Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV120751
BUTZ , J.A juvenile court found that Curtis T., a minor, committed the misdemeanor of unlawfully causing a fire of a structure or forest land. (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a)), and placed on six months of informal probation.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The minor appeals, claiming that there was insufficient evidence that he committed the crime. We reject his arguments and shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2005, the minor and two other juveniles, Matthew G. and James S., went to a field under a bridge near their apartment complex. The minor and James used lighters to light dead fish on fire. Later, the two boys made small piles of dry grass, about four or five inches in diameter, lit them on fire, and stomped them out. Finally, the minor and James made a larger pile of dry grass, about 12 inches in diameter, and lit it on fire.
Matthew testified that he “believed” that the minor was the one who actually lit the larger pile, but that he was “not too sure.” Matthew also stated that he told the minor and James, before they lit the larger fire, that they should not light it because it might get too big for them to control. After trying unsuccessfully to stomp out the flames of the bigger fire, the boys fled the area. The fire burned part of a field and came within 20 or 30 feet of the nearby apartment complex before it was extinguished.
Four witnesses testified that they saw the minor and James leave the area of the fire together very quickly.
The minor testified that he had held the lighter once, while James went to the bathroom, but that he did not light anything on fire. He also stated that no one lit any fish on fire and that his participation was limited to stomping out the fires. He maintained that James lit the larger fire and that, when James fled, he stayed behind and tried to stomp it out. Contradicting the testimony of four other witnesses, he also testified that he ran off in a different direction from James when it became clear that the fire was out of control.
The minor was charged with one felony count of recklessly causing a fire to burn a structure or forest land (reckless arson). The juvenile court sustained the petition, but reduced the charge to a misdemeanor (§ 452, subd. (c)), and placed the minor on six months’ probation.
DISCUSSION
I. Evidence of Mental State
The minor argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he had the mental state required for reckless arson. He contends that there was no way for him to know that burning the larger pile of grass would catch the surrounding grass on fire, since prior smaller fires had done no damage. We disagree.
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court must determine from the entire record whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, the reviewing court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.)
Reckless arson (§ 452, subd. (c)) occurs when a person “‘recklessly sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, any structure, forest land or property.’” (People v. Budish (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1047, quoting § 452.) A fire is set “recklessly” when “a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act will set fire to, burn, or cause to burn a structure, forest land, or property. The risk shall be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” (§ 450, subd. (f).)
Contrary to the minor’s assertion, there is substantial evidence that he willfully disregarded a known risk that the fire he and James started could get out of control and burn adjoining property. Just before the two boys lit the larger pile of grass on fire, Matthew warned them against doing so, because they might not be able to put it out. The boys were lighting fires in July, in an unenclosed area under a bridge. The larger fire was markedly different from the smaller fires, in that it was over twice the size and set in an area that was predominately dry grass, as opposed to dirt.
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision, a reasonable inference could be drawn that the minor knew that there was a danger of an uncontrollable conflagration when he and James made and lit the large pile of grass, and that he recklessly disregarded that risk.
II. Accomplice Liability
The minor argues that he could not be found guilty as a perpetrator based on the equivocal statement of Matthew that “I believe Curtis [lit the fire], but I’m not too sure.”
Whether the evidence is sufficient to conclude that the minor personally lit the fire is of no moment, because the court did not base its finding on such a determination, but rather on the conclusion that the minor and James acted together in the commission of the reckless act which caused the field to burn. “[P]rincipals to crime (that is, those who are equally responsible for its commission) include not only the actual perpetrator of the crime but one who aids or abets its commission.” (People v. Solis (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 264, 270, disapproved on a different ground in People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268, fn. 7.) Thus, the real question is whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the minor was James’s accomplice in committing the crime.
The gist of the minor’s claim is that he cannot be liable as an accomplice because there was no evidence that he helped James light the larger pile of grass on fire. This argument is unavailing because accomplice liability may be based on actions other than the actual lighting of the fire.
“In order to hold the accused as an aider and abettor the test is whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures.” (People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 134, italics added; see also People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) While merely being at the location of the crime is not sufficient, “factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. [Citations.] In addition, flight is one of the factors which is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt.” (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095.)
There was evidence that the minor assisted James in lighting dead fish and small piles of grass on fire, that he then helped James create a larger pile of grass, and that he fled the scene when the fire got out of control. These facts constitute sufficient evidence that the minor aided and abetted James in committing reckless arson.
The minor insists he lacked the required mental state for accomplice liability, because merely assisting James in making a large pile of grass is not proof that he shared the same state of mind.
In order to be guilty as an accomplice, the defendant must “act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) “‘“[B]y intentionally acting to further the criminal actions of another, the [accomplice] voluntarily identifies himself with the principal party,”’” and becomes equally responsible for the crime. (People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 1053.)
The criminal purpose under section 452 is to “recklessly set[] fire to or burn[] or cause[] to be burned, any structure, forest land or property.” (§ 452.) This includes cases where the defendant sets a smaller fire intentionally with reckless knowledge that the smaller fire will likely spread and burn a surrounding structure or forest land. (People v. Schwartz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1325.) Thus, to be guilty as an accomplice, the minor must have not only aided James in starting the fire, but shared the same reckless state of mind.
The record shows that James and the minor disregarded Matthew’s warning that setting a larger pile of grass afire could result in an uncontrollable blaze. The fact that the warning came from Matthew showed that a person of the same approximate age and maturity recognized the risk. Both James and the minor had the same information about the surrounding conditions, both heard the same warning, and both acted together in setting in motion the chain of events that led to an uncontrolled blaze. Thus, there was substantial evidence that the minor shared James’s reckless state of mind when the crime was committed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur:
DAVIS , Acting P.J., NICHOLSON , J.