Opinion
11-09-2017
In the Matter of the FORECLOSURE OF TAX LIENS BY PROCEEDING IN REM PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 11 OF the REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW BY the COUNTY OF ONTARIO. County of Ontario, Petitioner–Respondent; Lundquist 1996 Living Trust, Respondent–Appellant, and Five Star Bank, Respondent.
Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester (Thomas A. Fink of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant Lundquist 1996 Living Trust. Jason S. Diponzio, Rochester, for Petitioner–Respondent.
Davidson Fink LLP, Rochester (Thomas A. Fink of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant Lundquist 1996 Living Trust.
Jason S. Diponzio, Rochester, for Petitioner–Respondent.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:In this proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11, respondent Lundquist 1996 Living Trust (Trust) appeals from an order denying its motion pursuant to RPTL 1131 to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure. We conclude that Supreme Court erred in failing to recognize its inherent authority to vacate the default judgment " ‘for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice’ " ( Matter of County of Ontario [Middlebrook], 59 A.D.3d 1065, 1065, 872 N.Y.S.2d 805 [4th Dept.2009], quoting Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727, 790 N.E.2d 1156 [2003] ; see Matter of County of Genesee [Spicola], 125 A.D.3d 1477, 1477, 2 N.Y.S.3d 380 [4th Dept.2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 904, 2015 WL 2025750 [2015] ; Matter of County of Genesee [Butlak], 124 A.D.3d 1330, 1331, 1 N.Y.S.3d 666 [4th Dept.2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 904, 2015 WL 2025446 [2015] ).
Here, as in Middlebrook, 59 A.D.3d at 1065, 872 N.Y.S.2d 805, we further conclude that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the Trust's motion. The record establishes that an office manager transposed the due date for payment from January 13 to January 31 and that the Trust attempted to make payment on January 25, i.e., within the deadline communicated to it by its office manager. Moreover, the Trust established its "ability to pay the taxes after the redemption period had ended and the lack of any prejudice to petitioner" ( Butlak, 124 A.D.3d at 1331, 1 N.Y.S.3d 666 ; see Spicola, 125 A.D.3d at 1477, 2 N.Y.S.3d 380 ). Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that "the entry of a default judgment based on the failure to pay [the taxes] would result in a disproportionately harsh result" and that " ‘this is an appropriate case in which to exercise our broad equity power to vacate [the] default judgment’ " against the Trust ( Middlebrook, 59 A.D.3d at 1065, 872 N.Y.S.2d 805 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed in the exercise of discretion without costs, the motion is granted and the default judgment of foreclosure is vacated against respondent Lundquist 1996 Living Trust.