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In re Daniel P.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 21, 2008
2d Juv. No. B198711 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2008)

Opinion


In re DANIEL P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL P., Defendant and Appellant. 2d Juv. No. B198711 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Sixth DivisionApril 21, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of Ventura, Super. Ct. No. 2007002450, Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge

Susan B. Lascher for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GILBERT, P.J.

Daniel P. appeals a juvenile court judgment sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that alleged Daniel tampered with a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852). We conclude that the juvenile court did not err by denying Daniel's motion to exclude his confession. His incriminating statements during a custodial interrogation about tampering with a truck radio were voluntary and not the result of coercion or improper promises of leniency by the police. We affirm.

FACTS

Sandro Galaviz parked his truck in front of a house, and then went inside the residence. Sandra M., a little girl who came to visit, went outside the house and saw something. Galaviz noticed that she appeared to be nervous and was making "strange movements with her hands." She was looking in the direction of Galaviz's truck.

Galaviz went outside and walked to his truck. Someone had pulled the stereo out of the dash and had broken it. Two amplifiers, two speakers and a case for discs, which had been in the truck, were now missing.

Sandra M. told the police that she saw Daniel inside Galaviz's vehicle. She later testified that she did not see Daniel. After the prosecutor showed her a police report, she said she remembered telling the police that Daniel was in the truck. But she claimed this was not true, the police "forced" her to implicate Daniel and she "got scared." Sandra M.'s older brother is Daniel's friend.

The Interrogation and Confession

Police officer Chris Jimenez arrested Daniel and gave him a Miranda advisement at the station. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) The interrogation was recorded. Daniel initially denied that he took anything from the truck. But shortly thereafter he said, "I swear I (inaudible) praying for anything to get me out." Jimenez: "Okay. Okay." Daniel: "I made a stupid mistake."

Daniel told Jimenez that he parked his car and his two associates checked the truck to see if it was open. The truck was not locked.

Jimenez told Daniel, "You're 17. The judge likes it when you guys kind of man up . . . and take responsibility . . . . So one of them checked the door and decided to go in?"

Daniel responded, "One of them was locked. They were keeping watch and I just grabbed the radio and it didn't come out so I left it . . . I went back to the car and I started it up and they came back with some stuff. I don't know who grabbed what. Who was watching what. They just grabbed some stuff. And they came back and they went to my house. I didn't want to go back. We were there. I had a bad feeling and this is the bad feeling. That is what happened. I'm a fucking idiot. I just don't want to do a lot of time. Do you think I'll be out before July? Or June?"

Jimenez said, "I don't know. We'll see . . . . Two felonies." Daniel: "You can't take one of those felonies off? I'm telling you everything I know." Jimenez: "Okay. You said they were keeping watch, so both Gerard and what was the name of your other friend?" Daniel: "Raul." Jimenez: "Raul. Okay. So Gerard and Raul were keeping watch. Did they say they were going to keep watch?" Daniel: "Well, yeah. I told them - - I told them make sure nobody sees me."

Shortly after confessing, Daniel asked Jimenez, "Am I going back, is that for sure, no matter what I say?" Jimenez: "Right now what you say is determining how soon you leave."

During further questioning, Daniel reiterated that he told his friends to keep watch and they all went to Daniel's house. The items they took included speakers, amplifiers and CDs. Raul carried the speakers, Gerardo carried the "amps" and Daniel's brother was going to store the property. During questioning by Jimenez, Daniel banged his head on a wall, had a nose bleed and was crying.

Near the end of the interrogation, Daniel asked Jimenez, "Do you think you can make it a misdemeanor (inaudible) from a felony to a misdemeanor?" Jimenez: "I file the booking charges. The DA files the other charges. They file if it's going to be a misdemeanor or a felony." Daniel: "Does that depend on what you write or what you tell them? Jimenez: "It depends on what I tell them."

During further questioning, Daniel denied that he picked up a screwdriver inside the truck. He reiterated that he "went for the radio and after it broke [he] got out and . . . went to the car." He said there was a cell phone in the truck. He picked it up and "threw it back."

DISCUSSION

I. Denying the Motion to Exclude the Confession

Daniel contends the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to exclude his confession because he was "motivated" to make incriminating statements because of Officer Jimenez's "improper promises of leniency." We disagree.

"'It is well settled that a confession is involuntary and therefore inadmissible if it was elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency whether express or implied. [Citations.] However, mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary. . . .'" (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) An improper promise by police does not require exclusion of a confession unless "the promise was a motivating factor in the giving of the statement." (People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 874.)

A. The "Take Responsibility" Remark

Daniel notes that Jimenez told him "the judge likes it" when wards "man up" and "take responsibility" for their actions. But the record does not support Daniel's claim that his incriminating statements were initiated because of these remarks. Shortly after receiving his Miranda advisements, Daniel told Jimenez, "I made a stupid mistake." He voluntarily made this remark and then told Jimenez that while he parked his car, his friends checked the truck to see if it was open. He made these incriminating statements prior to Jimenez's "take responsibility" remark.

Daniel claims that Jimenez's statement that the judge likes wards who take responsibility was an improper promise of leniency. But police may urge "a suspect to tell the truth by factually outlining the benefits that may flow from confessing . . . ." (People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 117.) Jimenez did not make a promise when he made these remarks. He told Daniel what he knew about the juvenile justice system. He "did no more than tell [Daniel] the benefit that might flow [] '"naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct."'" (Id. at p. 116.)

