Opinion
04-23-00744-CV
01-31-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF C.M.P., L.R.S., B.J.S., J.K.R., and M.R., Children
From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022PA00058 Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PATRICIA O. ALVAREZ, JUSTICE
AFFIRMED
In this parental rights termination case, the trial court terminated Mom's parental rights to her children, C.M.P., L.R.S., B.J.S., J.K.R., and M.R.
We use aliases to protect the children's identity. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8.
Mom challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence for the trial court's findings on the best interests of the children.
Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings under the elevated evidentiary standards, we affirm the trial court's order.
Background
In this case, Mom is the only appellant, and we limit our recitation of the facts to those relating to Mom and the children.
This case began when C.M.P. reported to her teacher that her uncle, Mom's brother, had sexually abused her at home. C.M.P. was ten years old at the time of the incident. She also reported that her uncle tried to touch her sister and that C.M.P. punched him.
In her outcry, C.M.P. stated that Mom was not at home when the abuse occurred, but C.M.P. told Mom about the abuse when she returned home. C.M.P. reported that there was a video of the abuse that Mom had access to, as well. C.M.P. reported that Mom and the uncle fought, that she intervened and was hit in the eye, which caused bruising.
When C.M.P.'s siblings, B.J.S. and L.R.S., were asked about C.M.P.'s outcry, they corroborated their uncle's presence in the home, though they had been instructed to deny it. Mom stated that the uncle was not in the home, and she later testified that she had not seen him in years. The children were removed and placed in alternate housing.
The Department created a service plan for Mom, which required her to complete a psychological evaluation, a parenting class, and a domestic violence class. She was also required to give the Department access to her home for inspection, and she was required to participate in parent-child visits.
Mom participated in visits and completed her psychological evaluation, but she did not complete her other requirements. For example, Mom's psychological evaluation resulted in a recommendation to address her personal past trauma. Mom was already seeing a therapist when the case began, and the Department did not modify her therapy right away. But Mom signed no release for the Department to obtain reports or records from her therapist, so the Department had no information about Mom's progress in her therapy. Approximately seven months into the case, the Department referred Mom to a specific therapist to address her personal past trauma. At trial, Mom testified that she completed the sessions with the Department's therapist. The Department's therapist and the caseworker both testified that Mom simply stopped attending.
Regarding the parenting class requirement, Mom was participating in ongoing instruction with a life coach that she hoped would satisfy the service requirement. Her caseworker told her that she needed to complete a state-approved course and provide proof of completion. According to the caseworker's testimony, Mom failed to satisfy this requirement.
Finally, regarding the required domestic violence class, Mom's caseworker testified that Mom felt she did not need it because domestic violence was never an issue in her family. At trial, Mom testified that she completed a domestic violence class and provided proof of completion, but her caseworker testified that Mom provided no proof of completion.
In addition, Mom's caseworker was unable to determine whether Mom's housing was appropriate because Mom would not allow the caseworker inside. The caseworker testified that the last time Mom allowed her inside was nine months earlier. Since that time, the caseworker testified that she tried to visit Mom's home once per month. Mom testified that the caseworker only tried to visit her home once in that timeframe, that it was an unplanned visit, and that Mom was too busy to accommodate her caseworker's visit at that time.
Mom understood that, as the case went on, the Department shifted away from trying to reunify the family towards terminating Mom's parental rights. After that shift occurred, Mom maintained her desire to have her children returned home, but also expressed her desire to have the children remain with family if her rights were terminated.
Mom's cousin came forward as a relative willing to care for the children. She testified that she had raised her own children and was "in a position" to house and care for C.M.P., L.R.S., B.J.S., J.K.R., and M.R. But after an initial period of working with Mom's cousin, the Department grew reluctant to consider her as a viable permanent placement because she failed to become certified as a foster parent, she failed to keep C.M.P. on her medication when C.M.P. stayed with her, and because she spanked J.K.R. during a visit.
After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mom's course of conduct met the grounds in Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(O) and that terminating Mom's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The trial court terminated Mom's parental rights to C.M.P., L.R.S., B.J.S., J.K.R., and M.R., and it appointed the Department as managing conservator.
Mom appeals. She challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence on the best interests of the children. Before we address Mom's sole issue, we briefly recite the applicable evidentiary and appellate review standards.
Evidence Required, Standards of Review
"[I]n a bench trial, the judge as the trier of fact weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies." In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 691 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, pet. denied); accord In re F.M., 536 S.W.3d 843, 844 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
On review, an appellate court must not "substitute its own judgment for that of a reasonable factfinder." In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tex. 2020); accord In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). The evidentiary standardi the Department must meet and the statutory groundsii the trial court must find to terminate a parent's rights to a child are well known, as are the legaliii and factualiv sufficiency standards of review. We apply those standards here.
