Opinion
05-22-01202-CV
12-27-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF C.T.H. AND H.V.H., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 302nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-14-07021
Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE
Appellants appeal the trial court's order in this suit to modify the parent-child relationship. They are the maternal grandparents of C.T.H. and H.V.H., and they sought to be appointed sole managing conservators of the children. Raising seven issues, Grandparents contend the trial court erred in entering permanent injunctions against them and contend the trial court abused its discretion in failing to render judgment on a ten-year-old mediated settlement agreement, in denying their motion to reopen the evidence, and in finding Mother and Father are fit parents. We affirm the trial court's order.
Background
Mother and Father married in 2012 and are the parents of two sons, C.T.H. and H.V.H. After C.T.H. was born in 2009, he and Mother lived with her parents, Grandparents. Mother and C.T.H. moved out over two years later, but after H.V.H. was born in 2013, Mother and her children moved back in with Grandparents and lived with them until 2017. While the children lived in Grandparents' home, Grandparents, particularly Grandmother, helped raise them.
Mother and Father divorced in 2016. The October 28, 2016 divorce decree appointed both parents as joint managing conservators, with Mother being the primary conservator, and provided for possession, access, and support of the children. As agreed by the parties, Grandmother, who had intervened in the divorce proceeding, was ordered to provide secondary health insurance for each of her grandsons as long as child support was payable for that child.
In March of 2017, Mother filed a petition to modify the divorce decree for reasons involving Father. A few months later, in September 2017, Mother and the children moved out of Grandparents' home. Mother claimed Grandmother had been controlling the first time she and C.T.H. lived with her and had become more controlling after Mother's divorce. In July 2018, Mother and the children moved in with Mother's boyfriend. In August 2019, Mother and her boyfriend married.
Three months after Mother moved out of their house, in December 2017, Grandparents intervened in Mother's modification suit. Grandparents sought to be appointed as the children's sole managing conservators. They alleged the children's present environment may endanger the children's physical health or significantly impair their emotional development while in possession of Mother or Father. They further alleged it would be in the best interest of the children for them to be named sole managing conservators. Alternatively, they asked to be named nonparent joint managing conservators or possessory conservators. They also asked for the right to continue providing secondary insurance for the children.
In June 2019, Mother filed an application for temporary restraining order and request for injunctive relief against Grandparents. In September 2019, the associate judge issued a temporary restraining order that enjoined Grandparents from certain conduct, including contacting Mother or the children, and coming within 1000 feet of the children's home, child-care facilities, or schools. In her live pleading, Mother requested permanent injunctions against Grandparents, the release of Grandmother from her obligation to provide secondary insurance, and dismissal of Grandparents from the suit. Father had no pleadings on file.
A bench trial was held on November 1 and 2, 2021. Much of the testimony involved the mental health of C.T.H. It was undisputed that C.T.H. has struggled with mental health issues most of his life. He was diagnosed with major depression, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, generalized anxiety, and social anxiety. Before trial, the court appointed two psychiatrists, Dr. Mark Blotcky and Dr. Benjamin Albritton, to conduct forensic examinations of him. The doctors met with the parties and reviewed many documents, including records from the divorce proceeding.
C.T.H.'s mental health had suffered on an increasing scale in 2021. In April 2021, he attempted suicide by wrapping a swing around his neck, and in July 2021, he cut his wrists while at an acting camp. Two months before trial, C.T.H. was admitted for inpatient treatment for suicidal ideations at a facility called Mesa Springs. By the time of trial, he had been released from inpatient treatment, but was in an intensive outpatient treatment program. Grandmother disagreed with Mother and Father's decisions for C.T.H.'s care and believed he should be placed in a residential treatment center.
At the conclusion of trial on November 2, the trial judge made an oral ruling. The trial court signed a final order on August 5, 2022, which granted Mother's request for modification. It ordered that Mother and Father are the joint managing conservators of the children, with Mother having exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children. The trial court released Grandmother from her obligation to provide secondary health insurance to the children. It also found that because of Grandparents' behavior, a permanent injunction should be granted against them. Grandparents were permanently enjoined from:
1. Contacting or communicating in person, by telephone, or in writing with the children of this suit, [Mother], and [Mother's husband];
2. Coming within 1000 feet of the residence, child-care facilities, or schools the children attend, including their current residence . . .;
3. Contacting child-care facilities or schools the children attend;
4. Coming within one thousand (1,000) feet of [Mother];
5. Disturbing the peace of the children of this suit, [Mother], and [Mother's husband]; and
6. Stalking the children of this suit, [Mother], and [Mother's husband].
Grandparents filed a combined motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration, and motion to reform and correct judgment. The trial court signed a reformed final order on December 9, 2022, to include an award of attorney's fees that was omitted from its earlier order. The trial court denied Grandparents' motions for new trial and reconsideration and made findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Permanent Injunctions
In their first issue, Grandparents contend two of the permanent injunctions violate the United States and Texas Constitutions because they impose prior restraints on speech. They refer to the provisions of the final order that enjoin them from contacting or communicating with the children, Mother, and Mother's husband and contacting the children's child-care facilities or schools. They assert that before it could impose a prior restraint on their speech, the trial court was required to make certain findings and it failed to do so.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that a party presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the ruling with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, and that the trial court ruled on the request, objection, or motion or refused to rule. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a). Even constitutional claims must be preserved for appellate review. In re S.V., 599 S.W.3d 25, 40 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017, pet. denied) (citing In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. 2003)). Grandparents have not directed this Court to where in the record they made the trial court aware of their complaint that the injunctions were an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and we have not found such a complaint. They mentioned the First Amendment in their motion for new trial: "A parent can make decisions regarding their children, but that does not vest the Court with authority to grant injunctive relief enjoining one from asserting their constitutional rights - namely their first amendment rights." The motion does not mention the right to free speech, prior restraint, or the Texas Constitution. This assertion was not specific enough to apprise the trial court of the complaint they now make, that the permanent injunctions constitute a prior restraint on their right to free speech under the Texas and United States Constitutions. As such, Grandparents failed to preserve this complaint for appellate review. See id. (father who did not argue in trial court that injunctions against him in SAPCR order were prior restraint on his right to free speech failed to preserve argument for appellate review).
Even if Grandparents preserved their complaint, it is without merit. The term "prior restraint" is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). Prior restraints on the right to free speech under the Texas and the United States Constitutions are presumptively unconstitutional. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. 2014). The Texas Supreme Court has expressed a preference to sanction a speaker after, rather than before speech occurs. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1992). Gag orders in civil judicial proceedings withstand constitutional scrutiny only when the trial court makes specific findings, supported by the evidence, that (1) an imminent and irreparable harm will deprive litigants of a just resolution of their dispute, and (2) the judicial action represents the least restrictive means to prevent that harm. Id. at 10.
Grandparents argue the injunctions at issue cannot stand because the trial court did not make the findings required by Davenport. They rely on two family law cases in which the trial court enjoined parents from making derogatory remarks about the other party. See Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1995); In re Rigg, No. 05-21-00342-CV, 2022 WL 908951, *7 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2022, original proceeding) (mem. op.). In each case, the injunctions were found to be unconstitutional prior restraints because the trial court did not make the necessary findings to support them. Grigsby, 904 S.W.2d at 621; In re Rigg, 2022 WL 908951, at *7-8.
This case is factually distinguishable because the permanent injunctions are not content based. The trial court's order enjoined Grandparents from contacting or communicating with the children, Mother, and Mother's husband and from contacting the children's child-care facilities or schools. These restrictions were not directed at the contents of Grandparents' communications. Because the injunctions at issue are not content based, the trial court was not required to perform a prior restraint analysis. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2 (1994). We overrule Grandparents' first issue.
