Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup.Ct. No. JD225492
MORRISON, J.
Appellant Cynthia M., mother of Crystal M. (the minor), appeals from an order of the juvenile court finding the minor to be a person within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, and placing appellant and the minor under the supervision of the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department). (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300 and 360, subd. (b); further section references are to this code.) Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b), and that the Department failed to provide notice in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2007, the minor, then six years old, was removed from the home and placed into temporary protective custody following a report that appellant, believing someone had come into her home and disturbed her acrylic painting, became angry and kicked a can of paint across the room, causing the minor to hide in fear.
The Department filed a section 300 juvenile dependency petition alleging failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)) due to the following: appellant “has psychiatric/emotional problems, which impairs her judgment and ability to provide adequate care and supervision of her child;” appellant “has refused voluntary services and participation in a full mental health assessment[;]” on one occasion, appellant had a “violent outburst and kicked a can of paint across the room” causing the minor to become frightened; and appellant’s “unstable mental health places the [minor] at substantial risk of physical harm and abuse or neglect.”
Appellant had previously been referred to Children’s Protective Services for general neglect based on reports appellant experienced auditory hallucinations and was delusional and paranoid, believing “the people” were trying to kill her and barricading herself and the minor in the home. As a result of that referral, appellant participated in family maintenance services for approximately five months.
The detention report notes that both appellant and the maternal grandmother denied having Native American heritage, but that the minor’s father reported possible Native American heritage through a Cherokee tribe on his father’s side of the family.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered the Department to provide notice to the appropriate tribes, and returned the minor to appellant’s custody on the condition that appellant comply with her case plan and make the minor available for interviews and assessments.
Approximately one week after the detention hearing, the Department prepared a Notice of Involuntary Child Custody Proceedings Involving an Indian Child based on information obtained from the minor’s father. The form included information regarding appellant’s name, address and birth date, the minor’s father’s name, address, birthplace and birth date, the name of the tribe (Cherokee), the name and additional information about the paternal grandmother, and the name of the paternal grandfather. The form also indicated that it was “unknown” whether any member of the family had ever attended an Indian school, received medical treatment at an Indian health clinic or lived on a federal trust land, a reservation, a rancheria or Indian allotment. The completed form was mailed to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and three Cherokee tribes.
The Department’s attempts to contact appellant to obtain information regarding the minor’s Native American heritage were unsuccessful.
Approximately two weeks later, the Department sent amended notices to the BIA and each of the identified Cherokee tribes, adding a new middle name for the minor’s great-grandfather.
As of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, responses from the tribes and the BIA were “pending.” The record contains no evidence that either the BIA or any of the three tribes ever responded to the notices.
Prior to the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on April 6, 2007, appellant filed a pretrial statement which included as an exhibit a letter sent by the minor’s paternal grandmother, E.S., to the court. Other than E.S.’s name, the fact that she was the minor’s paternal grandmother, and the fact that the letter had been signed before a notary public in Del Norte County, there was no information in the letter providing a means to locate or contact E.S.
On April 6, 2007, the date of the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Department filed a first amended section 300 petition alleging appellant’s failure to protect the minor due to “psychiatric/emotional problems” which impair appellant’s judgment and ability to provide adequate care for the minor; appellant’s refusal to participate in voluntary services or a full mental health assessment; the fact that appellant “informs the [minor] that people are trying to kill them” and, when she gets angry, throws objects without any concern for whether or not they might hit the minor; and the fact that appellant’s “unstable mental health and paranoid thinking places the [minor] at substantial risk of physical harm and abuse or neglect.” At the hearing, the Department submitted the matter on the evidence contained in its report. The minor’s stepfather testified on behalf of appellant. After considering the evidence and the oral argument from the parties’ counsel, the court found the allegations in the petition true by a preponderance of the evidence. The court sustained the first amended petition but did not adjudicate the minor a dependent child, ordering only that services be provided to appellant, including a psychological evaluation and a medication assessment.
Section 360, subdivision (b) provides: “If the court finds that the child is a person described in Section 300 it may, without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court, order that services be provided to keep the family together and place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with section 301.”
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
ICWA Notice Not Required
Appellant contends the Department failed to comport with the notice provisions of ICWA by (1) failing to provide sufficient information to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the relevant Indian tribes for purposes of determining the minor’s Indian ancestry, if any, and (2) failing to provide continuing notice of each hearing in the dependency proceeding.
In 1978, Congress passed ICWA, which is designed to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children “in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902; Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30 [104 L.Ed.2d 29].)
To effectuate the purposes of ICWA, “‘child custody proceeding[s]’” involving, among other proceedings, the “‘foster care placement’” of an Indian child, are subject to special federal procedures. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)-(iv).) A foster care placement includes “any action removing an Indian child from its parent . . . for temporary placement in a foster home . . . or the home of a guardian . . . where the parent . . . cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i).)
Among the procedural safeguards included in ICWA is a provision for notice, which states in part: “In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The Indian status of a child need not be certain or conclusive to trigger ICWA’s notice requirements. (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 471.) Rule 5.664 of California Rules of Court contains identical requirements. (Former rule 5.664(f).)
ICWA applies generally to “child custody” proceedings, which include “foster care placement,” “termination of parental rights,” “preadoptive placement,” and “adoptive placement.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)-(iv).) In this case, the Department was not seeking to put the minor in foster care or to remove her from appellant’s custody. There was no suggestion that the minor was “at risk of entering foster care.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664, subd. (b); cf. In re Enrique O. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 728, 734, fn. 3.) Thus, when this case was before the juvenile court, it was not a “child custody” proceeding as defined by ICWA, and no notices were required.
