Opinion
No. 351240
01-21-2021
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-001041-NA AFTER REMAND Before: REDFORD, P.J., and METER and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
This case returns to this Court after remand. This Court previously affirmed the trial court's decision to terminate respondent, Jonathan Capers' parental rights to JAC and affirmed the trial court's jurisdiction and statutory grounds decisions respecting two other children, JC1 and JC2, but remanded to the trial court to articulate on the record the grounds for its decision that termination of respondent's parental rights to JC1 and JC2 served the children's best interests. In re Condron, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals issued August 20, 2020 (Docket No. 351240).
On remand, the trial court conducted a limited evidentiary hearing at which it heard the testimonies of respondent, the children's mother, Kellie Condron, and Linda Haist, of Child Protective Services, who conducted the initial investigation and petitioned to terminate respondent's parental rights, and the parties' respective closing arguments. Respondent testified that he had a relationship and bond with JC1 and JC2. He affirmed that he had not seen the two boys since his incarceration following his plea to third-degree criminal sexual conduct against his daughter, JAC. Respondent asserted that he provided housing for his children and furnished the rental property at which the children lived. He testified that he loved JC1 and JC2 and desired to be their father.
Condron testified that she cared for JC1 and JC2 since respondent's incarceration and worked long hours seven days a week to provide for their care and custody. She testified further that neither JC1 nor JC2 asked about respondent nor expressed any interest in having a relationship with him.
Haist testified that she believed that termination of respondent's parental rights to JC1 and JC2 served the children's best interests because respondent sexually abused the boys' older sister, JAC, while the boys were in the home. She testified that she remained concerned regarding whether respondent would sexually abuse the boys. Haist asserted that Condron provided for the boys' needs and had the ability to do so but respondent could not do so because of his incarceration in prison for 5.5 years to 15 years. Haist also opined that respondent lacked fitness to parent the boys and provide them a good role model.
The trial court reviewed the entire record and articulated its analysis and decision regarding JC1's and JC2's best interests. The trial court stated that it considered respondent's parenting ability and that respondent had pleaded to sexually abusing one of his minor children, a sibling to JC1 and JC2. The trial court found that respondent lacked the ability to properly parent the children because respondent sexually abused one of his children. The trial court found that, under the circumstances, JC1's and JC2's safety and well-being could not be reasonably assured in the care or custody of respondent. The trial court stated that respondent's sexual abuse of his daughter did not persuade it that he would not abuse his sons. The trial court explained that respondent's lack of regard for his daughter's safety and well-being indicated his inability to properly parent the boys. The trial court found that JC1 and JC2 had a significant bond with each of them, but respondent's conduct toward JAC influenced the weight that the trial court could give respecting the bond. The trial court questioned what message would be sent to the children; whether they would be influenced to consider it appropriate to sexually abuse a minor and one's offspring. The trial court expressed concern that JC1 and JC2 would suffer mental harm if respondent remained their parent and concluded that concern outweighed the children's bond with respondent. The trial court found that JC1 and JC2 were similarly situated for best-interest analysis purposes despite their differences in age. The trial court declined to consider respondent's lengthy prison sentence because the information had not been available in the first instance of its best-interest analysis since he had been charged but not convicted at that time. The trial court ruled that JC1's and JC2's respective best interests would be served by terminating respondent's parental rights to them. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights to JC1 and JC2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination serves the best interests of the child before it may terminate parental rights. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review for clear error a trial court's best-interest decision. MCR 3.977(K); In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. Id. We give deference to the "trial court's factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). We also defer to the trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
ANALYSIS
When considering best interests, the trial court must focus on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich at 87. The trial court may consider several factors including the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), how long the child has lived in the present home, and the likelihood that the child "could be returned to [the] parent's home within the foreseeable future, if at all," In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). In In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), this Court summarized:
The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests. To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.]Further, a child's safety and well-being, including the risk of harm a child might face if returned to the parent's care, constitute factors relevant to a best-interest determination. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). A "child's placement with relatives weighs against termination. . . ." In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). Whether the "child is living with relatives when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether termination is in the child's best interests." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43.
In this case, the record reflects that the trial court considered relevant factors and the evidence in the record for its best-interest decision. A preponderance of the evidence in this case established that the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination of respondent's parental rights. The record reflects that, before respondent's incarceration, he had a bond with JC1 and JC2. Since his incarceration, however, evidence indicated that the bond had deteriorated between them to the point that the boys did not ask about respondent or desire a relationship with him. At most, this factor weighed neither in favor of preserving respondent's parental rights nor terminating them. The trial court found that although respondent had a bond with the boys, it did not outweigh other factors pertinent to the best-interest determination.
The trial court found that respondent lacked parenting ability because he demonstrated through his conduct toward JAC that he failed to regard her need for safety and well-being. The trial court concluded that respondent's historical behavior indicated that he lacked parenting ability. The record supports the trial court's analysis in this regard. Respondent sexually abused his own daughter in the house where the boys resided. Because of respondent's abuse of one of his children, the trial court could reasonably question his ability to parent his other children. Further, respondent's criminal sexual conduct against their sibling placed the boys at risk of harm and no evidence established that the boys faced no risk in the future. The trial court also correctly observed that respondent's behavior had a likelihood of negatively impacting the boys if respondent were able to retain parental rights to them after having sexually abused his daughter, the boys' sibling. The record reflects that respondent's conduct indicated that he lacked the ability to provide for the physical safety and mental well-being of JC1 and JC2.
Although the trial court did not address the children's placement, the record reflects that JC1 and JC2 resided with Condron who provides fully for their care and custody. She is employed and financially able to provide for them. The record indicates that she is reasonably capable of providing them the permanency and stability that they need.
The record also reflects that respondent was incarcerated as a result of his plea respecting commission of third-degree criminal sexual conduct against his minor daughter and faced a potentially long prison term before his release. In its discretion, the trial court declined to consider this as part of its best-interest determination because the information had not been before the court in the first instance of its best-interest analysis. The trial court did not err in this regard.
Considering all of the evidence in this case, a preponderance of the evidence established that the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination of respondent's parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by deciding that termination of respondent's parental rights served JC1's and JC2's respective best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien METER, J. did not participate, having retired from the Court of Appeals effective January 1, 2021.