In their second issue, Grandparents contend the evidence does not support any of the six permanent injunctions against them. Before we consider this issue, we address our standard of review. In their seventh issue, Grandparents ask the Court to review whether the traditional requirements of a permanent injunction-a wrongful act, imminent harm, irreparable injury, and no adequate remedy at law- were met, as the Second Court of Appeals does in family law cases. See In re A.A.N., No. 02-13-00151-CV, 2014 WL 3778215, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). This Court, however, has long held that the general standards applicable to permanent injunctions in civil cases do not apply in family law cases. In re J.A.A., No. 05-22-00578-CV, 2023 WL 4944505, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re B.H.W., No. 05-15-00841-CV, 2017 WL 2492612, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Peck v. Peck, 172 S.W.3d 26, 35-36 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). In family law cases, we review a permanent injunction enjoining a party from specific conduct for an abuse of discretion. In re J.A.A., 2023 WL 4944505, at *3.
Grandparents contend the evidence does not support the injunctions under either standard. We decline to address their complaint that the injunctions did not meet the traditional standard for injunctive relief. We will review their argument that the trial court abused its discretion in enjoining their conduct because there was insufficient evidence the injunctions were in the best interest of the children.
A trial court has broad discretion in determining the best interest of a child in family law matters. In re S.B., No. 05-20-00338-CV, 2023 WL 6284703, at *12 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In family law cases, the abuse of discretion standard overlaps with traditional sufficiency standards of review. In re W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). As a result, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of reversible error, but instead are factors relevant to our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and whether it erred in its exercise of that discretion. Id. The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re A.V., No. 05-20-00966-CV, 2022 WL 2763355, at *3 (Tex. App.- Dallas July 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The trial court found that it was in the best interest of the children to remove and enjoin Grandparents from interfering with the health care decisions of the parents and from interfering with the parenting of Mother and Father. The court found Grandmother's behavior had risen to the level that it was in the best interest of the children that she be enjoined from contacting their school. It also found that the injunctions were necessary due to the high level of animosity between the parties and are in the best interest of the children.
Grandparents argue the evidence does not link the prohibited conduct to the children's best interest. They assert Mother's testimony was insufficient because it was conclusory. When Mother's counsel asked her at trial what led to her request to enjoin Grandparents from having any contact with her, her children, and her husband, Grandparents' counsel objected "because there was a pleading on file" about what led Mother to request an injunction. Counsel did not want to "open this up beyond that." The trial court took judicial notice of the filing and told Mother's counsel to "get to the end." In accordance with the court's wishes, Mother did not testify in detail about the conduct that led to her seeking injunctive relief against her parents.
Nonetheless, the record contains numerous exhibits that document Grandparents' intrusive behavior after Mother and the children moved out of their house and show Grandparents did not respect the boundaries Mother and Father set for them regarding access to the children. There are pictures of large birthday and holiday gifts Grandparents left for the children outside Mother's home with poster-size notes for the children to read. One note said, "God knows we would never hurt you. You do not need to be afraid." Grandmother also dropped off a birthday present for H.V.H. at the home of the parents of Mother's new husband. Along with the present, Grandmother dropped off a letter to Mother's new in-laws that was a "grandparent to grandparent" appeal to them to talk to their son about reuniting Grandparents with the boys. In the letter, Grandparents accused Mother of "severe child psychological abuse" against C.T.H. and H.V.H. She included transcripts from Mother and Father's divorce proceeding and other legal documents, among other things.
In addition, prior to the restraining order, both Mother and Father had asked Grandparents not to come to school and sporting events where the children would be. Grandparents continued to do so. Father testified about Grandparents attending C.T.H.'s basketball game after he and Mother asked them to not attend. According to Father, Grandparents were very disruptive. On May 2, 2019, Mother's attorney emailed Grandparents' attorney to ask that Grandparents stop sending gifts to the boys and stop entering Mother's property. Grandmother posted the letter on her Facebook page, causing Mother's lawyer to write Grandparents' lawyer again on May 7 demanding Grandparents stop their harassment and unsolicited interactions with Mother and the boys. Even so, Grandparents showed up uninvited to H.V.H.'s kindergarten graduation at the end of May 2019. Further, Grandmother admitted picking through Mother's trash one time in April 2018, and acknowledged she had showed up at the children's school to try to observe them. Grandparents' own witness, court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. Blotcky, testified Grandparents harassed Mother.
