When, as here, the law required DCYF to employ reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, a finding of reasonable efforts on the part of DCYF is a necessary precondition for a finding of parental unfitness, and a prerequisite to the granting of a TPR decree. See § 15-7-7(b)(1); In re Briana D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam); In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d at 203. As we previously have held, "[t]he issue of the reasonableness of the department's efforts must be determined from the 'particular facts and circumstances of each case.'"

"When reviewing a decree involving the termination of parental rights, this Court examines the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice." In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 414 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam) (citing In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 205 (R.I. 1989)). Those findings are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.

It is well settled that when reviewing a termination of parental rights decree, this Court examines the record to determine whether the findings of the trial justice are supported by legally competent evidence. In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 414 (R.I. 2002). "[T]he findings of a trial justice are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong."

Ultimately, “a parent's genuine love for [his] child, or an existence of a bond between parent and child, is not sufficient to overcome the child's fundamental right to a safe and nurturing environment.” In re Douglas F., 840 A.2d 1087, 1089 (R.I.2003); see also In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I.2002). The termination of parental rights is a sad event.

We appreciate that respondent articulates her love for her children and her desire to be a parent, but the fact remains that over an extended period of time respondent has not been able to demonstrate an actual ability to care for her children. "[A] parent's genuine love for their child, or an existence of a bond between parent and child, is not sufficient to overcome the child's fundamental right to a safe and nurturing environment." In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002). The trial justice appropriately noted that "[t]his is a case where actions speak louder than words. The [respondent] may want to be reunified with the children but her actions do not support her desire to be reunified."

"Although this Court is ever cognizant of the significance of severing the bond between parent and child, it is in the best interests of children to have a safe and nurturing environment in which to live, learn and grow." In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d at 170 (citing In re Douglas F., 840 A.2d 1087, 1089 (R.I. 2003) and In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002)). Based on the "believable, credible evidence," the trial justice found "by clear and convincing evidence that it [was] in the best interest[s] of the three boys that the parental rights of their father be terminated."

"[A] parent's genuine love for [her] child, or an existence of a bond between parent and child, is not sufficient to overcome the child's fundamental right to a safe and nurturing environment." In re Douglas F., 840 A.2d 1087, 1089 (R.I. 2003) (quoting In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002)). We therefore conclude that the trial justice did not err when she terminated April's parental rights.

However, as we have previously stated, "a parent's genuine love for [his or her] child * * * is not sufficient to overcome the child's fundamental right to a safe and nurturing environment." In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002); see also In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1210 n. 10; In re Douglas F., 840 A.2d 1087, 1089 (R.I. 2003). IVConclusion

Although this Court is ever cognizant of the significance of severing the bond between parent and child, it is in the best interests of children to have a safe and nurturing environment in which to live, learn and grow. See In re Douglas F., 840 A.2d 1087, 1089 (R.I. 2003); In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002). The trial justice clearly found that respondent was not able to provide for her son in this way.

We have no reason to doubt the trial justice's conclusion that Mr. Renfro loves Pricillion deeply, but we have often observed that "a parent's genuine love for [the] child, or an existence of a bond between parent and child, is not sufficient to overcome the child's fundamental right to a safe and nurturing environment." In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002). We turn then to the trial justice's application of the statute governing termination of parental rights, specifically G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7 subsections (a)(2)(iii) and (a)(3).