Having failed to do so, respondents' arguments concerning whether the 2009 MGPP is sufficient to support a constitutional public purpose are now time barred. Even if a challenge to the 2009 MGPP could be characterized as an Article 78 challenge, such a proceeding is also time barred in accordance with the four-month Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 217(1) ( see e.g. Matter of City of New York (Grand Lafayette Props), 6 NY3d at 547;Matter of Sanitation Garage Brooklyn Dists. 3 3A, 32 AD3d 1031 [2006], lv denied, motion dismissed 7 NY3d 92 [2006]; In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by the County of Tompkins, 237 AD2d 667, 668 [1997]). Similarly, inasmuch as the question of the public use to be served by the project is a matter that could have been determined in a proceeding under EDPL Article 2, jurisdiction to hold such a hearing is limited to the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals pursuant to the express mandate of EDPL 207(b) and 208 ( see e.g. In re Broome County, 159 AD2d at 791, citing Matter of Waldo's v Village of Johnson City, 74 NY2d 718, 720 [because respondents' answer raised constitutional questions as to petitioner's authority to acquire lands for purposes of their public project in contravention of respondents' right to equal protection, jurisdiction to resolve such issues rested exclusively in the appropriate Appellate Division]; In re Farmington Access Rd., 156 AD2d 936 [the Appellate Division has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine a condemnee's objections pursuant to EDPL 207[B]).

Having failed to do so, respondents' arguments concerning whether the 2009 MGPP is sufficient to support a constitutional public purpose are now time barred. Even if a challenge to the 2009 MGPP could be characterized as an Article 78 challenge, such a proceeding is also time barred in accordance with the four-month Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 217(1) (see e.g. Matter of City of New York (Grand Lafayette Props), 6 NY3d at 547; Matter of Sanitation Garage Brooklyn Dists. 3 & 3A, 32 AD3d 1031 [2006], lv denied, motion dismissed 7 NY3d 92 [2006]; In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by the County of Tompkins, 237 AD2d 667, 668 [1997]).

'National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Town of Concord, 299 A.D.2d 898, 899, 752 N.Y.S.2d 187, 189 (3d Dep't. 2002); Matter of County of Tompkins, 237 A.D.2d 667, 669-70, 654 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (3d Dep't. 1997). "If a property owner believes that an offer is inadequate, the remedy is to commence an action in the Court of Claims pursuant to EDPL article 5." Town of Concord, 299 A.D.2d at 899; 752 N.Y.S.2d at 189.

Moreover, petitioner’s "assertion that alternate sites would better serve the [Town’s] purposes is not a basis for relief under EDPL 207" (Matter of Peekskill Hgts., Inc. v. City of Peekskill Common Council, 110 A.D.3d 1079, 1080, 974 N.Y.S.2d 501 [2d Dept. 2013]; see Mat-ter of One Point St, Inc. v. City of Yonkers Indus. Dev. Agency, 170 A.D.3d 851, 853, 93 N.Y.S.3d 887 [2d Dept. 2019]; see also Village Auto Body Works v. Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 90 A.D.2d 502, 502, 454 N.Y.S.2d 741 [2d Dept. 1982]). [7] Finally, inasmuch as petitioner did not raise any of its SEQRA concerns at the public hearing on April 24, 2023 (see EDPL 202 [C] [2]), we conclude that, if petitioner wanted to challenge the subsequent SEQRA determination, it should have done so by commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the Town (seeMatter of County of Tompkins [Perkins], 237 A.D.2d 667, 668, 654 N.Y.S.2d 849 [3d Dept. 1997]). We therefore do not address the merits of those contentions.

Finally, inasmuch as petitioner did not raise any of its SEQRA concerns at the public hearing on April 24, 2023 (see EDPL 202 [C] [2]), we conclude that, if petitioner wanted to challenge the subsequent SEQRA determination, it should have done so by commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the Town (see Matter of County of Tompkins [Perkins], 237 A.D.2d 667, 668 [3d Dept 1997]). We therefore do not address the merits of those contentions.

Thus, when the State denied the very permit upon which petitioner's authority to construct the pipeline was conditioned, petitioner—by definition—lost its contingent right to construct the public project that undergirds its demand for eminent domain in this proceeding (seeIslander E. Pipeline Co., LLC, 482 F.3d at 91 [recognizing that Connecticut's WQC denial "continues to prevent Islander East from proceeding with its FERC-approved natural gas pipeline project"] ). Accordingly, as a result of the State's WQC denial, petitioner does not currently hold a qualifying federal permit for purposes of EDPL 206(A), i.e., a federal permit that (at a minimum) authorizes construction of the public project for which the condemnor seeks to exercise its power of eminent domain (compare e.g.Matter of County of Tompkins [Perkins], 237 A.D.2d 667, 668–669, 654 N.Y.S.2d 849 [3d Dept. 1997] ). Without a qualifying federal permit under EDPL 206(A), petitioner is not entitled to bypass the standard hearing and findings procedure of EDPL article 2.

