Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. PJ45062, Morton Rochman, Judge.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Shira B. Seigle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Minor and appellant Daniel L. was placed home on probation after the juvenile court sustained a petition declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, based on a finding he attempted to commit felony vandalism in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 594, subdivision (a). The juvenile court ruled the maximum period of confinement is 18 months. In his timely appeal, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding the attempted vandalism was a felony, in that there is no evidence the damage would have been in the amount of $400 or more. He further contends the juvenile court did not have the authority to set a maximum term of confinement. The Attorney General argues that the minute order of the disposition needs to be corrected to delete the indication that appellant was ordered removed from parental custody.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The minute order correctly reflects the juvenile court’s order placing appellant home on probation, but erroneously states that custody of appellant was removed from the parents.
We conclude the evidence is insufficient to support the felony finding and the juvenile court did not have authority to set a maximum term of confinement. We further conclude the disposition minute order must be corrected to delete the finding that appellant was removed from the custody of his parents. We reduce the finding of attempted felony vandalism to attempted misdemeanor vandalism, strike the maximum period of confinement, strike the erroneous notation on the minute order that appellant was ordered removed from parental custody, and in all other respects affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of June 14, 2009, Los Angeles Police Officer Dan Hadfield, who was piloting a police airship over a large crowd of people, observed appellant cheering, jumping on the trunk of a patrol car, and dancing around. As soon as he was illuminated by the airship’s spotlight, appellant leapt from the trunk into the crowd, ran to a second patrol car, and kicked the rear passenger side window of the second patrol car several times. He was detained by officers on the ground.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the attempted felony vandalism conviction because there is no evidence the vandalism he attempted would have caused damages in excess of $400. We agree the evidence is insufficient to support the felony finding.
“The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases: we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.)” (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.)
Vandalism is defined in section 594, subdivision (a). Subdivision (b)(1) of section 594 provides that vandalism is punishable as a felony if the property damage is $400 or more. If the damage is less than $400, section 594, subdivision (b)(2)(A) makes the vandalism a misdemeanor.
Section 594 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: [¶]... [¶] (2) Damages. [¶] (3) Destroys. [¶]... [¶] (b)(1) If the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is four hundred dollars ($400) or more, vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or if the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more, by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment. [¶] (2)(A) If the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is less than four hundred dollars ($400), vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.”
The finding of attempted vandalism is based on the evidence appellant kicked the rear passenger window of the second patrol car. There is a complete failure of proof of the dollar amount of the damage had the attempt been successful. There is no evidence the damage to the window would have been $400 or more-a necessary element of felony vandalism.
We disagree with respondent’s argument, citing Ferrari v. Mambretti (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 318, 328 (Ferrari), that the juvenile court could rely on its “common knowledge” of the high cost of automobile repairs. In Ferrari, the court held the value of the services to the decedent could not be fixed without evidence, because the trier of fact did not possess common knowledge of such services’ value. (Ibid.) The cost of repairing or replacing the rear passenger window of a patrol car is not a matter of common knowledge. As police vehicles are generally not repaired by trial judges or other members of the public who might serve as triers of fact, there is no basis for applying the common knowledge principle in this case.
Accordingly, the finding of attempted felony vandalism must be reduced to attempted misdemeanor vandalism.
Setting the Maximum Period of Confinement
Appellant contends, respondent concedes, and we agree that the juvenile court was not authorized to set the maximum term of physical confinement, because he was not removed from parental custody.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), provides in part as follows: “If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to [Welfare & Institutions Code] Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Where a minor is placed home on probation and not removed from his parents’ custody, the juvenile court lacks the authority to set the maximum period of confinement. (In re Matthew A., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 541.)
As the juvenile court did not remove appellant from his father’s custody, the court lacked the authority to set a maximum period of confinement.
DISPOSITION
The finding of attempted felony vandalism is reduced to attempted misdemeanor vandalism under sections 664 and 594, subdivision (b)(2). The maximum period of confinement of 18 months is stricken. The notation on the minute order of November 30, 2009, indicating appellant was removed from parental custody is stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., KUMAR, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.