Opinion
B223170 x-ref. B213075
06-23-2011
In re the Marriage of COURTNEY J. and JAMES C. STEWART. COURTNEY J. STEWART, Respondent, v. JAMES C. STEWART, Appellant.
Law Offices of Lynn Soodik, Lynn Soodik and James L. Keane for Appellant James C. Stewart. No appearance for Respondent Courtney J. Stewart.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SD018483)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Elia Weinbach, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with directions.
Law Offices of Lynn Soodik, Lynn Soodik and James L. Keane for Appellant James C. Stewart.
No appearance for Respondent Courtney J. Stewart.
James Stewart appeals from a postjudgment order entered in this marital dissolution action concerning his marriage to Courtney Stewart. James contends that the law of the case compels partial reversal of the order, which was entered while a previous appeal in this case was pending. We agree.
To avoid confusion, we will henceforth refer to the parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
The present appeal does not require extensive description of the factual and procedural background, which was summarized in our opinion in the previous appeal. (See In re Marriage of Stewart (No. B213075, Apr. 27, 2010) [nonpub. opn.].) On January 21, 2003, the trial court entered a stipulated judgment of dissolution, resolving all issues.
On March 24, 2008, Courtney filed an order to show cause to establish child and spousal support arrearages under the stipulated judgment. On October 31, 2008, the trial court entered an order resolving the disputes presented by the order to show cause. One of the disputes concerned the treatment, under the stipulated judgment, of noncash grants of stock that James received under his employers Equity Ownership Plan (EOP). The trial court concluded that Jamess EOP stock should be treated as cash bonuses, rather than being given the same treatment as the noncash grants of stock James received under his previous employers Equity Incentive Compensation Plan (EICP).
Both parties appealed, and we reversed in part. In particular, we concluded that under the stipulated judgment Jamess EOP stock should be treated the same as his EICP stock, not as a cash bonus. (See In re Marriage of Stewart, supra, (No. B213075).) We filed our opinion in that appeal on April 27, 2010.
While that appeal was pending, however, on May 22, 2009, James filed a motion to determine support arrearages based on the trial courts order of October 31, 2008, and seeking other relief. Courtney filed a responsive declaration concerning Jamess motion. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 639, the trial court appointed a referee to hear the motion and issue a report "that includes a recommendation on the merits of any disputed issue." The referee issued his report on December 3, 2009. In accordance with the trial courts order of October 31, 2008 (which we had not yet partially reversed), the referees report concluded that Jamess EOP stock should be treated as a cash bonus rather than being treated the same as EICP stock.
On January 15, 2010, the trial court entered an order approving and adopting the referees report in its entirety. Both parties timely appealed, but Courtneys appeal was dismissed for failure to file an opening brief. The sole issue presented on Jamess appeal is whether our previous holding that his EOP stock should be treated the same as his EICP stock compels partial reversal of the trial courts January 15, 2010, order, which determined that the EOP stock should be treated as a cash bonus. Courtney did not file a respondents brief. We agree with James that our prior decision on this issue constitutes the law of the case and requires partial reversal of the order under review.
Under the doctrine of the law of the case, we ordinarily will not revisit an issue of law that was actually presented and determined in a prior appellate proceeding if the issue was necessary to the decision in the prior case. (See, e.g., People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841-842.) The doctrine applies to our previous holding that, under the stipulated judgment, Jamess EOP stock should be treated the same as his EICP stock, rather than as a cash bonus. Accordingly, we partially reverse the trial courts order of January 15, 2010, and direct the court on remand to enter a new order conforming to our previous holding that EOP stock should be treated the same as EICP stock.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the January 15, 2010, order finding that EOP was bonus income rather than the equivalent of EICP stock is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an order that EOP stock is to be treated the same as EICP stock for the purposes of determining support, to determine support arrearages in accordance with this opinion, and to make any orders adjusting the parties financial obligations as required. The order is otherwise affirmed. Appellant shall recover his costs of this appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. We concur:
CHANEY, J.
JOHNSON, J.