuse problem.
Ruben and Anthony were placed with their father and ultimately their cases were dismissed.
While the 2004 Petition was pending, a subsequent section 300 petition was filed in December 2005 (“2005 Petition”). The 2005 Petition alleged that Mother gave birth to Baby Girl [A.], who was born suffering from a detrimental condition, including a positive toxicology screen for methamphetamine and that Mother had a history of substance abuse including amphetamine and methamphetamine use. The court ordered permanent placement services. In October 2006, Mother’s parental rights over baby Girl A., Robert and Dominic were terminated.
A few months later, in January 2007, the Department filed another section 300 petition with regard to newborn, Reyna (“2007 Petition”). As in the prior petitions, the 2007 petition concerning Reyna alleged Mother’s amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana abuse. In March 2008, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Reyna.
It appears that reunification services were not offered to Mother in connection with the two dependency cases concerning Baby Girl A. or Reyna.
The Current Dependency Case.
In May 2010, Mother was hospitalized while in labor. She tested positive for amphetamines, and three days later Mother gave birth to Daniel R. On the day he was born, neither Mother, nor Daniel R. tested positive for drug exposure, but a nurse at the hospital told the social worker that the infant was fussy and had not been able to pass a hearing test because he was “jittery.”
Mother denied she had abused drugs prior to Daniel R.’s birth. She said she had been prescribed “Tylenol with codine” while pregnant to treat gallbladder stones; she opined that prescription caused the positive drug test. Mother claimed that she had been “drug free for the prior six years.”
Mother’s prenatal medical providers stated that they had provided Mother with a prescription for Tylenol with codeine, but also stated that they did not prescribe any medications for Mother that contained any amphetamines.
When the social worker interviewed Mother on June 1, 2010, Mother told the social worker that the baby’s father was Daniel R., Sr. (“Father”). She told the social worker that she did not want Father present because she did not want him to find out about her history with the Department.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
The social worker contacted Father, and he said he was willing and able to take custody of the baby. Father admitted that he had been using marijuana, but had recently stopped using, and agreed to test for drugs. Father knew of Mother’s past drug abuse; he also reported that Mother had been using crystal methamphetamine and drinking alcohol when she was about 3-5 months pregnant. The paternal grandmother told the social worker that she suspected that Mother was using drugs.
The minor, Daniel R., was detained and placed in foster care. On June 4, 2010, the Department filed a section 300 petition under subdivisions (b) and (j) alleging that the minor Daniel R. needed the protection of the juvenile court based on Mother’s history of substance abuse, the neglect and abuse of his older siblings, and that he appeared to have suffered from drug withdrawal symptoms at his birth. The petition also included a notice pursuant to section 361.5, that the Department might seek an order denying reunification services to the family. The juvenile court ordered Daniel R. detained, and both parents were granted monitored visitation. At the detention hearing, the court also ordered the Department to provide reunification services pending the hearings on jurisdiction and disposition.
According to the jurisdiction and disposition report, Mother acknowledged she had a prior history of amphetamine/methamphetamine abuse and had been severely addicted to drugs. She said she lost custody of her other children because she was in a “bad place” and unable to overcome her addiction. Mother also claimed, however, that she was able to stop using drugs on her own three years before, without the assistance of a drug rehabilitation program. She continued to deny illegal drug use during her pregnancy and maintained that the Tylenol with codeine resulted in the positive test for amphetamine two days before Daniel’s birth.
Mother told the social worker that she had enrolled in “Shiloh, ” a residential drug treatment program, but stayed one week and then left because she had problems with how the program was run, and felt her needs were not being met. Mother informed the social worker that she had signed up for an outpatient program at the Tarzana Treatment Center. She claimed she had one negative test given by the program. Although Mother told the social worker she was enrolled in the Tarzana program, she cancelled three follow-up intake appointments. Mother had another appointment scheduled, however, the program informed the social worker that if she missed that appointment, she would be dropped from their assessment process. It appeared that Mother had not enrolled in a parenting class.
The Department recommended that the juvenile court deny Mother reunification service pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), and (b)(13), because of her long history of drug abuse, her failure to reunify with her other children and her “slow initiative” in seeking treatment and participating in parenting classes.
On July 22, 2010, the Department reported that minor had been placed with a maternal aunt. Mother was still not enrolled in a drug treatment program. She failed to appear for her intake appointment at the Tarzana treatment program, and so was not enrolled in that program. Mother stated that she had an intake appointment with another program, “Woman to Woman.” She had also failed to appear for an on demand drug test.
On July 29, 2010, the juvenile court adjudicated the section 300 petition. The Department introduced into evidence the documents and reports it had previously filed with the court. After argument, the juvenile court found the allegations of the section 300 petition to be true, and continued the matter for a contested deposition hearing.
On August 27, 2010, the Department reported that Mother had enrolled in a outpatient drug treatment program. Mother also randomly tested, and she had three negative tests and one positive test. Her counselor wrote, Mother “entered our program on July 20, 2010. She is required to attend one individual session and one support group session a week. Ms. [A] is being randomly drug tested. She has thus far complied with all that has been required of her. Drug tests thus far have been three negative and one positive result.” At the disposition hearing, Mother’s lawyer stated his belief that the positive test referred to was a missed test on July 24. Mother’s counsel also argued that contrary to what was stated in the letter from the counselor, that Mother attended the program seven days a week.
After counsel argued, the juvenile court stated:
“With respect to mother’s family reunification services, she has only been in the program since July 20th and has a long, long history, I am not going to offer family reunification services today. If she stays in the program and stays clean, then I would expect a 388 petition to be filed in a few months. But one month does not prove anything yet. Especially since the father’s getting reunification services for six months, mother still has a shot.”
Thereafter, the court denied Mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), finding that she had not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that she had that led to the removal of the children.
The court offered father reunification services. He was ordered to participate in drug rehabilitation with random testing and parent education.
Mother filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Before this court, Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s order denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11). We are not persuaded.
When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court must direct the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and his or her parents in order to facilitate reunification of the family, unless the case falls within a statutory exception. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Section 361.5, subdivision (b) sets forth the aggravated circumstances permitting a bypass of reunification services. This statute demonstrates the Legislature’s recognition that in some instances it may be fruitless to provide reunification services such that offering services under those circumstances would amount to an unwise use of public resources. (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744; Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96 [“In enacting section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), ‘the Legislature has made the decision that in some cases, the likelihood of reunification is so slim that scarce resources should not be expended on such cases.’ [Citation.]”.)
Subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 applies when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it had ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half-siblings of the minor because the parent at issue failed to reunify after the sibling or half-sibling had been removed from that parent, and the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal.” Subdivision (b)(11) pertains when the parental rights of a parent over a sibling or half-sibling of the minor have been severed permanently, and the parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal. The inclusion of the “no reasonable effort” language in these provisions mitigates an otherwise harsh rule that would permit the court to deny reunification services on a finding that services had been terminated to a previous child when the parent had, in reality, worked on addressing the underlying problems. (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 218.) In addition, the standard of “reasonable effort to treat” is not synonymous with “cure.” (Id. at p. 221.) Where a parent has not entirely vanquished his or her drug problem, the court would not be precluded from determining that the parent had made reasonable efforts to treat it. (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464.)
Accordingly, to apply these statutory provisions, the trial court was required to find both that (1) the parent previously failed to reunify with a sibling of the child for whom she now requests reunification services, and (2) the parent has not subsequently made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling. (In re Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.) We review an order bypassing reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence, examining the whole record in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions, and deferring to that court on issues of credibility. (Id. at p. 216.)
Mother concedes that the first prong of section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) – previous failure to reunify with other children – is present. Her argument on appeal, instead, focuses on the second prong. Specifically she maintains that the record fails to support the trial court’s finding that she had not made reasonable efforts to address the problems that resulted in the prior removal of her other children. Mother argues that she had “worked on” her drug problem. She claims she made efforts in the three years before Daniel R.’s birth to stop using drugs based on the facts that he was born “over seven pounds at birth and tested negative for any substances.” She also points out that she enrolled in an out-patient drug treatment program and participated in the program for a month prior to the dispositional hearing. While the facts Mother cites appear in the record, she cites them in isolation. When viewed in the context of the other evidence in the record, we conclude the evidence supports the lower court’s finding that Mother had not made a reasonable effort to address her substance abuse problems that resulted in the removal of her other children.
Indeed, Mother ignores the full history of this case. Our review of the trial court’s order requires us to consider the historical circumstances as well as the current situation. (Shawn S. v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 748, fn. 6.)
The statute “provide[s] a parent who has worked toward correcting his or her problems an opportunity to have that fact taken into consideration in subsequent proceedings; it was not [enacted] to create further delay so as to allow a parent, who up to that point has failed to address his or her problems, another opportunity to do so.” (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 843; see K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393.)
Here, the juvenile court removed all of Daniel R.’s siblings from Mother's custody and terminated her parental rights to her children in three separate prior dependency proceedings for the same reason—her unresolved substance abuse problems. The trial court ordered various reunification services to address that problem in connection with the first dependency proceeding in 2004. But Mother failed to avail herself of those services to any success. Over the next three years, Mother gave birth to other children, who tested positive for substances at their birth and were removed from Mother’s custody. Contrary to Mother’s claim that she had dealt with her drug problem, the record contains sufficient evidence that Mother continued to abuse drugs while she was pregnant with Daniel R. Father reported that Mother used drugs and alcohol while she was pregnant; the paternal grandmother also reported her belief that Mother abused drugs; and Mother appeared at the hospital two days before Daniel R.’s birth and tested positive for amphetamines. In addition, after Daniel R. was detained, Mother dropped out of several drug treatment programs, and it appears she had at least one “positive” drug test.
Measured against this history, Mother’s reliance on the fact that she had enrolled in a program is an insufficient reason for us to overturn the trial court’s order. In reviewing a trial court’s order to deny reunification services, our power begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s order. We must resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of that order and draw all reasonable inferences in its support. Where more than one reasonable inference can be inferred from the facts, we are without power to substitute our opinion for that of the trial court. (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600.) Given that standard of review, we find that the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother had not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the prior removal of her other children. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination to deny her reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11).
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile dependency court denying Mother reunification services is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J.ZELON, J.