A party may demonstrate that a transfer is actually fraudulent through direct evidence of fraudulent intent; alternatively, courts can "infer fraudulent intent from the circumstances surrounding the transfer." In re Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 178, 949 A.2d 102 (2008) (citing Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc. v. A.D.B. Investors, 926 F.2d 1248, 1254 (1st Cir. 1991) ). Because "debtors will rarely admit an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor, courts have long considered objective ‘badges of fraud’ in determining the existence of fraudulent intent." Id. "Badges of fraud are ‘circumstances so commonly associated with fraudulent transfers that their presence gives rise to an inference of intent.’ "

Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Harris , 131 So.3d 1137, 1146 (Miss. 2013) (quoting In re Coffey's Case , 157 N.H. 156, 949 A.2d 102, 115 (2008) ). F. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

See, e.g., In re Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 949 A.2d 102, 120 (2008); Gilchinsky v. Nat'l Westminster Bank N.J., 159 N.J. 463, 732 A.2d 482, 490 (1999). The presence of several badges of fraud, however, creates an inference of fraud that requires clear evidence of a legitimate purpose to rebut.

See, e.g., In re Coffey's Case, 949 A.2d 102, 120 (N.H. 2008); Gilchinsky v. Nat'l Westminster Bank N.J., 732 A.2d 482, 490 (N.J. 1999). The presence of several badges of fraud, however, creates an inference of fraud that requires clear evidence of a legitimate purpose to rebut.

In examining the extent to which the conduct was willful, we will examine “whether the judge acted in bad faith, good faith, intentionally, knowingly, or negligently.” In re Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 949 A.2d 102, 115 (2008) (quoting [C. Grey, American Judicature Society: A Study of State Judicial Discipline Sanctions 77–82 (2002) ] ). “[M]isconduct that is the result of deliberation is generally more serious than that of a spontaneous nature.” In re Coffey's Case, 949 A.2d at 115–16.

In examining the extent to which the conduct was willful, we will examine “whether the judge acted in bad faith, good faith, intentionally, knowingly, or negligently.” In re Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 949 A.2d 102, 115 (2008) (quoting AJS Study ). “[M]isconduct that is the result of deliberation is generally more serious than that of a spontaneous nature.” In re Coffey's Case, 949 A.2d at 115–16.

In applying this analysis to judges, we again recognize that "`judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the public trust.'" Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57, quoting Shaman, Lubet Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics (3d Ed. 2000) 2; see also In re Coffey's Case (N.H. 2008), 949 A.2d 102, 114. ("Because they assume a heightened station in our society, judges must maintain a standard of personal and professional conduct above that expected of attorneys"). A. Duties Violated and Injuries Caused

While the New Hampshire Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on the issue, it has suggested that creditors can reach property held by spouses as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Compare In re Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 177-79 (2008), with RSA 545-A:1, II, (c). Therefore, Mr. Sowa did maintain possession of the Farmhouse property following the conveyance to his wife.

"The power to discipline and control the actions of officers of the court . . . [is] absolutely necessary for [New Hampshire courts] to function effectively and to carry out [their] mandate to preserve the judicial system." Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 949 A.2d 102, 113 (2008) (citations and quotations omitted). Because the proper practice of law is "intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power," the New Hampshire Supreme Court has inherent power to regulate the legal profession.

See Kerwin v. Remittance Assistance Corp., 559 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1124 (D.Nev. 2008) ("Intent to annoy, abuse, or harass may be inferred from the frequency of phone calls [or] the substance of the phone calls. . . ."); Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 864, 873 (D.N.D. 1981) (finding that call by collection agency immediately following a prior call could establish harassment); cf. In re Coffey's Case, 157 N.H. 156, 178, 949 A.2d 102 (2008) (recognizing that intent may be proven through sufficient circumstantial evidence). Further, at least one court has rejected a defendant's argument that the frequency of calls may be excused where the defendant is collecting on several separate debts, finding that "such a distinction [is not] apparent from the plain language of . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5)."