Under these facts, the restrictions the trial court put in place are reasonably related to the children and to protecting their best interests. See In re S.B., 2023 WL 6284703, at *13. The trial court had discretion to enjoin Grandparents' conduct and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. We overrule Grandparents' second issue.
In their third issue, Grandparents assert there is a conflict between the final order and one of the court's fact findings. The trial court's order contains mutual permanent injunctions between Mother and Father, agreed to by them. Mother and Father were each permanently enjoined from allowing the children to contact Grandparents, allowing Grandparents to babysit for the children or pick them up from school, inviting them to the children's activities, and communicating with Grandparents about the children. The trial court's findings of fact state Mother "has the discretion to choose to allow the grandmother to have access to the children or allow the grandfather to have access to the children." Grandparents assert that because the order and findings are in conflict, the fact findings control and the injunctions prohibiting Mother from allowing contact between them and the children should be vacated.
When a trial court makes findings of fact, the findings "shall form the basis of the judgment upon all grounds of recovery and of defense embraced therein." Tex.R.Civ.P. 299. If there is a conflict between findings of fact and the judgment, the findings of fact control. In re N.E.C., No. 05-18-01350-CV, 2020 WL 3286521, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 18, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, the conflict is harmless error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). Even if the injunctions prohibiting Mother from permitting Grandparents to contact or see her children were vacated, as discussed above, there are separate injunctions against Grandparents, enjoining them from contacting or communicating with the children. If Mother changed her mind and decided to give her parents access to the children, she would need to seek a modification of the order. We overrule Grandparents' third issue.
Mediated Settlement Agreement
In their fourth issue, Grandparents contend the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to render judgment on a 2012 mediated settlement agreement ("MSA"). In 2012, Grandparents filed an original SAPCR, which was later consolidated with Mother and Father's divorce action. In November 2012, Mother, Father, and Grandparents signed an MSA. The MSA gave Grandparents the certain possession rights to C.T.H. H.V.H. was not yet born. The trial court never adopted the MSA as an order of the court, and the 2016 divorce decree did not give Grandparents any rights of possession or access to the children.
Grandparents rely on section 153.0071 of the family code in support of their position. Under that section, a mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement prominently provides that it is not subject to revocation, is signed by each party to the agreement, and signed by the party's attorney, if any, who is present when the agreement is signed. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.0071(d). If a mediated settlement agreement meets these requirements, a party is entitled to judgment on the agreement. Id. § 153.0071(e).
Grandparents did not raise the issue of the MSA during November 2021 trial. They sought greater rights to the children in this modification proceeding than the rights granted them in the 2012 MSA, and they waited until well after the trial court denied their request for conservatorship before bringing the MSA to the trial judge's attention. They first mentioned the MSA to the trial judge almost eight months after trial, on June 29, 2022, when they filed a "Motion to Sign Mediated Settlement Agreement" during the interim between trial and the court's written order. We conclude Grandparents did not timely present their request about the MSA to the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Further, the MSA was signed before Mother and Father's divorce and before their second child was born. The MSA was part of an earlier action that was consolidated into the divorce proceeding. The time for Grandparents to seek judgment on the MSA was during the divorce action, which was finalized in 2016. Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court had discretion to refuse to render judgment on the ten-year-old MSA. See Brooks v. Brooks, 257 S.W.3d 418, 421-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (trial court did not have duty to render judgment on MSA where husband took inconsistent positions regarding the agreement). We overrule Grandparents' fourth issue.
Request to Reopen the Evidence
In their fifth issue, Grandparents argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to reopen the evidence after trial. On June 24, 2022, Grandparents filed a motion to reopen their case in chief. They alleged that after the court made its oral ruling on November 2, 2021, Mother engaged in behaviors that significantly impair the children's mental health. They allege she made C.T.H. the subject of several interviews that discussed his sexuality and his mental health issues in a "public and permanent forum." They asked the trial court to reopen their case in chief so they could present evidence of: Mother's November 2021 discussion of C.T.H.'s case on yahoo.com; a November 15, 2021 international article on the Daily Mail's website quoting Mother regarding C.T.H.'s sexuality and suicidal behaviors; a March 8, 2022 interview C.T.H. did with NBC News, as well as Mother's posting the interview on her Facebook page; and a March 8, 2022 podcast interview with C.T.H. and Mother. The trial court denied the motion.