A so-called “trial ready” appraisal report is required only in the context of an EDPL article 5 proceeding to determine the amount, if any, of just compensation owed to a condemnee ( see 22 NYCRR 202.61). To the extent that our decision in Matter of County of Tompkins (Perkins), 237 A.D.2d 667, 669, 654 N.Y.S.2d 849 [1997] stands for the proposition that the statute requires that an appraisal be obtained and an offer of compensation made before the commencement of a proceeding under EDPL article 4, we decline to follow it. Based upon a plain reading of the statute, we discern no such requirement. Nor does the record support Supreme Court's finding that petitioner was not entitled to immediate access to respondents' property.

A report by the Department of Environmental Conservation in 1986 noted that because the area is easily accessible, it is conceivable that all types of waste have been dumped into the canal, which could include chemical waste allegedly dumped there by the General Electric Silicon Plant in the Town of Waterford, Saratoga County. Lastly, there is no basis to support petitioners' claim that respondent failed to negotiate in good faith pursuant to EDPL 301 ( see Matter of County of Tompkins [Perkins], 237 AD2d 667, 669-670) or that a permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation ( see ECL 15-1501 [b]) was required prior to the commencement of this condemnation proceeding ( see Matter of Swan Lake Water Corp. v. Suffolk County Water Auth., 204 AD2d 463, 464). Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

on, the court found that there is no statutory or case law authority that allows a condemnee to oppose a vesting proceeding in reliance upon a challenge to the financial arrangements made by the condemnor to finance the Project (Condemnation Decision *25-29, citing Matter of Byrne, 101 AD2d 701, 701-702). Further, to the extent that modifications to the business arrangement between FCRC and the MTA that were approved on June 24, 2009 were challenged in the Condemnation Proceeding, this court held that any such challenge should have been made in an Article 78 proceeding commenced four months after the determination to be reviewed became final and binding upon the petitioner in accordance with CPLR 217(1), so that any such challenge was then time barred (Condemnation Decision *27-28, citing Matter of City of New York [Grand LafayetteProps] , 6 NY3d 540, 547; Matter of Sanitation Garage BrooklynDists. 3 3A , 32 AD3d 1031, 1035; In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by the County of Tompkins, 237 AD2d 667, 668). In addressing this contention, the court also noted that in the Article 78 proceeding that was commenced to challenge the June 24, 2009 resolution passed by the MTA, Judge Stallman noted that "[t]he subject 2009 resolution approved modification of various business terms to essentially the same plan approved with FCRC on December 13, 2006, when the MTA Board authorized the MTA staff to negotiate and execute binding agreements with FCRC and adopted SEQRA findings'" (Condemnation Decision *28, quoting Matter of Montgomery, 2009 NY Slip Op 52539[U] *1).

at there is no statutory or case law authority that allows a condemnee to oppose a vesting proceeding in reliance upon a challenge to the financial arrangements made by the condemnor to finance the Project (Condemnation Decision *25–29, citing Matter of Byrne, 101 A.D.2d 701, 701–702 [1984] ). Further, to the extent that modifications to the business arrangement between FCRC and the MTA that were approved on June 24, 2009 were challenged in the Condemnation Proceeding, this court held that any such challenge should have been made in an Article 78 proceeding commenced four months after the determination to be reviewed became final and binding upon the petitioner in accordance with CPLR 217(1), so that any such challenge was then time barred (Condemnation Decision *27–28, citing Matter of City of New York [Grand Lafayette Props], 6 NY3d 540, 547 [2006];Matter of Sanitation Garage Brooklyn Dists. 3 & 3A, 32 AD3d 1031, 1035 [2006];In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by the County of Tompkins, 237 A.D.2d 667, 668 [1997] ). In addressing this contention, the court also noted that in the Article 78 proceeding that was commenced to challenge the June 24, 2009 resolution passed by the MTA, Judge Stallman noted that “[t]he subject 2009 resolution approved modification of various business terms to essentially the same plan approved with FCRC on December 13, 2006, when the MTA Board authorized the MTA staff to negotiate and execute binding agreements with FCRC and adopted SEQRA findings” ' (Condemnation Decision *28, quoting Matter of Montgomery, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op 52539[U] *1).