Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. J03829
SIMS, Acting P.J.Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was adoptable. Disagreeing with this claim, we shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2005, a dependency petition was filed concerning the eight-month-old minor, alleging in part that appellant had a history of sniffing paint in the minor’s presence. According to the petition, appellant smelled strongly of glue or epoxy when police personnel responded to a call from her alleging there were intruders in her home, and her behavior was sufficiently bizarre when the officers arrived (and found no intruders) that she was taken in for a mental health evaluation.
Although appellant repeatedly denied she sniffed paint or used drugs, she entered a “plea of No Contest” to the allegations in the petition, and reunification services were ordered.
Paternity testing excluded the alleged father named in the petition, and another alleged father was never located.
Appellant was provided an array of services but continued to deny drug use, did not submit to random drug testing and exhibited difficulty parenting the minor during visits. In October 2006, appellant was arrested for possessing toluene with the intent to inhale it (Pen. Code, § 381, subd. (a)), nine days after prematurely giving birth to another child. Meanwhile, although previous reports noted no mental or emotional problems for the minor, the report for a review hearing in November 2006 stated that the minor had been throwing temper tantrums. However, it was also reported that she did “not show serious emotional problems.”
Appellant did not appear at the November 2006 review hearing. At that hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for the minor.
In the reports prepared for the subsequent hearing, the social worker recommended that parental rights be terminated so the minor could be placed for adoption. According to the reports, the minor had been in the same foster home since three days after she was removed from appellant, but her foster parents, who had other “younger children” in the home, did not want to adopt her.
Although the minor had no problems medically or developmentally, the foster mother reported that the minor had “rapid mood changes, uncooperative behaviors” and “temper tantrums” during which she “crie[d] for long periods when she d[id] not get her way.” According to the foster mother, it was “very hard to console” the minor when she was in this state, as she “never seem[ed] to tire out.” The minor was described as “quite demanding” and her behavior had become “quite challenging.” One of the reports speculated that the minor may have been exposed to the illegal inhalants used by appellant and it was unknown how this might affect her in the future, while another report acknowledged that the minor might require counseling “if she continues to have anger issues.” At an interim hearing at which the court inquired about the availability of counseling for the minor, the agency’s attorney stated that the minor “may have some kind of brain damage due to [appellant’s] substance abuse.”
Nonetheless, adoption remained the recommendation. The adoption report noted the minor “appears to have the ability to attach to others and can be very loving and friendly.” Several adoptive home studies had been received from families interested in having the minor placed with them, and a placement was being sought that also would be willing to adopt the minor’s sibling if he was unable to reunify with appellant. The report concluded: “Although [the minor] reportedly demonstrates behavior challenges, she is a toddler who needs consistency, boundaries and a sense of belonging. Adoption clearly is the permanent plan that best meets the needs of this minor.”
Appellant did not attend the section 366.26 hearing, and her attorney presented no evidence or argument other than to state that he “oppose[d] the adoption recommendation.” The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was likely to be adopted and ordered parental rights terminated.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the minor was adoptable because the minor had behavioral problems and an adoptive family had not been identified. Contrary to this claim, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability.
“In order for the court to select and implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the minor will likely be adopted if parental rights are terminated.” (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.] Hence, it is not necessary that the minor already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.)
We review an order terminating parental rights for substantial evidence. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
In the present matter, at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the minor was three years old, an age at which children are generally adoptable, and had demonstrated an “ability to attach to others” and to “be very loving and friendly.” Although the minor had been manifesting some behavioral concerns, the social worker’s assessment that she was adoptable was made with an awareness of these concerns. The fact that several approved families were interested in adopting the minor bore out this assessment. Neither appellant nor any other party urged a contrary conclusion at the section 366.26 hearing.
Appellant claims the social worker’s opinion that the minor was adoptable was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding because it “was not adequately supported by direct evidence.” She concedes that the minor’s age and physical health weigh in favor of her adoptability, but contends that her emotional problems posed an obstacle to adoption. The evidence does not support this contention.
As already noted, although a particular adoptive home had not been identified for the minor as of the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the social worker reported that several families were interested in adopting her. It reasonably may be inferred, absent any evidence to the contrary, that these families were informed of the minor’s behavioral issues. This is quite different from the circumstances in In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060 at page 1065, relied on by appellant, which involved a sibling group of 10 children with various delays that had been deemed “hard to place.” In that case, the court held there was insufficient evidence of adoptability because only two of the five foster homes that were caring for the children were even “considering” adoption and there was an absence of other evidence that an adoptive home could be located for the children. Here, on the other hand, there were numerous prospective adoptive families that were interested in having the minor placed with them and no evidence that she would be hard to place. Thus, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the minor’s behavioral problems were not a deterrent to adoption.
Appellant’s reliance on In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616 (Brian P.), involving a four-year-old child with a history of “developmental difficulties,” is likewise misplaced. In that case, although the reports prepared for the section 366.26 hearing stated that the child was adoptable, they contained no evidence to support this conclusion, and the appellate court determined that “th[e] record raise[s] as many questions as assurances about his adoptability.” (Id. at pp. 624-625.) The court concluded that the “fragmentary and ambiguous evidence was not enough to buttress the [social service a]gency’s position that [the child] was adoptable.” (Id. at p. 625.)
Unlike Brian P., here, the social worker’s reports contained information about the minor’s development, and the adoption assessment addressed the minor’s physical and emotional health, as well as her developmental status. And while it is true that the minor had begun to manifest some behavioral problems, nothing in the record suggests that these problems were of such magnitude that they might present an impediment to adoption. In sum, evidence of the minor’s qualities and characteristics sufficiently supported the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., BUTZ, J.