A trial court has discretion to reopen a case for the purpose of admitting additional evidence. Naguib v. Naguib, 137 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 270 (court may permit additional evidence to be offered at any time). Although that discretion should be exercised liberally so both parties are permitted to fully develop their cases, unless a trial court has clearly abused its discretion, an appellate court should not disturb its refusal to open a case for the purpose of admitting additional evidence. Naguib, 137 S.W.3d at 372 . In determining whether to permit additional evidence, a trial court may consider: (1) the movant's due diligence in obtaining the evidence, (2) the decisiveness of the proffered evidence, (3) any undue delay the reception of the evidence could cause, and (4) any injustice the granting of the motion could cause. Id. at 373. If not all of these factors are satisfied, a trial court's denial of a motion to reopen evidence should not be disturbed. Id.
Here, not all of the factors have been satisfied. The trial court had discretion to determine that Grandparents were not diligent in asking the court to reopen the case. Some of the interviews were conducted in November 2021 and others took place in March 2022, and Grandparents waited until June 2022 to ask the trial court to reopen their case. The trial court also had discretion to determine that reopening the case would cause undue delay. In addition, the substance of the evidence Grandparents sought to present was available to the trial judge. As the finder of fact in this nonjury trial, the judge was in the best position to determine whether the proffered evidence was decisive. The motion to reopen is nearly 30 pages long. It contains links to and/or excerpts of the interviews and news articles Grandparents wanted the trial court to consider. The trial court's written order denying the motion indicates the judge considered the substance of the proffered evidence. The trial judge made handwritten edits to the order to indicate she denied the motion "after consideration of the motion and content thereof." The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grandparents' request to reopen their case. We overrule Grandparents' fifth issue.
Parental Fitness
In their sixth issue, Grandparents contend the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Mother and Father joint managing conservators and denying Grandparents' request for sole managing conservatorship and possession. The court expressly found that Mother is a fit custodial parent who had substantial objections regarding Grandparents and impliedly found Father was a fit parent. Grandparents maintain the evidence is factually insufficient to show parental fitness.
We review a trial court's conservatorship determination for an abuse of discretion. In re A.V., 2022 WL 2763355, at *3. A grandparent's rights are generally subordinate to a parent's rights. In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334 (Tex. 2007). The custody, care, and nurture of a child resides first in the parents. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). There is a legal presumption that it is in a child's best interest to be raised by his or her parents. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. 2020). The fit-parent presumption is "deeply embedded in Texas law" as part of the determination of a child's best interest. Id.; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131 (presumption that parent should be appointed managing conservator). A fit parent presumptively acts in the best interest of his or her child and has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of that child. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 808. Grandparents had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother and Father were not fit. In re A.V., 2022 WL 2763355, at *4. "[So] long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children, (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family." Id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.).
Grandparents do not dispute that the fit-parent presumption applies. They contend they rebutted that presumption with "overwhelming evidence" of lack of parental fitness. They argue that evidence falls into four categories: (1) Mother's and Father's history of instability and conflict; (2) Mother's personality disorder, which prevents her from making good parenting decisions and providing stability; (3) Mother's decision to take the children away from Grandparents and prevent them from having contact with them; and (4) Mother's alienation of the children against Grandparents.
First, Grandparents contend Mother and Father are unfit because they have a history of instability and conflict. Grandparents' evidence included many text messages between Mother and Father. Grandmother reviewed the messages and testified they showed "long-term constant parental conflict." From our review of the evidence, the trial court as fact finder could have concluded the amount of conflict shown in the messages was not inappropriate for divorced parents who are caring for a child with serious mental health issues and also showed an effort to communicate and co-parent with the children's best interest in mind.