Appellant concedes that the Department “did not request placement in foster care or termination of parental rights, and instead . . . requested that the court allow [the minor] to remain in [appellant’s] home, under a program of dependent supervision[,]” but argues “this was only a recommendation by the [D]epartment, and the court could have removed [the minor] from [appellant’s] home.” Should such a change of circumstances occur, ICWA notice may well be required. However, that issue is not presently before us. Because the provisions of ICWA did not apply to the Department’s petitions, any defect in the notices provided to the tribes and the BIA was immaterial.
II
Substantial Evidence of Risk of Serious Harm to the Minor
Appellant contends the Department failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the minor suffered, or was in substantial risk of suffering, serious harm.
Subdivision (b) of section 300 provides for jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, . . .” (§ 300, subd. (b).)
The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of a petition comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (§ 355.) We review the juvenile court’s order for substantial evidence (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820), resolving conflicts in the evidence in favor of the juvenile court’s decision. (In re Katrina L. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1288, 1297.) We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence, but must decide only whether sufficient evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) Issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone; we may decide only “‘“whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” [Citation.]’” (In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1226-1227, quoting In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1132.)
Jurisdiction may be upheld if the evidence supports one of several grounds on which the juvenile court relied, even though the evidence may be insufficient to support all of the grounds relied on by the court. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.) Appellant has the burden of proving the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
The juvenile court began the contested jurisdictional hearing by acknowledging the filing of the amended petition filed on April 6, 2007. That petition alleges appellant’s failure to protect the minor due to “psychiatric/emotional problems” which impair appellant’s judgment and ability to provide adequate care for the minor, appellant’s refusal to participate in voluntary services or a full mental health assessment, the fact that appellant “informs the [minor] that people are trying to kill them” and, when she gets angry, throws objects without any concern for whether or not they might hit the minor, and the fact that appellant’s “unstable mental health and paranoid thinking places the [minor] at substantial risk of physical harm and abuse or neglect.”
In support of those allegations, the Department relied on the evidence set forth in the social worker’s March 27, 2007 report. That report provides specific details obtained from various sources that the minor has been, and continues to be, at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to the mother’s inability to protect and care for the minor due to the mother’s unstable mental health. For example, the report states that (1) the minor said appellant told her people “were trying to kill” them both; (2) the minor believes appellant “always speaks the truth;” (3) the minor said appellant often gets mad and throws things without caring where they land, and the minor has learned to duck so that she does not get hit; (4) the minor recalled an incident when appellant, who was “upset about those people trying to kill her[,]” threw a block which hit the minor in the ankle. The minor added, “I’m not sure about that. Maybe they were trying to kill me too[;]” (5) appellant told the minor her grandmother was trying to kill them; (6) the minor said she is very scared of people trying to kill her and appellant; and (7) the minor said she likes living with appellant and loves her very much, but would like help from the social worker to “solve the mystery of who is trying to kill her and [appellant].”
The minor’s maternal grandmother, J.S., reported that appellant “has severe psychiatric and emotional problems” and continually complains that she is being stalked by an unknown person. Appellant lives in a condominium owned by J.S., but has not paid rent for nearly one year. J.S. noted that the minor was “experiencing almost the same behaviors as [appellant]. She’s hearing things and probably also thinks someone is trying to kill her too.”
The report also included a summary of results from appellant’s mental health consultation conducted by Tanda Almont of UC Davis CAARE Center. During that interview, appellant displayed paranoia and anxious behavior, often giving inconsistent responses and going off on tangents. Appellant described a tumultuous relationship with her mother (J.S.) which sometimes makes her feel anxious and angry. According to appellant, J.S. is “out to get her” and trying to take the minor away from her. When appellant was asked about an incident during which she allegedly barricaded herself and the minor in her condo, she explained that she suspected someone of coming into her home and placed furniture in front of the door to prevent that from happening. Almont concluded that appellant meets the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and exhibits symptoms of Paranoid Personality Disorder (PPD). Almont also concluded that appellant has “difficulty maintaining healthy relationships with others and is unable to maintain stable employment[,]” and has “limited insight into how [the minor] could be affected” by her behavior. Because appellant indicated she does not believe in mental health diagnoses or treatment, Almont concluded it was unlikely appellant would participate in a mandatory program or voluntarily seek help if she needed it.
The report concludes that there is evidence (including the fact that appellant believes people are going to kill her and becomes angry and throws objects at or near the minor) that appellant has psychiatric and emotional problems which impair her judgment and ability to provide adequate care and supervision of the minor. The report further concludes that, although the “risk to the [minor] is low to moderate if allowed to remain in [appellant’s] care[,]” there is cause for concern given that the minor is emulating appellant’s paranoia (e.g., saying she can hear voices upstairs) and believes that appellant is speaking the truth when she says J.S. is trying to kill them.
Based on that evidence, the juvenile court agreed with the Department’s recommendation that the minor should be adjudged a dependent of the court but allowed to remain in appellant’s care and custody under the Department’s supervision. Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (In re Terry D. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 890, 899), the record provides ample support for the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.
III
Correction in Minute Order
Our review of the record reveals an inconsistency between the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of its findings at the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, at which time the court sustained the petition as amended, and its written order which reflects that the court sustained the first amended petition but states that the findings are based on the allegations as set forth in the original petition. “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order . . ., the oral pronouncement controls. [Citations.]” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385-386.) We direct the juvenile court to amend its minute order to reflect that the court’s findings are based on the allegations in the first amended petition.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., SIMS, J.