Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2023, SECTION "L"(1).
May 2, 2003.
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion of Petitioner Crewboats, Inc. ("Crewboats") for Summary Judgment on the Issues of Jones Act Negligence, Unseaworthiness, and General Maritime Negligence. For the following reasons, the petitioner's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of an accident sustained by claimant Dorwin Berrier ("Berrier") on May 27, 2002 during the course of his employment as a seaman aboard Crewboats' vessel, the M/V SUPER RUNNER. On that date, the vessel was operating out of Southport, North Carolina providing supplies to the dredge barge MERIDIAN owned and operated by Bead Dredging, L.L.C. ("Bean"). At the time of the accident, Berrier was delivering a spool of steel cable to the dredge. He was the only Crewboats employee aboard the SUPER RUNNER, although he testified that another employee should have been aboard the vessel.
Berrier was at the stem controls of the vessel holding the stem of the vessel against the dredge while two Bean employees boarded the vessel to prepare the spool to-be hoisted off the SUPER RUNNER by a crane aboard the MERIDIAN. It is undisputed that the load was "overboomed," i.e., the boom of the crane extended past the load in Berrier's direction. It is further undisputed that there was no tag line on the spool. Once the spool was connected to the cable, a Bean employee signaled the crane operator to begin lifting. As he did so, the load swung toward Berrier, who was still at the stern controls of the vessel. He was unable to avoid the spool and tried to lift his leg to block the spool. The spool struck Berrier and pushed him against the roof of the vessel causing him to bend over backwards and sustain injury.
Crewboats filed a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability in this Court, and Berrier timely asserted claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, et seq., and general maritime law in the limitation proceeding. Crewboats now moves for summary judgment arguing that any negligence or unseaworthiness on the part of the vessel did not cause Berrier's injuries. Crewboats further contends that a seaman does not have a cause of action for negligence under the general maritime law. Berrier responds that the issue of causation is fact intensive and not appropriate for summary judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 — 24, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249 — 50 (citations omitted).
B. Summary Judgment on the Issue of Jones Act Negligence
Under the Jones Act, an employer is negligent if he fails to use reasonable care to maintain a reasonably safe place to work. Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Under the Jones Act, the standard of causation is very light; "[i]f the defendant's negligence played any part, however small, in producing the seaman's injury, it results in liability." Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1991).
Crewboats contends first that it was not negligent because Bean's employees were responsible for moving the spool from the deck of the SUPER RUNNER. Berrier points out, however, that a second crew member should have been aboard the vessel at the time. Whether it was reasonable for that additional crew member to have been aboard the vessel at that time is a fact-intensive question precluding summary judgment. Regarding causation, Berrier points out several issues of material fact concerning whether the failure to provide an additional crew member played some part in Berrier's accident. For example, it is possible that an extra crew member could have assisted in making sure that the crane was properly positioned over the spool. Also, an extra crew member's presence may have allowed Berrier to be away from the stern controls and not in the path of the swinging spool. As such, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that Crewbaots' negligence, if any, contributed in some way to the claimant's injuries; thus, summary judgment is inappropriate.
C. Summary Judgment on the Issue of Unseaworthiness
A vessel owner has a non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel that is reasonably fit for its intended uses. See Bommarito v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 929 F.2d 186, 190 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1991). The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel includes "a duty to supply an adequate crew." Id. Thus, the failure to provide an adequate number of crew members aboard the SUPER RUNNER may have resulted in an unseaworthy condition.
The standard of causation is different for unseaworthiness cases than in Jones Act cases. I THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 6-25 at 347 (3d ed. 2001). Causation requires a showing of proximate cause, which requires a showing that "(1) the unseaworthiness played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that (2) the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness." Id. Although the standard is different, the issues surrounding the lack of additional crew members discussed above is still the same. Further, causation under this definition is still a fact-intensive inquiry, and summary judgment is similarly inappropriate at this time.
D. Summary Judgment on the Issue of General Maritime Law Negligence
Finally, Crewboats moves for summary judgment on Berrier's claims for negligence under the general maritime law. It is well settled that a seaman does not have a claim against his employer under the general maritime law for negligence. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1979). Berrier does mention that he has claims for damages resulting from the failure to pay maintenance and cure, but this is an issue wholly separate and apart from issues of negligence. See Boudreaux v. United States, 280 F.3d 461, 468 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the obligation to provide maintenance and cure is "independent-of tort law"). Accordingly, Berrier's claims for maintenance and cure or for damages resulting from non-payment thereof are not precluded by a finding that he has no cause of action as a matter of law for negligence under the general maritime law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petitioner's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted only insofar as it seeks to dismiss the claimant's claims for negligence under the general maritime law. The motion is denied as to the issues of Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness.