In re Cotto

6 Citing cases

  1. In re Dejoy

    Case No. 11-10268 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011)   Cited 4 times

    11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iii). "What constitutes a 'special circumstance' is by no means well settled." In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008)).

  2. In re Linton

    23-20064 JJT (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2024)

    "What constitutes a 'special circumstance' is by no means well settled." In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).

  3. In re Addison

    580 B.R. 24 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)   Cited 2 times

    In re Kimbro , 389 B.R. 518, 527 (6th Cir. BAP 2008), rev'd and remanded , 409 Fed.Appx. 930 (6th Cir. 2011) ; In re Lopez , 574 B.R. 159, 164 (Bankr. E D. Cal. 2017) ; In re Rivers , 466 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) ("it is widely recognized that the Means Test provides a nondiscretionary formula for determining whether the Court should presume that the case is an abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7"); In re Cotto , 425 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (intent of Congress in creating means test "was to create a more objective standard for establishing a presumption of abuse and to reduce judicial discretion in the process"); In re DeJoy , No. 11-10268, 2011 WL 5827319, at *6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011) (the "means test is a bright line test").

  4. In re Harkins

    491 B.R. 518 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013)   Cited 18 times

    Yet courts have held that each of those must be included in the calculation of current monthly income. See In re Stanley, 438 B.R. 860, 863–64 (Bankr.D.S.C.2010) (requiring a lump-sum inheritance to be included in the calculation of current monthly income); In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2010) (“While Debtors argue for the exclusion of the Wage Settlement based on the fact that it is a one time only payment, § 101(10A) does not distinguish between income that is non-recurring and income that will be received on an ongoing basis.”). In short, although Congress chose median family income as calculated by the Census Bureau as the benchmark for determining who is above and below median income, it did so despite the fact that § 101(10A)'s definition of current monthly income is not perfectly symmetrical with the Census Bureau's definition of income.

  5. In re Persaud

    Case No. 12-43602-CEC (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2013)

    The Debtor's argument must be rejected, because the "special circumstances" exception cannot be used to circumvent the definition of CMI as set forth in § 101(10A). See In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010). Like the provision at issue in Cotto, the statutory language here is unambiguous, expressly including in CMI any income of a non-debtor spouse that is contributed "on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents," whether or not the non-debtor spouse chooses to make that income available to fund a Chapter 13 plan. See § 101(10A)(B).

  6. In re Persaud

    486 B.R. 251 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that the phrase "date of the first meeting of creditors" in § 704(b) is ambiguous because: "the § 341 meeting may be commenced on one date, and then adjourned to a later date"; and "[w]hen the time period is to be measured from the commencement of the § 341 meeting, the Code often refers to the 'first date set' for the meeting, or uses similarly unambiguous language."

    The Debtor's argument must be rejected, because the “special circumstances” exception cannot be used to circumvent the definition of CMI as set forth in § 101(10A). See In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2010). Like the provision at issue in Cotto, the statutory language here is unambiguous, expressly including in CMI any income of a non-debtor spouse that is contributed “on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents,” whether or not the non-debtor spouse chooses to make that income available to fund a Chapter 13 plan.