Best Interests of the Child
In her only issue, Mom argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that terminating her parental rights was in C.M.P., L.R.S., B.J.S., J.K.R., and M.R.'s best interests. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).
A. Unchallenged Statutory Grounds Findings
A single statutory ground finding, when accompanied by a best interest of the child finding, is sufficient to support a parental rights termination order. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 111 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
Here, the trial court found that Mom failed to comply with her court-ordered service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
Mom does not directly challenge the trial court's ruling under subsection (O), and we do not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (requiring appellate courts to review grounds (D) and (E) "[w]hen a parent has presented the issue for appeal"). Instead, Mom challenges and we address the trial court's best interest findings.
B. Best Interest of the Children Factors
The Family Code statutory factorsv and the Holley factorsvi for best interest of the child are well known. Applying each standard of review and the applicable statutory and common law factors, we examine the evidence pertaining to the best interests of the children.
The trial court heard the following testimony regarding the children's ages and vulnerabilities, Mom's course of conduct, and the children's placements.
1. The Children's Desires
At the time of trial, C.M.P., L.R.S., B.J.S., J.K.R., and M.R. were 12, 6, 5, 4, and 2 years old respectively. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1).
The caseworker testified that the children loved their mom and liked seeing her during visits but that they did not want to go back to living with her. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976) (factor (A)). According to the caseworker, C.M.P. stopped attending visits with Mom. The advocate testified that C.M.P.'s refusal to visit Mom was due in part to Mom not believing that the uncle sexually abused her. See id. (factors (A), (B), (C)); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (3), (12).
The caseworker also testified that most of the children did not want to live with Mom's cousin. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factor (A)). After they visited her, they complained that she hollered at them, that she spanked J.K.R., and that they felt she favored C.M.P. because she placed C.M.P. in charge of her younger siblings. See id. (factors (A), (B), (C)); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (12).
The caseworker stated that C.M.P. did express an interest in being placed with Mom's cousin and that she also expressed an interest in being placed with her previous foster home. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factor (A)). The caseworker testified that C.M.P. felt indecisive, but that she wanted to be able to stay in contact with Mom. See id.
Mom's cousin testified that C.M.P. expressed an interest in returning to live with Mom. See id. She also denied hollering at the children and stated that they expressed an interest in living with her. See id. (factors (A), (B), (C)); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (12). Mom's cousin testified that C.M.P. expressed an interest in living with her if she were not placed with Mom and that C.M.P. wanted to be placed with her siblings. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factor (A)).
The children's advocate corroborated the caseworker's testimony regarding C.M.P.'s interest in being placed with Mom's cousin. See id.
2. The Children's Present and Future Emotional and Physical Needs
The children all needed stable placements and permanency. See id. (factors (B), (C)); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1). L.R.S. and B.J.S. were placed with a foster family, and J.K.R. and M.R. were placed with another foster family. The caseworker testified that the foster families were bonded to each other and regularly visited each other's homes. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(13).
The caseworker testified that the children were bonded to their foster parents. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factor (B)). She stated that L.R.S.'s and B.J.S.'s foster placement was nurturing and structured and that the children were happy and calm around their foster parents. See id.
The children's advocate testified that J.K.R. and M.R. were doing well in their placement. See id. She stated that they seemed happy and bonded to their foster family. See id. J.K.R. was excited to show her around his foster home so that she could see the other children who lived there, the animals the family kept, and where he slept. See id. The advocate testified that M.R. was still too young to articulate her experience with the foster family, but she noticed that M.R. had become more amenable to redirection. See id.
Regarding Mom, the caseworker stated that the children were bonded to her, some more than others. She stated that L.R.S. and M.R. were bonded to Mom and that C.M.P., B.J.S., and J.K.R. sometimes had a bond with her. She also stated that, for B.J.S., it seemed less like he had a bond with Mom and more like he had a desire to receive gifts from Mom.
The caseworker, advocate, Mom, and her cousin all agreed that the children were bonded to each other and that it would be best for them to be placed together, though the Department was challenged on that eventuality because of other concerns and limitations with their potential placements. See id. (factors (B), (D), (G)).
For example, the caseworker described C.M.P. as "parentified," meaning that she had taken on the role of parent towards her siblings and even towards Mom, making sure that they had eaten and bathed, and she was inclined to take on disciplining her siblings. The caseworker was concerned that C.M.P. was not having an opportunity to be a child without taking on parental worries. See id. (factors (B), (C)). The caseworker testified that Mom was not concerned about C.M.P.'s "parentification" and considered C.M.P.'s parental behavior to be normal. See id. And, while the cousin denied putting C.M.P. in charge of her siblings, the siblings reported a family dynamic with Mom's cousin that continued to "parentify" C.M.P. See id.