B. Statements About Reducing Felonies to Misdemeanors

Daniel contends that Jimenez promised to reduce his felonies to misdemeanors if he confessed. But the transcript of the interrogation does not reflect that Jimenez made such a promise. During questioning, Daniel asked Jimenez, "Do you think you can make it a misdemeanor (inaudible) from a felony to a misdemeanor? Jimenez: "I file the booking charges. The DA files the other charges. They file if it's going to be a misdemeanor or a felony." Daniel: "Does that depend on what you write or what you tell them? Jimenez: "It depends on what I tell them." Daniel: "And what my probation officer tells them?" Jimenez: "Uh-huh. So it's kind of like what I say, what your PO says and the attorney says." Daniel: "So if my PO says I've been doing good, just messing up in school, and you say that . . . ." Jimenez: "Right. And I say you screwed up, but you came clean and you manned up and you were responsible and you held yourself accountable and you took responsibility for it."

Here Jimenez answered Daniel's questions. He neither made a promise nor was he in a position to do so. He told Daniel that the prosecutor decides whether offenses are charged as felonies or misdemeanors. Daniel's questions indicate that he understood this.

Jimenez told Daniel that he would report that Daniel "took responsibility." He said, "I'd like to be able to say good things about you." The Attorney General claims that even if Daniel interpreted these remarks to be a promise to intervene on his behalf with the prosecutor, that such representations are proper. He correctly notes that in People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, our Supreme Court rejected a claim that a confession was invalid because a detective promised to "intercede with the district attorney on defendant's behalf, telling the district attorney that defendant had been honest." (Id. at p. 297.) The defendant claimed he had been deceived and confessed because this promise implied that "intercession would generate leniency." (Ibid.) The Court disagreed and held that "the detective's offers of intercession with the district attorney amounted to truthful implications that his cooperation might be useful in later plea bargain negotiations. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 298.)

In People v. Groody (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 355, 358, a detective told the defendant that he could talk to the district attorney about giving him special consideration which could include charging him with only one burglary. The defendant confessed to committing several burglaries. On appeal he claimed his confession should have been excluded because it was induced by promises of leniency. The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the detective's statements were no more than the pointing out of benefits which might result naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct. (Id. at p. 359.)

Here Jimenez's remarks fall within the category of police representations which were upheld in Jones and Groody. He made these statements near the end of the interrogation after Daniel had confessed to tampering with the truck's radio. Jimenez's statements therefore were not the motivating factor which induced that confession. (People v. Vasila, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 874.)

Daniel contends that the transcript of his interrogation at the station does not include all of Jimenez's representations. He suggests that prior to the interrogation at the station, Jimenez promised to reduce his felonies to misdemeanors. He notes that during cross-examination Jimenez listened to a police tape made before Daniel arrived at the station. Jimenez identified his voice on the tape using the phrases "felony to a misdemeanor" and "give the property back to him." He said he recalled asking Daniel "if he wanted to turn this from a felony into a misdemeanor . . . ." But the record does not reflect the context of this statement and it is unclear who initiated this conversation. The juvenile court found this tape was "muffled" and so inaudible that it was difficult to understand any conversations. Jimenez had earlier testified that Daniel had asked him questions "about the disposition" and "how much time he was going to do . . . ." These discussions began before they reached the station. Jimenez said he responded to Daniel's questions.

The juvenile court found that Jimenez never promised to reduce felonies to misdemeanors and Daniel voluntarily initiated the conversations on this issue. It could reasonably infer that Jimenez's question to Daniel was not a promise, it was a remark responding to concerns raised by Daniel. Jimenez testified the responses he gave Daniel were "the natural and probable consequences of his situation." A reasonable inference from this is that he was discussing only procedures and was not making promises. Moreover, Jimenez's responses during the taped station interview refute Daniel's claim that Jimenez had earlier promised to reduce felonies to misdemeanors. There would have been no reason for the questions Daniel asked if such a promise been made prior to the taped interview, or if Daniel believed there was such a prior promise. Based on this incomplete record, Daniel has not shown error.

C. Jimenez's Statements About Early Release

Daniel contends that during questioning at the station Jimenez made comments about an early release which induced him to confess.

During the interrogation, Daniel asked Jimenez, "Am I going back, is that for sure, no matter what I say?" Jimenez: "Right now what you say is determining how soon you leave." Daniel: "All right. I'm going no matter what?" Jimenez: "You are, but right now you're working on how long you're going to stay." Daniel: "I don't want to stay there." Jimenez: "Do you want to be released in the morning?" Daniel: "What do you mean? Tomorrow morning? Jimenez: "Yeah." Daniel: "I would love that."

It is improper for police to suggest to suspects in custody that they will be released if they incriminate themselves. (People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 298.) Jimenez's statements fall within this category. But as the Attorney General correctly notes, Jimenez made these remarks after Daniel had confessed to pulling the radio out. That admission coupled with Galaviz' testimony proved all the required elements of tampering with a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10852; People v. Anderson (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806, 811.) Jimenez's remarks were not the motivating factor for that confession. (People v. Vasila, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 874.) Consequently, the additional details Daniel gave after Jimenez made these comments would not change the result even had they been excluded.

Moreover, the juvenile court found that Jimenez made no threats, did not use coercion or pressure and Daniel gave a voluntary statement. It noted that Daniel was a sophisticated minor who was familiar with the legal system. He had prior sustained juvenile petitions and had been on probation. Many of the comments by Jimenez, which Daniel challenges, were initiated by his questions to Jimenez. The juvenile court did not err by denying the suppression motion. Substantial evidence supports its findings on conflicting factual issues. From our independent review of the record, we conclude that Daniel's confession was voluntary. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 827.)

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: YEGAN, J., PERREN, J.


Summaries of

In re Daniel P.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division
Apr 21, 2008
2d Juv. No. B198711 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2008)
Case details for

In re Daniel P.

Case Details

Full title:In re DANIEL P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Apr 21, 2008

Citations

2d Juv. No. B198711 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2008)