Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 15-0191
12-22-2015
IN RE CONNOR K.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa By Suzanne W. Sanchez Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Diane Meloche Counsel for Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JV597478
The Honorable Steven P. Lynch, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Diane Meloche
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined. JONES, Judge:
¶1 Connor K. timely appeals the juvenile court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender. After searching the entire record, Connor's defense counsel has identified no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. Connor was afforded an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, but elected not to do so. Therefore, in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), and Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-117258, 163 Ariz. 484 (App. 1989), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. Finding none, we affirm.
Connor turned eighteen the day after his notice of appeal was filed and prior to the filing of counsel's Anders brief, and this Court afforded him the opportunity to file a supplemental brief. Cf. Cochise Cnty. Juv. Delinquency Action No. DL88-00037, 164 Ariz. 417, 419-20 (App. 1990) (concluding a minor requesting a review of his criminal conviction for fundamental error is not entitled to review his counsel's brief or the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. See In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, 426, ¶ 7 (App. 2001) (citing In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, 2-3, ¶ 6 (2000)).
¶2 In April 2014, Connor pleaded delinquent to attempted molestation of a child. The juvenile court placed Connor on probation and deferred sex offender registration subject to compliance with the terms of his probation. Probation was to be served under the custody of Connor's father in Utah and required completion of sex offender treatment. A status review hearing was recommended by Connor's probation officer in May 2015 and held on June 3, 2015, seven days before Connor's eighteenth birthday.
¶3 At the hearing, the probation officer reported Connor failed a polygraph test and had not completed sex offender treatment. Both the Arizona probation officer and the State's attorney recommended Connor be required to register as a sex offender. Connor's counsel pointed out that neither the Utah probation officer nor Connor's treatment counselor recommended sex offender registration, and counsel requested the court to order Connor be released from probation without a sex offender registration requirement. The juvenile court released Connor from probation but found he was not compliant with the terms of his probation and ordered he register as a sex offender. Connor timely appealed the day before his eighteenth birthday.
DISCUSSION
¶4 We have searched the record for fundamental error and find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; JV-117258, 163 Ariz. at 488.
¶5 The juvenile court is statutorily authorized to order a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of sexual molestation of a child to register as a sex offender. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(A)(7), (D). The court has broad discretion to impose a sentence within those statutory limits. State v. Davis, 226 Ariz. 97, 102, ¶ 23 (App. 2010); see also In re Nickolas T., 223 Ariz. 403, 406, ¶ 10 (App. 2010) ("[T]he legislature has given the juvenile court the discretion in the first instance to determine whether a juvenile offender should be required to register as a sex offender."). The disposition here was legally permissible, supported by the evidence, and did not constitute fundamental error. Nor did the court err in deferring sex offender registration subject to Connor's compliance with the terms of his probation. See Nickolas T., 223 Ariz. at 406, ¶ 10 (noting the absence of any legislative language limiting a juvenile court's discretion to determine "later" whether the need for sex offender registration "persists under the circumstances of the individual case").
Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. --------
¶6 Additionally, so far as the record reveals, Connor was present at all critical stages of the proceedings, including the status review hearing. The juvenile court proceedings were conducted in full compliance with Connor's constitutional and statutory rights as well as the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.
CONCLUSION
¶7 We affirm the juvenile court's order. Connor's counsel's obligations in this appeal are at an end. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 583-85 (1984). Counsel need do no more than inform Connor of the status of the appeal and his future options unless counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See id. Connor has thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 107(A), (J).