3. Emotional and Physical Danger to the Child Now and in the Future
The caseworker and the therapist both expressed their concerns that Mom could not adequately protect her children because she could not fully acknowledge C.M.P.'s outcry or admit that the uncle had been in the home after her three children who were old enough to say that he was there reported that he was. See id. In addition, the caseworker testified that Mom had extensive history with the Department due to allegations of neglectful supervision. See id. (factors (B), (C), (D)). In general, the caseworker and the therapist did not believe that Mom exhibited an ability to help C.M.P. cope with the trauma of having been sexually abused. See id.
4. Parental Abilities of the Individuals Seeking Custody
The caseworker testified that Mom did not interact very much with the children during her visits to the point that the caseworker had to direct Mom not to bring tablets for the children to play on at each visit. See id. (factor (D)). The advocate corroborated this testimony and stated that Mom and C.M.P. bickered like sisters. See id. After Mom was directed not to bring the tablets, she interacted with the children more. However, the caseworker noted that the children exhibited anxiety around the visits and behaved rebelliously at those times. See id. (factors (B), (C)).
5. Programs Available to Assist These Individuals to Promote the Best Interest of the Children
Before C.M.P. went to stay with Mom's cousin, she had been taking her prescribed psychiatric medication consistently and making strides in therapy. See id. The caseworker testified that C.M.P. was prescribed trazodone to address symptoms of Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder and Depressive Mood Disorder. See id. The Department expected C.M.P. to continue attending therapy, but Mom's cousin did not take her, even though C.M.P. was covered by Medicaid. See id. (factors (B), (C), (D)). This omission caused the Department concern about placing C.M.P. with the cousin. See id. The Department was also concerned that the cousin did not keep C.M.P. on her psychiatric medication and noted that C.M.P.'s demeanor and affect seemed uncharacteristically flat at the time of trial. See id. The cousin testified that C.M.P.'s doctor was removing C.M.P. from the medication because C.M.P. wanted to play sports.
6. Plans for the Children by These Individuals or by the Agency Seeking Custody
The caseworker testified that the Department planned to seek adoption for the children. See id. (factor (F)). She stated that the Department would continue to try to work with Mom's cousin, at least for C.M.P.'s sake. See id. (factor (B)). She agreed that it was possible that the children could all be adopted by their current placements, i.e., in three different homes. See id. (factor (G)).
7. Stability of the Home or Proposed Placement
According to the caseworker, Mom was unemployed and unable to assist with her children's care while they were in other placements. See id. (factor (B)). Mom's cousin testified that she was "in a position" to take in five children, but she had not followed through with direction she received from the Department on getting a foster certification that would permit her to draw a stipend to help care for the children. See id. In this respect, the children's foster placements were the most stable options. See id. (factors (B), (G)).
C. Sufficient Evidence
Having reviewed the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude the trial court could have "reasonably form[ed] a firm belief or conviction" that it was in the children's best interests for Mom's parental rights to be terminated and for the Department to continue working on its permanency plans for them. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). Therefore, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best-interest-of-the-child findings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We overrule Mom's sole issue.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, we affirm the trial court's order.
i Clear and Convincing Evidence. If the Department moves to terminate a parent's rights to a child, the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's acts or omissions met one or more of the grounds for involuntary termination listed in section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code and terminating the parent's rights is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2002). The same evidence used to prove the parent's acts or omissions under section 161.001(b)(1) may be used in determining the best interest of the child under section 161.001(b)(2). In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002); In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b). The trial court may consider a parent's past deliberate conduct to infer future conduct in a similar situation. In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d at 472.
ii Statutory Grounds for Termination. The Family Code authorizes a court to terminate the parent-child relationship if, inter alia, it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's acts or omissions met certain criteria. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b). Here, the trial court found Mom's course of conduct met subsection (O):
(0) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.Id. § 161.001(b)(1).
iii Legal Sufficiency. When a clear and convincing evidence standard applies, a legal sufficiency review requires a court to "'look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.'" In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). If the court "'determines that [a] reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true,'" the evidence is legally sufficient. See id.
iv Factual Sufficiency. Under a clear and convincing standard, evidence is factually sufficient if "a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25; accord In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We must consider "whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; accord In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
v Statutory Factors for Best Interest of the Child. The Texas legislature codified certain factors courts are to use in determining the best interest of a child:
(1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;
(2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements;
(3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child;
(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department;
(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child's home;
(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child's home;
(7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home;
(8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home;
(9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified;
(10) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency's close supervision;
(11) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time;
(12) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child and other children under the family's care with:
(A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care;
(B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent with the child's physical and psychological development;
(C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child's safety;
(D) a safe physical home environment;
(E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even though the violence may not be directed at the child; and
(F) an understanding of the child's needs and capabilities; and
(13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b); see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018) (recognizing statutory factors).
vi Holley Factors. The Supreme Court of Texas identified the following factors to determine the best interest of a child in its landmark case Holley v. Adams:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (footnotes omitted); accord In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012) (reciting the Holley factors).