Next, Grandparents contend Mother has a personality disorder. In their brief, they represent that Dr. Blotcky testified Mother had a personality disorder that prevents her from providing long-term stability. Dr. Blotcky did not personally diagnose Mother with a personality disorder, and the record is not clear that Mother has one. In evaluating C.T.H., Dr. Blotcky reviewed records from a Dr. Robert Gordon. Dr. Gordon reviewed Mother's "MMPI-2" and interpreted it to reflect a personality disorder that would likely interfere with parenting. Dr. Blotcky was asked if he agreed with Dr. Gordon's description of Mother. Mother objected on various grounds, and the trial court sustained the objections. Dr. Gordon's records predated the divorce, and in determining whether the divorce decree should be modified, the trial court limited its review to events after the divorce. It is unlikely the judge gave much weight to evidence of any personality disorder. Further, at the time of trial Mother was in a stable home and marriage and had lived in the same place for three years.
Grandparents' remaining two arguments about fitness are related. They contend Mother is unfit because she decided to prevent the children from having contact with them and also because she intentionally alienated the children against them. Evidence showed Grandparents were actively involved in the care of the children when they lived with them. Shortly after Mother and the boys moved out, C.T.H. told an adult at his school he loved Grandparents and wanted to move back and was mad he did not live with them anymore. Then there was a shift in the language C.T.H. used to talk about his Grandparents. In March 2021, he described his Grandmother as toxic and a gold digger. It was reported that C.T.H. appeared to be afraid of Grandparents or to not like them. He told Dr. Blotcky Grandmother was smothering and intrusive to Mother and him before they left her home.
Dr. Blotcky indicated that when a child is "amputated from a parent figure" it can cause feelings of loss, abandonment, and confusion. He testified that C.T.H. represented that he has abandonment issues. The doctor believed losing contact with Grandparents exacerbated his feelings of abandonment. Dr. Albritton also testified that abandonment issues exacerbated C.T.H.'s condition.
As discussed in connection with our review of the injunctions against Grandparents, there is evidence in the record to reflect that Mother had legitimate reasons to disassociate herself and her children from her parents. Further, the evidence showed C.T.H.'s abandonment issues were not the sole cause of his struggles. He had a history of severe bullying at school, among other things.
A parent is fit if they adequately care for their children. In re A.V., 2022 WL 2763355, at *4. Grandparents have not shown the children were not adequately cared for. To the contrary, the record reflects they were more than adequately cared for. The trial court found that Mother "has gone to monumental efforts to assist her sons with their behavioral issues." The record supports this determination. Mother testified C.T.H. had mental health issues from a young age. She sought treatment for him; he saw a counselor and a psychiatrist. When Mother found out about C.T.H.'s suicide attempts, she contacted Father, and C.T.H.'s counselor and psychiatrist. When Mother became aware in early September 2021 that C.T.H. was having suicidal ideations, within about 12 hours she admitted him to Mesa Springs for inpatient therapy.
C.T.H.'s mental health caregivers also presented evidence of Mother's level of fitness. A psychiatrist who treated C.T.H. at Mesa Springs indicated Mother participated in his treatment there. Jody Payson was C.T.H.'s counselor before he went into inpatient care. She testified Mother asked for guidance on how to handle C.T.H.'s suicide attempts and followed through with her recommendations. Payson also believed Father was following her recommendations. In Payson's professional opinion, Mother and Father are attempting to meet C.T.H.'s needs. Even Dr. Blotcky and Dr. Albritton, Grandparents' witnesses, thought Mother was addressing C.T.H.'s mental health needs.
While the focus at trial was on the parenting of C.T.H., the record reflects Mother and Father were also addressing H.V.H.'s needs. We conclude Grandparents did not meet their burden to prove that Mother and Father are unfit parents. The trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion to determine that Mother and Father were fit parents. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grandparents' request for conservatorship rights and in appointing Mother and Father joint managing conservators. We overrule Grandparents' sixth issue.
We affirm the trial court's reformed order of December 9, 2022.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the trial court's December 9, 2022 order is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Christina Edmiston recover her costs of this appeal from appellants Tina Chapman and Vinson Chapman.